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 We have learnt a lot about the development and maturation of colour vision 
in infants, but know comparatively little about the development and structure of 
colour perception once trichromacy has been established. This thesis aims to 
characterize infant colour perception in the first year of life over several areas which 
have previously been well documented in adults; colour categorisation, colour 
preference, perception of illusions, and infant sensitivity to natural scene statistics.  
Paper 1 (Skelton, Catchpole, Abbott, Bosten, and Franklin, 2017) systematically 
mapped infant colour categories revealing that infant colour categories are related 
to the retinogeniculate pathways of colour vision. Paper 1 also illustrates and 
quantifies the correspondence between infant colour categories and 
commonalities found across the worlds’ colour lexicon. Paper 2 shows that infants 
look for longer at the colours which adults prefer, and provides evidence for an 
influence of low-level mechanisms on infant response to colour and adult 
preference. Paper 3 (under review) reopens the question perception of the 
Munker-White illusion in infants aged 4 to 8 months, through the replication of a 
previous study and the use of an alternative method, with discussion of the 
reasons for studying illusions in infancy. Finally, paper 4 provides the first 
substantive evidence that infants aged 4 months are sensitive to natural scene 
statistics, as evidenced though the presence of a blue-yellow discrimination bias 
commonly associated with the distribution of chromaticities found in natural 
scenes. Paper 4 also has critical implications for the use of psychophysical methods 
in infants and adults.  
The findings inform our understanding of infant colour perception and general 
perceptual processes by outlining some of the structure around which infants’ 
colour perception is built. The early structure of infants’ perception of colour is 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction & Thesis Overview 
 
The phenomenon of colour has extensively captured the interest of people 
from a wide range of disciplines. Philosophers have long used colour in thought 
experiments (see  Hume’s missing shade of blue (Morreall, 1982) or ‘Mary’s room’, 
(Jackson, 1986)) to debate concepts such as qualia . Anthropologists and linguists 
take interest in how the way we speak about colour has grown and evolved over 
time in response to our environment or culture (e.g. Hovers, Ilani, Bar-Yosef, & 
Vandermeersch, 2003; Lucy, 1997; Thavapalan, Stenger, & Snow, 2016). Artists 
manipulate colour to provoke specific feelings that would otherwise be difficult to 
capture (see Finlay, 2014 for a review), and architects use colour as more than just 
decoration, using it to shape our perception and response to physical space (e.g. 
Dalke et al., 2006). In the field of Psychology and Cognitive Science, colour’s ability 
to be tightly controlled and defined in terms of low level sensory inputs makes it 
the ideal stimulus for exploring a range of topics in perception and cognition. 
Colour has been used to study topics including attention, salience, visual aesthetics, 
and categorisation (Elliot, Fairchild, & Franklin, 2015). The investigation of colour 
can also help researchers understand more about the structure and constraints of 
the visual and neural system (e.g. Conway, 2009), and how experience may 
interact with these ‘built in’ processes to shape our perception of the world (e.g., 
Wachtler, Doi, Lee, & Sejnowski, 2007).  
The apparent dichotomy between colour as a shared physiological response and as 
a seemingly very personal perceptual experience makes it an ideal and fascinating 
tool for studying human perception, cognition and behaviour. Most people would 
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prefer to have colour vision than to not have it, but despite colour being a large and 
enjoyable part of our perceptual experience and the wealth of studies on adult 
colour perception, there are many elements of colour perception where there still 
remains lively debate. For example; there remain questions on the origins of colour 
categories, how colour perception is shaped by experience and what mechanisms 
underlie our experience of colour.  A developmental approach can provide critical 
insight into these exciting questions in the field of colour science. Over the first few 
months of life the infant visual system undergoes a large maturational change, 
whilst simultaneously undergoing changes in the quality and quantity of 
perceptual experience. As a result, the early months of life are an ideal place to 
investigate questions on both the commonalities in our perceptual experience as 
adults, and the underlying structure of our colour perception.  
This thesis presents an investigation of multiple aspects of colour perception and 
cognition in human infants. The goals of the thesis are to: (i) progress our 
understanding of human processing and experience of colour in both infants and 
adults; (ii) to further understanding of infant perception and cognition; and (iii) to 
address broader fundamental debates in the cognitive sciences. In order to fully 
understand the motivations of the studies of this thesis and how they are situated 
in a broader context, this Introduction and Overview section first reviews the 
relevant literature: it provides a brief introduction to the physiology of colour and 
colour models along with brief discussion of some areas of interest in the field of 
colour science. Following this, there is a discussion of the development of colour 
vision, and an overview of our current understanding of infant perception both in 
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colour and other domains.  
 
1.1. The physiological basis of colour 
 
 
Newton’s renowned prism experiments in 1672 (reported in Newton, 
1972) were one of the greatest advancements of our scientific understanding of 
colour, being the first to clearly define colour in terms of wavelengths which are 
fixed in a set order (the colour spectrum). Since then, there has been a great deal of 
research on the physiology of colour vision. We now know that humans have three 
independent receptor types which are sensitive to colour (a concept proposed by 
Young, (1802) and which is now known as ‘trichromacy’). These photo-pigments 
are known colloquially as ‘red’, ‘green’, and ‘blue’ cones due to the regions in the 
colour spectrum where their peak sensitivity lies, but each cone is sensitive to a 
specific range of wavelengths of light; short (S cones), medium (M cones), and long 
(L cones).  
The relative strength of the wavelengths detected are compared in order for the 
brain to ‘see’ visible light in a process known as cone-opponency. The origin of 
cone-opponent theory derives from Hering's (1874) observations that there are 
four unique chromatic experiences: blue, red, green, and yellow, and that there 
were patterns in the relationships of these unique sensations (e.g. blue-green is a 
real possible colour, but blue-yellow is not). Physiologically this is represented 
early in the visual system by three separate channels in the retinal ganglion cells, 
two which give us the ‘cardinal directions’ of colour (reddish-greenish and blueish-
yellowish) and the third for luminance (De Valois, Abramov, & Jacobs, 1966; 
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Derrington, Krauskopf, & Lennie, 1984; Krauskopf, Williams, & Heeley, 1982). Cone 
opponency reduces the amount of redundant information generated by overlap 
between the cones’ spectral sensitivities, and also reflects the properties of the 
spectral properties found in natural scenes (Lee, Wachtler, & Sejnowski, 2002). 
This suggests that some elements of the visual system may have developed over 
the course of evolution or in early life, as a result of interactions within our 
environment (see also Wachtler, Doi, Lee, & Sejnowski (2007) for discussion on the 
relationship between natural scenes and cone-specific statistical learning). 
 
1.2. Colour in the Cortex 
 
Rather than there being one central area in the cortex responsible for 
processing colour, colour perception appears to be distributed across a network or 
regions (Gegenfurtner, 2003, Solomon & Lennie, 2007). Earlier regions of the 
visual cortex predominantly process wavelength information, whilst later regions 
appear more specialised for shaping our final perception of colour. For example, 
cells in V1 respond to the wavelength of light being reflected from an object, while 
cells in V4 appear to discount the information about the illumination which is 
embedded in these wavelengths, responding instead to the surface colour of the 
object we are looking at (Shipp & Zeki, 1985; Wild, Butler, Carden, & Kulikowski, 
1985). This helps us to continue perceiving an object as being a constant colour 
despite changes in the reflected wavelength from the object as a result of changes 
in the illumination, a process known as colour constancy. Differences in cell 
selectivity alone cannot account for the entirety of colour constancy, and there 
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remains much to understand about its cortical mechanisms. For example, there is 
debate about the role and time course of statistical learning from natural scenes on 
the mechanisms of colour constancy at the cortical level (Cecchi, Rao, Xiao, & 
Kaplan, 2010; Pearce, Crichton, Mackiewicz, Finlayson, & Hurlbert, 2014).  
Single cell recordings in macaques have revealed ‘colour maps’ of hue selective 
regions stable across different levels of cortex (V1, Xiao, Casti, Xiao, & Kaplan, 
2007; V2, Wang, Xiao, & Felleman, 2007; and V4,  Tanigawa, Lu, & Row, 2010). 
Similar hue maps have not yet been reported in humans due to limitations in 
achieving the necessary resolution in order to do this, although given similarities 
in the processing of colour in humans and macaques it may be expected that 
similar hue maps would be found in humans. fMRI studies of humans have shown 
that populations of neurons in V1 and V2 of the visual cortex show a colour 
opponent response (Engel, Zhang, & Wandell, 1997). However, cells in the LGN 
tend to cluster around the cardinal directions of colour, whilst those in the cortex 
(V1, V2, V3 and V4) selectively respond to intermediate hues, as well as the 
opponent cardinal axes, (Gegenfurtner, 2003; Kuriki, Sun, Ueno, Tanaka, & Cheng, 
2015).  
Many cells which respond to colour also appear to respond to other aspects of 
object perception such as shape, or texture (Grill-Spector et al., 1998; Lennie, 
Krauskopf, & Sclar, 1990; Zeki & Marini, 1998), although in mid-regions specialised 
for more complex scenes there is evidence of separate processing channels for 
colour, shape, and texture (Cavina-Pratesi, Kentridge, Heywood, & Milner, 2010). A 
more recent study has attempted to parse these processes of where the in the 
cortex low level sensory input about wavelength becomes ‘bound’ to an object 
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surface, and suggests that these processes converge around V2 (Seymour, 
Williams, & Rich, 2016). This coincides with the presence of ‘glob’ and ‘interglob’ 
cells found in V2 (Conway, 2009) which respond predominantly to colour, 
although some are often also orientation selective. Globs have been shown to have 
luminance independent tuning to colour, and appear to be responsive to both hue 
and saturation dimensions of colour (Stoughton & Conway, 2008). Interglob cells 
in comparison do not respond independently to luminance (Conway, 2009), and 
are more likely to be orientation tuned than globs.  
There is some debate as to the extent that colour signals converge with the 
processing of other features of objects such as shape. There is, for example, 
evidence of an input of signals from the S-cones into non-colour selective regions 
such as the MT (a region of the brain which processes motion) but there are 
behavioural differences in the processing of shape and colour suggesting a 
dissociation between the two processes (Conway, 2014). Colour is used in object 
recognition, evidenced partly by the dominance of the ventral stream in the 
processing of colour (Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994). Currently it appears that 
anterior regions of the ventral visual processing system show an interaction 
between colour and shape processing (Simmons et al., 2007), whilst posterior 
regions are shown to process these features separately (Conway 2014). This 
highlights that there is a difference between colour processing from cells which are 
colour selective or those which are colour sensitive. Whilst some cells are able to 
represent the composition of a selective hue, other cells instead may be sensitive 
to the fact that there is a hue there regardless of what that hue is. This is thought to 
be beneficial for object processing, as cells found in object processing regions can 
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encode the presence of a hue boundary (Conway, 2009).  
 
1.3. Models of Colour  
  
 Early colour science is dominated by ‘simple’ linear representations of 
colour, (e.g. Aristotle represented colour as a ratio of the brightest to darkest 
components of the object being seen, Barnes, 2014). Robert Grosseteste in the 13th 
Century was one of the first to describe colour using a more complex continuous 
and combinatorial 3D space (Smithson et al., 2012), more similar to the 
chromaticity diagrams used today. Rigorous physiological and psychophysical 
testing means that we now have models of colour which allow for accurate 
rendering of stimuli across studies, as well as measured control of stimuli across 
colour dimensions (e.g. saturation, lightness). Colour models commonly are either 
tied to the physiology of colour vision alone, or are developed with the aim of 
being structured along perceptual dimensions of colour and of being perceptually 
uniform (figure 1.1). Here, a selection of colour models are discussed which are 
relevant to the current thesis. 
The MacLeod Boynton Chromaticity diagram (MacLeod & Boynton, 1979) is an 
example of a representation of colour tied to the physiology of colour vision. In the 
MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram, the Cartesian axes represent the early 
mechanisms of colour by giving the relative cone excitation of the L, M, and S cones 
in a single luminance plane relative to the central (origin) adaptation point. The 
horizontal axis allows for variation between L and M cones whilst keeping the 
input of S cones constant, and the vertical axis varies the response of the S cone. 
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The vertical axis is often referred to as indicating changes along the “blueish-
yellowish” direction, however, it is the negative diagonal (from upper left to lower 
right on figure 1.1a) which shows the location of the true “blue-yellow” axis. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Representations of different colour models, due to differences in display 
monitors and printers. Colours are representative only, and not necessarily 
colorimetrically accurate. a) The MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram, 
showing the ‘cardinal directions’ of blueish-yellowish and reddish-greenish 
as determined by the relative excitation of cones in early colour 
mechanisms, b) an example of two hues (5R and 10R) from Munsell colour 
system, designed to be perceptually uniform within the dimensions of hue, 
value (lightness), and chroma (‘colourfulness’, roughly equivalent to 
saturation). Note in particular that the maximum chroma possible is not 
equal across hues, and c) CIELAB (1976), shown in the figure is a single 
lightness level, the horizontal axis represents changes in red-green, and the 
vertical axis changes in blue-yellow.  
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Discrimination across the colour spectrum is not equal (see e.g. MacAdam, 1943): 
in some regions of colour space a larger difference is needed between a colour and 
a reference in order to be discriminated than in others. Several models of colour, 
such as the Munsell colour system (Cleland, 1921) and CIELAB (Commission 
internationale de l'éclairage ,1976), aim to present colours in perceptually uniform 
spaces. The Munsell colour system specifies colour along three dimensions; hue, 
value (lightness), and chroma (similar to saturation, or ‘colourfulness’), and aims 
to equate stimuli so that each step along each of these hue dimensions is 
perceptually equivalent. Munsell card is commonly used to present physical 
surfaces to participants, and aims to be representative of typical colours in natural 
scenes (providing it is viewed under a standard illuminant C). CIELAB in 
comparison is designed to be a perceptually uniform representation of the cone-
opponent mechanisms, varying in luminance (L*), red-green (a*), and blue-yellow 
(b*). All colours in CIELAB are defined relative to a white point, and so knowing 
the white point of a stimulus set (usually defined as the background colour on 
which stimuli are presented) is necessary in order to reproduce those colours with 
accuracy.  
 
1.4. Colour: Perception, Cognition and Behaviour 
 
 Colour affects our perception, cognition and behaviour in many ways. In a 
typical day our interactions with colour may involve: using colour information to 
help us to visually search for objects, to communicate effectively and efficiently 
about objects, our surroundings, or even our emotions (consider colloquial 
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phrases such as ‘seeing red’, ‘green with envy’). We also use colour information 
when making judgements about an object both practically (as in judging the 
ripeness of some fruit) and aesthetically. Here we discuss a brief selection of the 
topics which investigate colour perception and cognition.  
One topic that has received a lot of attention is that of colour naming. Whilst 
humans have the ability to discriminate millions of colours (Kaiser & Boynton, 
1996), the colour continuum is grouped by colour terms into discrete categories 
such as red, green, blue etc. Broadly speaking, categorisation is a domain general 
process which allows for more efficient processing of our sensory experience. A 
further advantage of categorisation of colour is that it allows us to communicate 
more effectively about the colours and objects in our environment (Gibson et al, 
2017). The number of colour categories in adult colour lexicons varies across 
languages (Kay, Berlin, Maffi, Merrifield, & Cook, 2009), but commonalities across 
languages indicate that this variation is not solely culturally defined (Jraissati & 
Douven, 2017; Kay & Regier, 2003; Regier, Kay, & Khetarpal, 2007). Further 
evidence for processes prior to cultural influence is the well documented 
phenomena of pre-linguistic infant colour categories (see for example, Bornstein, 
Kessen, & Weiskopf, 1976; Franklin & Davies, 2004; Yang, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi, & 
Kuriki, 2016).  
There is much debate on whether how we speak about colour influences our 
perception of it (Regier & Kay, 2009). It has been argued that pairs of colours are 
easier to distinguish on certain tasks if they are from different lexical categories 
than if they are both from the same category (Daoutis, Pilling, & Davies, 2006; Kay 
& Kempton, 1984; Drivonikou et al., 2007, although see Wright, Davies, & Franklin, 
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2015 for discussion on the reliability of these effects). There remains debate 
around to what extent these categorical colour effects are due to early sensory 
processes or perceptual warping, or due to the effect that colour terms have on 
attentional, top-down or post-perceptual processes (Clifford, Holmes, Davies, & 
Franklin, 2010; He, Witzel, Forder, Clifford, & Franklin, 2014). 
Another topic that has received much attention is that of the role of colour in visual 
search. Visual search tasks have revealed colour to be a particularly salient feature 
in our perception (Turatto & Galfano, 2000). When scanning a scene, attentional 
processing is often drawn to colour. This can happen via two mechanisms, widely 
defined as being either ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’. Top-down mechanisms can 
include broad relational judgements of the stimulus (‘bluer’, ‘redder’), as well as 
more focused feature processing, where all stimuli which provide a feature match 
to the target stimulus receive a ‘signal boost’ and attract further processing 
(Schönhammer, Becker, & Kerzel, 2017). Colour can also capture attention even 
when colour features are task-irrelevant by utilising bottom-up mechanisms 
responsive to salience and contrast (Hickey, Mcdonald, & Theeuwes, 2006; 
Theeuwes, Reimann, & Mortier, 2006). Psychophysical evidence shows that stimuli 
which capture our visual attention via these low-level bottom-up mechanisms do 
not necessarily always result in visual awareness. In one eye-tracking task where 
participants had to report the colour targets which they fixated, participants often 
fixated coloured targets which they do not report as having seen,  showing the 
disconnect between visual attention and visual awareness (Etchebehere, 
Fedorovskaya, 2017; Lamme, 2003).  
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The top-down and bottom-up mechanisms of attention to colour, although 
separate, are not entirely independent. Predictive models of salience and colour 
show that the salience of colour can vary according to the scene being viewed 
(Frey, Honey, & Konig, 2008). Reds and greens appear particularly salient when 
viewing a rainforest scene, in comparison to all colours in fractal pattern being 
equally salient. This highlights an interaction between top-down and bottom-up 
mechanisms during colour perception, as low level sensory processes alone are 
shown not to be solely responsible for looking behaviour in adults. Other studies 
have also shown that higher level perceptual processes can modulate colour 
perception. For example, participants’ memory of an object’s colour will influence 
their perception of an achromatic version of that object. When asked to adjust an 
image of fruit until achromatic participants will often ‘over shoot’ the greyscale 
point, in order to counteract their perception of the fruit still being coloured.  A 
greyscale image of a banana will still appear slightly yellow to participants, and so 
the hue will be adjusted to appear more blue-ish to reach a point they perceive it 
as being achromatic  (Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, & Gegenfurtner, 2006) 
A third topic in the investigation of colour perception and cognition is the 
investigation of  the potentially more ‘personal’ behavioural responses to colour 
such as colour preference, colour emotion associations, and cross modal responses 
to colour. Studies of colour preference and colour associations can tell us a great 
deal about how information across the senses is integrated and associated as 
seemingly unrelated sensations become bound together in a non-trivial manner. 
Much research has pointed out the similarities in colour preferences across 
participants despite people feeling that their preference for colour is an 
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idiosyncratic phenomenon (Hurlbert & Ling, 2007; Palmer, Schloss, & Sammartino, 
2011). There are several theories about the origins of these preferences, many 
relating to affective experience with objects in the environment over the course of 
a life span or evolution (Humphrey, 1976; Palmer & Schloss, 2010), and others 
suggesting an influence of biological mechanisms on colour preference (Hurlbert & 
Ling, 2007).  
There have also been studies which report an association between colour and 
emotion. Highly saturated yellows and oranges are more commonly associated 
with happiness than desaturated blues and greys, which are usually associated 
with sadness (Palmer, Schloss, Xu, & Prado-león, 2013). There is a suggestion that 
these emotions could also mediate other cross-modal correspondences such as 
those found between music-colour (Palmer et al., 2013), and smell-colour 
associations (Schifferstein & Tanudjaja, 2004; Dematte, Sanabria, & Spence, 2006), 
with ‘nice’ smells and up tempo music being associated with colours commonly 
associated with happiness. However, there remains debate as to what the exact 
mechanisms behind these emotionally mediated correspondences would be, with 
some suggesting that these become linked only once there is a semantic 
relationship between the two sensory processes (‘semantic mediation’). There are 
other forms of cross-modal associations with colour which do not relate to a 
mediating factor of emotion, such as between colour and touch (Ludwig & Simner, 
2013). This has led to suggestions either that there may be commonalities inherent 
in the processing of the separate stimuli themselves, such as a similar firing 
pattern in the early sensory processing of stimuli, or that co-occurrence in early 
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perceptual experience may lead to the re-enforcement of neuronal pathways 
which persist across the life span (Spence, 2011; Spence & Deroy, 2013). 
Many who use colour in a creative context manipulate their use of colour to 
communicate a particular meaning or emotion (see Finlay, 2014 for a review of the 
historical use of colour in art) often with the aim of creating something 
aesthetically pleasing. Experimentally it’s been shown that viewers’ prefer the 
colours used in art to differ from the distribution of chromaticities commonly 
found in natural scenes. When asked to adjust the colours in unfamiliar paintings 
(both abstract and figurative) to what they think is subjectively the most attractive, 
participants choose colours close to the original composition of the painting. The 
original composition of these images is also the point where the colours in the 
image share differ from the distribution of chromaticities found in natural scenes 
(Nascimento et al., 2017). Although we may not consciously be aware of the 
distribution of chromaticities in natural scenes, we do appear to have a sensitivity 
for them demonstrating how our experience (evolutionarily, or over the course of 
a life-time) may influence our aesthetic appreciation and response to stimuli in the 
environment.  
 
1.5. Interim summary and outstanding questions on colour perception 
 
This brief summary of some of the topics in colour science demonstrates 
the complex and diverse range of questions and debates of the field. Many of these 
colour phenomena are embedded in our daily experience to the extent that we 
often take them for granted. Broadly, studies of colour fall into two central but 
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intertwined questions, firstly, what are the physiological mechanisms behind our 
processing of wavelengths, and secondly, what processes determine our actual 
perception of colour? This thesis is primarily concerned with the second question, 
and focuses specifically on colour perception at its roots, in early infancy.  
Adult studies alone cannot explain transitions in development or how the maturing 
visual system interacts with the role of perceptual experience. As such, studies of 
infant colour perception are valuable to help researchers understand how the 
world appears to the developing infant, as well as the origins of adult colour 
perception. Understanding the mechanisms of colour perception in infancy can 
also further our understanding of perceptual learning more broadly both in 
infancy and across the developmental life span (Yermolayeva & Rakison, 2014). 
Several central questions and studies in colour science have highlighted that 
experience can shape our colour perception, and whilst infants are not completely 
inexperienced in the world, they are by no means adult-like in the quality and 
quantity of their experience. Additionally, commonalities found in our perception 
of colour across individuals point towards underlying mechanisms which may be 
built upon across development. Studying infant colour perception provides an 
opportunity to examine both the underlying mechanisms of our visual perception, 
and how these may be modulated by experience and culture.   
 
1.6.  Infant Colour Vision 
 
 
As the visual system matures in the first few years it undergoes many 
anatomical changes. At one week post-natal infants’ cones have become more 
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elongated than they were prenatally.  The density of the cones in the fovea increase 
rapidly postnatally, with cells also migrating from the central fovea to the 
periphery (Hendrickson, 1994; Yuodelis & Hendrickson, 1986). Foveal density and 
elongation of the cones continues to happen across the first five years of life, whilst 
the cell migration and subsequent formation of the foveal pit completes at 15 
months old (Barbur & Rodriguez-carmona, 2014; Yuodelis & Hendrickson, 1986). 
Colour vision in very early infancy appears to be mediated through sub-cortical 
pathways  (Atkinson, 1984; Nardini, 2017).  Whilst it has been shown that the 
magnocellular pathway (primarily responsible for processing luminance and 
motion) is functional at birth, the parvocellular pathway (usually implicated in the 
processing of colour) is not  (Hammarrenger et al., 2003). The magnocellular 
pathway also develops much faster than the parvocellular pathway, suggesting a 
dissociation between these two pathways in early infancy. At 4-months however, 
infant contrast sensitivity functions (used as a measure of underlying parvo and 
magno-pathway function in adults) show a similar pattern to those found in adults 
(Dobkins, Anderson, & Lia, 1999). Although development of the parvocellular 
pathway is slower than magnocellular development, there is still a significant 
amount of development within the first few post-natal months. Colour vision 
matures alongside the improvement of more general cortical information 
processing (Grieve, Emerson, Fifer, Isler, & Stark, 2003; Nardini, 2017), which 
includes a peak in synaptogenesis in the primary visual cortex at about 4-months-
old (Huttenlocher, 1990). There is evidence from children that higher order 
association cortical processes only mature after the maturation of lower-level 
somatosensory and the visual cortices (Gogtay et al., 2004). 
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 Although possessing a less mature visual system than adults, infants do have 
some, albeit limited colour vision at birth, and even new-born infants’ pattern of 
response to coloured stimuli is measurable and predictable. Studies of new-born 
infants demonstrate that they will look preferentially at a chromatic stimulus, 
rather than an achromatic stimulus, when that chromatic stimulus is of a long 
wavelength (red, green) and the stimulus is large (Adams, 1989; Adams & Courage, 
1995; Teller, Peeples, & Sekel, 1978). Infants respond equivalently to achromatic 
and short wavelength (blue) chromatic stimuli at birth, and first show evidence of 
discrimination of short wavelengths around two months of age (Brown & Teller, 
1989; Zemach & Teller, 2007). 
 Infant chromatic discrimination thresholds are larger than those of children and 
adults (Knoblauch, Vital-Durand, & Barbur, 2001; Zemach & Teller, 2007). 
However, the improvement of discrimination thresholds along the protan (L cone), 
deutan (M cone), and tritan (S cone) dimensions of colour vision is very rapid, 
decreasing by a factor of 2 with each doubling of age as measured from 4 months 
old (Knoblauch et al., 2001). Thresholds along the protan, deutan, and tritan axes 
show a similar pattern of improvement, although improvements along the tritan 
axis are slightly slower, and tritan discrimination thresholds remain larger across 
the lifespan. Although discrimination thresholds may be larger, the ratio of 
discrimination thresholds along of the protan, deutan, and tritan axes are similar in 
infancy to those found in adolescents and adults. 
Although the component parts of colour vison may be operational in infancy, this 
alone does not guarantee infants are trichromatic in the same way as adults. 
However, many studies have confirmed that young infants (aged 2 months) are 
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able to make discriminations which adult dichromats cannot (e.g. Bornstein, 1976; 
Suttle, Banks, & Graf, 2002). In order to confirm if infants were trichromats, Brown 
& Teller (1989) measured the spectral sensitivity of 2-month-old infants and found 
that infants showed a dip in sensitivity around 570nm which is also found in adult 
trichromats. This point, commonly referred to as a ‘Sloan notch’, is the result of the 
structure of the cone opponent mechanisms underlying human trichromacy 
(Thornton & Pugh, 1983).  
 
1.7.  Beyond trichromacy in infants: How is infant colour perception organised? 
 
 
It has been established that infants possess trichromatic vision which 
operates in a similar way to that of adults, although with certain limitations such as 
the need for larger colorimetric differences and a reduced ability to discriminate at 
lower saturations. Another question, now it has been firmly established that 
infants are trichromatic, is what infants actually do with this trichromatic colour 
vision – in other words, how do they perceive colour? This question as to how 
infants make use of their trichromacy, and how their perception is organized is the 
central question of this thesis. Preliminary studies of colour perception in infants 
have proved promising, with researchers able to gain an insight into both infant 
colour perception and infant perception more broadly. The following section will 
discuss the current literature on infant colour perception and will identify and 
limitations, unresolved issues and outstanding questions.  
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1.7.1. Infants’ perception of the colour of objects and surfaces 
 
 
 There is ongoing debate about when infants understand colour as a 
constant property of an object which can be used for object identification (Wilcox, 
Hirshkowitz, Hawkins, & Boas, 2014).  Infants 6-months-old look preferentially at 
items which are correctly coloured (e.g. red strawberries rather than blue 
strawberries) whilst infants 5-months-old do not, demonstrating an understanding 
of what the ‘right’ colour of certain objects should be may emerge between 5- and 
6- months (Kimura et al., 2010). However, it is not until around 11-months-old that 
infants begin to use colour information to spontaneously individuate objects 
(Wilcox, Woods, Chapa, & McCurry, 2007). Younger infants (7.5-months) can be 
primed to use colour to individuate objects if there is a functional value to the 
colour information (e.g. the red jug does something which the otherwise identical 
green jug does not (Wilcox & Chapa, 2004)).  
The spontaneous use of colour as a diagnostic feature of an object appears to come 
online quite late. One reason for this may be related to infants’ development of 
perceptual constancies such as colour constancy. If a feature of an object is not 
perceived as relaying helpful information to infants due to being inconsistent, or 
not conveying information about the role of the object, then infants will not attend 
to that feature spontaneously (Woods & Wilcox, 2006). 
Not a great deal is known about the development of colour constancy in humans. 
Dannemiller & Hanko (1987) tested colour constancy in 4-month-old infants. 
Infants were first familiarised to a coloured stimulus under one illumination, 
before being shown the familiar and novel chromaticity under one of two 
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illuminants, one which caused a large shift in reflectance (considered by the 
authors a ‘true’ test of colour constancy) and a second which caused a smaller shift 
in constancy (colour ‘generalisation’, or a weak test of colour constancy). If infants 
did not have adult like colour-constancy then under the new illuminant both the 
familiar and novel colour would appear novel, since the infants would only be 
using the reflectance of the stimuli, and not discounting the illuminant information, 
as adults would. This would result in infants looking equally at both the novel and 
familiar stimuli at test. In this study infants were shown to operate an immature 
version of colour constancy, functional only under the ‘weak’ test of colour 
constancy. Contrary to this, a second study using a similar method to Dannemiller 
and Hanko’s (1987) study, appeared to show infants aged 20-weeks-old possessing 
a more mature form of colour constancy (Dannemiller, 1989). In this study, rather 
than using physical stimuli and illuminant, reflectances were simulated on a 
coloured monitor under two different illuminant conditions. The author argues 
that the improved ability seen by 4-month-old infants in this second study is due to 
the two illuminant conditions being models of daylight illumination, optimising the 
likelihood of infants showing colour constancy as colour constancy is argued to be 
optimised for illuminants along the daylight axis (Worthey, 1985).  A final study 
(Yang, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi, & Kuriki, 2013) also demonstrated that 4.5-month-
old infants are colour constant again using a habituation method with stimuli 
rendered under different illuminations on a CRT monitor. One interesting 
consideration is that 2D stimuli displayed on a CRT monitor may not provoke the 
same colour constancy mechanisms as real physical objects illuminated by real 
illuminants.  
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Some studies have used more realistic rendering of objects to investigate 
differences in the perception of surface properties in infants. Two studies which 
have used this more realistic rendering of objects have investigated infants’ ability 
to discriminate between properties of surfaces. The first suggests that infants from 
7 months old discriminate between a metallic yellow (gold) and yellow, but not 
metallic green and a matt green (Yang, Kanazawa, & Yamaguchi, 2013). This age 
also appears to be the point when infants can discriminate more generally 
between glossy and matte objects (Yang, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi, & Motoyoshi, 
2015), and so it appears that from 7 months of age is the point where infants are 
potentially more attentive to the interaction between colour and surface 
properties of objects. However, as is well understood, a note of caution is needed. 
The study of object and surface perception and its interaction with colour in 
infancy is made particularly complicated by the developmental sciences’ reliance 
on infant looking responses which need to be interpreted carefully. There are 
many factors which can drive infant looking, such as salience, preference, and 
contrast, and that stimuli can be preferred for both novelty and familiarity 
(Houston-Price & Nakai, 2004). 
 
1.7.2. Infant Colour Preference 
 
 
  Infant colour ‘preference’ is of interest for two main reasons, firstly it can 
provide insights into the origins and development of adult aesthetic preference 
(both in general and for colour), and secondly, it can broaden our understanding of 
what influences infant looking behaviour. On the topic of aesthetics, infants do 
often look for longer at visual stimuli which adults find more aesthetically pleasing 
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(Damon, Mottier, Méary, & Pascalis, 2017; Quinn, Kelly, Lee, Pascalis, & Slater, 
2008). Although there are commonalities in the patterns of behaviours of adults 
and infants, it is intuitive that there is likely a distinction to be made between an 
affective aesthetic preference and infant looking times. There is a wide range of 
both bottom-up and top-down factors additional to aesthetic preference which 
may work together to influence looking (e.g. salience, novelty, and complexity). 
Nevertheless, commonalities between infant and adult colour preference may 
indicate a biological origin of adult aesthetics, or the presence of ‘perceptual 
primitives’ which guide perception early on (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999). 
Many of the studies which make up the foundation of our understanding of infant 
colour vision and colour perception are centred on the discovery that infant 
looking behaviour to colour is a reliable measure. Bornstein (1975) presented 
pairs of monochromatic lights to 4-month-old infants and found infants looked for 
longer at the colours which adults had rated as more pleasant, and suggested a 
sensory mechanism behind this recorded response to colour. However, 
monochromatic lights are not representative of the stimuli found in the natural 
world, leading some to question the validity of the results.  Subsequent studies of 
infant colour preference have used either physical stimuli or rendered colours 
which are more representative of chromaticities commonly found in the world. 
Several studies have reported that infant looking behaviour does not always align 
with adult preference (Peltola, Leppanen, Palokangas, & Hietanen, 2007), 
suggesting that adult aesthetic preference to colour is not the result of low-level 
sensory mechanisms, but instead is formed as a result of experience (see Schloss, 
Poggesi, & Palmer, 2011 for an example of adaptive preferences in adulthood). 
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However, few studies have actually directly compared infant looking and adult 
preference with the same set of stimuli, making it difficult to rule out completely 
an early biological mechanism in either infant or adult preference. Similarly, as our 
understanding of chromatic thresholds in infancy has grown, it has become more 
apparent that the same colour shown to adults may not be easily discriminable to 
infants, particularly at lower saturations where infant colour vision is most limited 
(Zemach & Teller, 2007). As a result, despite several studies comparing infant 
looking to adult preference, it is unclear how similar or dissimilar the two 
measures are, leaving questions about the development and origins of aesthetic 
preference unanswered.  
 
1.7.3.  Infant Colour Categorisation 
 
 
There is converging evidence that infants categorise colour (see Franklin, 
2015 for a review). Many studies of infant colour categorisation have used a 
novelty preference method where infants are first familiarised with one colour, 
before seeing that colour paired with a novel colour at test. Equivalent looking to 
both novel and familiar at test shows that the colours are not distinguished in 
infants’ recognition memory. This method has reliably shown that infants’ 
categorise blue, green, purple: that is, for example, that their recognition memory 
treats different blues as if they are equivalent despite chromatic differences being 
large enough for infants to discriminate (Bornstein et al., 1976; Catherwood, 
Crassini, & Freiberg, 1987; Clifford, Franklin, Davies, & Holmes, 2009; Franklin & 
Davies, 2004)  
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Another task used to investigate categorical colour effects in infancy is a target 
detection task where a coloured target is shown on a coloured background 
(Franklin, Piling, & Davies, 2005).  Studies using this task have revealed that in 4- 
to 6-month-old infants, categorical processing of colour is lateralised to the right 
hemisphere (Franklin et al., 2008). For example, infants are faster at locating a 
chromatic target on a chromatic background when the colour pairs are from 
different categories than when they are from the same category, but only when 
presented in the left visual field (right hemisphere). This lateralisation switches to 
the left with the acquisition of colour terms in toddlers, the same lateralisation 
which is found in adult categorical perception of colour (Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & 
Ivry, 2006).  
Electrophysiological methods have also provided further support for infant colour 
categories. ERP responses on a visual oddball task in 7 month old infants show a 
greater response when the deviant/oddball colour is from a different category to 
the standard colour than when the oddball is from the same category, even when 
same and different-category colours are equally discriminable (Clifford, Franklin, 
Davies, & Holmes, 2009). This pattern of categorical responding has previously 
(and since) also been found in other domains, such as phoneme categorisation 
(Dehaene-Lambertz & Baillet, 1998), and faces (Altvater-Mackensen, Jessen, & 
Grossmann, 2017), confirming that this response is domain-general, and not only a 
response to colour. fNIRs, a measure of blood flow to the brain similar to the BOLD 
response found in fMRI studies, has also been used to measure categorical 
responses of the infant brain to colour (Yang et al., 2016). Infants aged 5 to 7 
months viewed geometric patterns which either alternated between two same 
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colour categories or two different colour categories, and a higher hemodynamic 
response was measured in the visual cortex when the pattern alternated between 
different rather than same category colours.  
Despite the wealth and diversity of evidence for infant colour categories, 
substantial gaps remain. The number of infant colour categories has not been 
identified and it is not clear how infants actually form these categories or what (if 
any) relationship there is between infant categorisation of colour and language. 
One early study suggested a biological component underpins infant colour 
categories (Bornstein, 1975), but empirical evidence for this has never been 
provided. There are commonalities across languages in the division of colour space 
(Kay & Regier, 2003; Regier & Kay, 2009), and there is also evidence that some 
infant categories may align with those of adults . The similarities between adult 
colour lexicons and infant colour categories have not been fully documented or 
quantified. Further investigation of infant colour categories could provide a deeper 
understanding of why unrelated languages share similar structures in their colour 
lexicons. As well as giving insight into adult perception, further investigation of 
infant colour categorisation could also inform our understanding of the 
development and process of categorisation in infancy more generally. The process 
of colour categorisation in infancy has been likened to the development of biases in 
infancy such as the other-race-effect, as both may show a shift from perceptually 
biased responding, to incorporating socio-cognitive knowledge of the environment 
(Timeo, Farroni, & Maass, 2016). 
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1.7.4. Infant Perception of Colour Illusions 
 
 Adults’ ability to perceive visual illusions are the result of physiological 
constraints of the visual system (e.g. negative afterimages) and/or also a 
computation of what is ‘most likely’ given prior experience (Corney & Lotto, 2007; 
Witzel, Racey, & O’Regan, 2017). As a result, understanding infants’ ability to 
perceive illusions allows us to understand when infants begin to form these best 
representations of what is likely to occur in their environment. There are several 
studies which have looked at infant perception of colour illusions. The neon colour 
spreading illusion is an illusion where the colour of a figure spreads outside its 
boundaries, forming a ‘glowing’ transparent surface around the figure (figure 
1.2a). Infants older than 5 months look preferentially at a single coloured stimulus 
which produces this neon colour spreading effect over a multicolour control 
stimulus which does not produce a neon colour effect. Infants between 3 and 5 
months do also preferentially look at the neon colour spreading target, but only 
under certain conditions, suggesting that the mechanism for the perception of this 
illusion is still maturing between 3 and 5 months of age, but is not entirely absent 
(Yang, Kanazawa, & Yamaguchi, 2009). 
The Munker-White illusion is an illusion where the same physical colour can 
appear very different dependent on the surroundings of that colour (figure 1.2b). 
There is some suggestion that perception of the illusion is the result of experiential 
factors, either those which are thought to arise naturally with maturation (such as 
scene segmentation), or as a result of experience with our environment (Linnell, 
Bremner, Caparos, Davidoff, & de Fockert, 2018), although currently there is not 
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one model which can account for the shift in perception found. There appears to be 
evidence that infants older than 4-months perceive the Munker-White illusion in 
an equivalent way to adults (Yang, Kanazawa, & Yamaguchi, 2010), as revealed 
through a preferential looking paradigm. Infants were shown a pair of stimuli 
where the arrangement of colours results in either a perceived large increase in 
saturation of some components of the stimulus, or a version which does not result 
in an increase in saturation. Infants looked preferentially at the version which 
appears to have higher saturation. Interestingly, the actual perceived shift in 
saturation appears to be quite small, and is possibly smaller than infants’ 
saturation discrimination thresholds, potentially casting doubt on the conclusions 
of the study.    
 
 
Figure 1.2. a) Neon Colour Spreading. The inner portion of the image is white, but 
appears to be slightly bluer than the surroundings. b) The Munker-White 
Illusion. Both shades of blue are physically identical, but our perception of 
them differs dependent on their surrounds.  
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The study of visual illusions in infancy is complicated. Ideally, studies would be 
designed such that there would be clear patterns of behaviour predicted which can 
only be the result of an in/ability to perceive the illusions in infancy (as used in 
Pereverzeva & Teller, 2009). Past studies instead have often used preferential 
looking paradigms, predicting that preferential looking in either direction (either 
towards an illusory target, or at its non-illusory control) is evidence of an infant’s 
ability to perceive the illusions. Preferential looking clearly demonstrates an 
infant’s ability to discriminate between two stimuli. However, without an effective 
control however it is difficult to isolate if this preferential looking is actually the 
result of the illusion or just an ability to detect that there are some differences 
between two stimuli.  
 
1.7.5. Infant Colour Perception: Summary  
 
 
The preceding sections have identified that much has already been learnt 
about infant colour perception: for example, the age at which infants use colour 
information in object processing, that they can categorise colour, and potentially 
that they experience chromatic visual illusions.  However, limitations in the study 
of infant colour perception have come to light with our increasingly fine-tuned 
understanding of the development of infant colour vision. For example, infants’ 
ability to discriminate colour is poorer at lower saturations than adults, and infant 
chromatic discrimination thresholds are also poorer than adults, both of which 
need to be taken into account when designing experiments on infant colour 
perception. Other limitations are also found in the methodological controls and 
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paradigms often used in infant colour perception studies. In order to gain an 
accurate insight into the shape and nature of infant colour perception rigorous 
methods such as psychophysical methods and paradigms with clear predictable 
outcomes and interpretations should be applied where possible. 
Although we have already learnt much about infant colour perception, there 
remains little understanding of the mechanisms which underlie many of the 
phenomena of colour perception which are found in infancy. One example is that of 
colour categorisation. Converging evidence presents a strong case for infant colour 
categorisation as demonstrated across a range of studies, labs, and methods, but 
there is very little known about how infants colour categories are formed in the 
absence of language. It would be advantageous to our understanding of infant 
colour perception to gain a better insight into the connecting processes between 
sensory mechanisms and behavioural outputs. It is also important to note that this 
need to better understand the connection between sensory input and perception is 
not unique to the domain of colour perception.  
There is also substantial uncharted territory in the field of infant colour 
perception, with exciting questions not yet investigated.  For example, there are 
many phenomena of adult colour perception which have not yet been probed in 
infancy.  As discussed previously, adults’ discrimination of saturation is unequal 
across hues, with larger discrimination thresholds in the blue-yellow direction. 
Establishing whether infants’ chromatic sensitivity is also aligned to the statistical 
distribution of chromaticities in natural scenes would provide a critical insight into 
when and if infants are sensitive to natural scene statistics, and add a depth of 
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understanding to the growing understanding of infant statistical inferences more 
generally.  
 
1.8. Infant perception of stimuli other than colour  
 
 
The study of infant colour perception is of course situated in a much larger 
endeavour to understand infant perception of multiple types of stimuli.  The 
broader field of infant perception is therefore briefly summarised here.  Our 
understanding of infant perception has moved on from the now (in)famous idea of 
an infants’ world being “one great blooming, buzzing confusion” (James, 1890). 
Early debates in developmental science were characterised by theoretical debate 
between the idea of knowledge being either “built in” to infants (Nativism), or 
developing only as a result of learning and experience (Constructivism) 
(Barrouillet, 2015). More recently, there is has been acknowledgement that there 
is no evidence for an either/or account of the development perception and an 
understanding that it is unreasonable for infant behaviour to be a simple split 
between being purely innate or learnt. Rather it is acknowledged that infants’ 
perceptual and cognitive skills are undoubtedly part of a more complex system, 
with multiple levels of developmental progress (e.g. biological maturation, and 
development of domain specific cognition) (Spencer, Thoman, & McClelland, 
2009).  More recent models of constructivism explain cognitive growth as an 
increase of complexity of internalised schemas (such as categorical or quantitative 
thought). These schemas co-develop alongside improvements in infants’ 
processing efficiency and working memory (Arsalidou & Pascual-Leone, 2016), 
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although there is disagreement on the mechanisms which allow infants to progress 
across through development. For example, some consider consciousness as the 
causal influence in developmental progression (Spanoudis, Demetriou, Kazi, 
Giorgala, & Zenonos, 2015), whilst others implicate the development of attention 
as a necessary condition for progress (Halford, Cowan, & & Andrews, 2007; 
Pascual-Leone & & Baillargeon, 1994). 
Despite a range of theoretical proposals we still know relatively little about the 
integration of the mechanisms which give rise to cognition and perception. 
Consider for example, object perception. At birth, infants are functionally able to 
see the component parts of a visual scene, they can see edges and motion, but do 
not yet have an adult-like understanding of objects. Over the first few months 
postnatally, infants’ cognitive abilities develop to allow them to perceive objects as 
physical entities in a real world (Johnson, 2010). The development of the cognitive 
processes needed for this to happen has been well documented. For example, 
whilst 2 month old infants are able to perceive an image of a rod and box to be a 
single rod occluded by a box, neonates perceive the same scene as having three 
component parts (the box, and two rods)(Johnson, Davidow, Hall-Haro, & Frank, 
2008; Slater, Johnson, Brown, & Badenoch, 1996; Alan Slater et al., 1990). The 
ability to perceive objects as complete is dependent on the development of 
cognitive skills such as spatial and spatio-temporal feature binding (Johnson, 
2010). Despite tracking of the individual components necessary for holistic 
processing of the environment, research on the integration of these individual 
skills and the implementation of these abilities in learning is needed to understand 
how the perceptual system becomes optimised in adult perception (Yermolayeva & 
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1.8.1. The roles of experience and sensation in infant perception 
 
 
Perceptual development is the result of both a maturation of low-level 
sensory processes, and also experience related factors (Timeo et al., 2016). One 
illustration of this is found in infants’ phoneme discrimination. Infants aged 6-8 
months, but not those aged 10-12 months, are able to discriminate between 
consonant sounds from two languages which were unfamiliar to them, whilst all 
infants (aged 6 months above) in this study could discriminate between consonant 
sounds from their own language (Werker, Gilbert, Humphrey, & Tees, 2016). This 
is thought to be the result of exposure to their native language, and a lack of 
exposure to alternative languages.  This process is commonly referred to as 
‘perceptual narrowing’ where experience (either through repeated exposure to 
certain stimuli or the absence of examples of a stimulus) shapes an infants’ 
perceptual abilities (Scott, Pascalis, & Nelson, 2007). These biases can lead to a 
refinement of the infant sensory systems; the maintenance of neuronal 
connections is dependent on their usage prior to synaptic pruning. Connections 
which are commonly used remain, whilst those which have been inactive are lost 
(Luna & Sweeney, 2004). As a result, development can change the way in which 
information is represented. 
Studies of face perception in infancy have also well documented the relationship 
between early sensory biases and experiential factors in infant cognition. Neonates 
appear to have an inbuilt range of biases which guide attention to face-like stimuli. 
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Rather than being a bias to faces, neonates’ preferential looking at face-like stimuli 
is a bias towards stimuli with a certain spatial frequency, with areas of high 
contrast and a top heavy display (Farroni et al., 2005; Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & 
Morton, 1991) The perceptual or cognitive tools which infants possess often serve 
an evolutionary adaptive purpose (Moll & Tomasello, 2010; Tomasello & Moll, 
2010), and there is a clear evolutionary advantage in a bias to look towards face-
like stimuli. Infants’ sensory bias to stimuli is dynamic and adaptive, and changes 
over time as their cognitive skills also develop. When eye-tracked watching a video 
which contained faces, 3-month-old infants’ patterns of looking were best 
predicted by regions of low-level visual salience, such as regions of high saturation 
or colour, rather than faces. Between 3- and 9-months-old there is a gradual shift 
in looking behaviour from these ‘sensory driven’ areas of interest towards the 
faces in the video (Frank, Vul, & Johnson, 2009).  
This face bias also becomes more specific, with infants aged from between 6- to 9- 
months-old looking preferentially faces of their own ethnic group rather than faces 
of a different ethnic group (Kelly et al., 2007, refered to as 'the other race effect'). 
This ‘other race effect’ is accompanied by an increased recognition of faces from 
own rather than other races. As in phoneme discrimination, many central theories 
about the emergence of this bias both point towards perceptual narrowing. 
Exposure to faces is often limited to those of the same ethnic group, as well as 
related to socio-cognitive factors such as an increased likelihood of those of the 
same ethnic group to be individuated (e.g. the label ‘James’, rather than ‘the man’, 
to distinguish our friend James from a stranger in the street) (Scott & Monesson, 
2009; Tanaka & Pierce, 2009). 
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Parallels have been drawn between face and colour perception (Timeo et al., 
2016). For example, both colour categorisation and face perception are sensitive to 
cultural variation. Evidence has shown, for example, that infants make a 
categorical distinction between green and blue, whilst there are many languages 
which do not, demonstrating that our perception of colour, like face and phoneme 
perception, can change according to the social demands of a child’s environment. 
This also demonstrates a central facet of infant cognition; the need for cognitive 
abilities to be both stable and plastic over time, although what provides this 
stability over time is not well understood, nor is the way that across development 
this stability continues to be represented or manifested.   
Both colour perception and perception in other domains show elements of 
universal patterns in behaviour. Colour perception is initially driven by low level 
sensory mechanisms as evidenced for example by infants’ preference for stimuli 
with high contrast, which in turn is part of the reason for infants’ early preference 
for face-like stimuli. These patterns of behaviour are found in infants across 
cultures, and there is evidence for common neural correlates across tasks 
requiring domain general cognitive skills (Quinn, Westerlund, & Nelson, 2006). 
These commonalities in perception suggests an underlying structure upon which 
very early perception is based, although little is known about either the time 
course or development prior to linguistic, cultural, or experiential influences on 
perception. 
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1.8.2. Statistical perception in infancy 
 
 
A sensitivity to the structure of the visual environment makes the 
processing of a complex world as efficient as possible, and provides a frame 
around which infants can learn about their environment (McClelland et al., 2010).  
Research has shown that infants can extract statistical regularities from auditory, 
visual, and audio-visual streams (Marcus, Vijayan, Bandi Rao, & Vishton, 1999; 
Yurovsky, Yu, & Smith, 2012). Infants are able to extract information about these 
statistical streams, such as rules about which stimuli follow each other, and also 
use statistical patterns to shape their cognition. For example, infants 6.5-months -
old familiarised to a continuum of faces with a bimodal distribution will form two 
face categories for this continuum, whilst those familiarised to a unimodal 
distribution will form a single category (Altvater-Mackensen et al., 2017 and see  
Maye, Werker, & Gerken, 2002, for a similar example from phoneme perception). 
Faces and phonemes are just two examples from the huge number of statistical 
regularities which we are exposed to daily. Natural scenes contain a large amount 
of statistical information such as spatial frequency, and variability in chromaticity. 
Currently infants’ sensitivity to natural scene statistics is not understood. Most 
studies suggest that sensitivity to natural scene statistics starts around 9 years old 
(Ellemberg, Hansen, & Johnson, 2012), and there is only one study with infants 
(Balas & Woods, 2014).  That study suggested that 9 month olds look for longer at 
stimuli which resemble natural rather than synthetic textures, but only when the 
contrast of the image is inverted. The authors suggest that 9-month-old infants are 
therefore sensitive to natural scenes and are sensitive to deviations from typical 
appearance. However, it is not clear that the looking behaviours in this study are 
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not the result of other perceptual biases in the visual system rather than a 
sensitivity to natural statistics. 
Understanding if infants are sensitive to natural scene statistics will tell us more 
about the processing of statistical regularities in infants, and will give us an 
understanding of the domain generality of statistical awareness. As outlined earlier 
there are biases present in adult colour perception which align with natural scene 
statistics (poorer discrimination along the blue-yellow axis along which there is 
the greatest variation in natural scenes). Establishing if infants also show such a 
bias would further our understanding of infants’ statistical processing more 
generally. 
 
1.8.3. Progress in Developmental Science 
 
 Across developmental science, there is a need for insight into the perceptual 
processes which lie between sensation and behaviour in infancy. Much research 
into infant perception and cognition has focussed on domains which are inherently 
social, such as face perception or language acquisition. Studying these domains are, 
of course, critical to understanding the development of infants, not least because 
all cognitive development does invariably take place within a social context, 
regardless of how ‘social’ it may or may not be (Bjorklund & Causey, 2017).  
Investigation of areas which are not inherently social in nature, such as numerical 
cognition, probability estimation, and colour perception in infancy can help 
researchers to fully characterise infant development, by separating out which 
processes are domain general and which are domain specific.  
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Many of the findings of in studies of colour perception have implications for infant 
perception more generally, and colour provides a carefully controlled stimulus to 
examine aspects of infant perception and to verify their domain generality. For 
example, much of infant perception is based on the chunking and integration of 
information from continuous variables (colour, faces, orientation, texture, etc.). 
Creating a carefully controlled stimulus set is markedly easier with colour than it is 
in other domains. This is because our perception of colour can be modelled 
accurately by the underlying sensory mechanisms of the colour vision system. 
There are fewer degrees of freedom in colour than there are in other variables, 
such as faces for example. This allows researchers to more easily connect the 
underlying sensory mechanisms influence on behaviour in infants.  
 
1.9. Thesis Overview and Research Questions 
 
 
The current thesis investigates 4 aspects of colour perception in infancy; 
colour categorisation, colour preference, perception of colour illusions, and the 
sensitivity of infants to colour in natural scenes. These topics provide an insight 
into how infant colour perception operates once infants are trichromatic. We know 
much about the anatomical development of the infant visual system, but in order to 
fully understand infant perception both in colour and other domains, it is 
necessary to attempt to understand how an infant might use structures such as 
trichromacy to shape their perception of the world.  
How do infants categorise the continuum of hue, and what are the underlying 
mechanisms that enable them to do this in the absence of language? Is there an 
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early basis for aesthetic preference for colour: do infants look longer at colours 
that adults like? Are the perceptual processes which underlie the perception of 
chromatic illusions present and integrated in infancy? Do infants show the same 
statistical biases in colour discrimination as adults do? Or is this bias learnt across 
the life span? These questions all get to the heart of a central debate in 
developmental science about how low-level sensory processes interact with the 
role of experience or our environment to shape our perception of our world. They 
also cast light onto the origins of our perception as adults. As well as being 
concerned with colour and infant perception, these questions also address broader 
fundamental debate in the cognitive sciences such as the relationship between 
language and thought (Regier, & Kay, 2009), how early sensory response to allows 
for adaptations to our environment (Bjorklund, 2015), and the origins of aesthetic 
preference (Ramachandran, & Hirstein, 1999).  
The thesis addresses each of these questions by presenting 4 papers which each 
investigate an aspect of infant colour perception.  The following sections provide 
summaries of each of these papers. 
 
1.9.1. Paper 1 – Biological Origins of Colour Categorisation 
 
 
  Paper 1 (Skelton, Catchpole, Abbott, & Franklin, 2017) investigates the 
origin and mechanisms of colour categorisation in a large scale infant study. As 
outlined earlier, there has been much debate on whether colour categorisation is 
innate or culturally relative. Relativists argue that colour categories are defined by 
language making arbitrary divisions of the colour spectrum, resulting in variation 
   
39 
 
   
 
in colour lexicons across languages ( Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000; 
Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2004). Contrary to this, Universalists point 
to commonalities in the organisation of colour lexicons, such as the stability of 
colours commonly chosen as category centroids across languages, to suggest that 
there are universal constraints on how language divides up the colour spectrum 
(Kay & Regier, 2003; Lindsey & Brown, 2006; Regier, Kay, & Cook, 2005). One 
possibility related to the Universalist position is that colour categories are 
hardwired and determined by the biological mechanisms that underpin colour 
vision.  Support for a biological account of colour categorisation is found from 
studies which provide evidence for infant colour categories despite infants being 
pre-linguistic (e.g. Bornstein et al., 1976; Catherwood, Crassini, & Freiberg, 1990; 
Franklin & Davies, 2004; Yang et al., 2016). However, as outlined earlier, there are 
many unanswered questions about infant colour categories: in particular, the 
number and location of these categories across the colour spectrum; how these 
categories are formed; and how these infant colour categories relate to adult 
colour lexicons.  
Paper 1 aimed to address these questions by mapping the colour categories of 
infants (4- to 6- months-old) using the World Colour Survey (WCS) stimulus grid 
which has been used to map the world’s colour lexicons. This was done using a 
method based on infant recognition memory called novelty preference. The 
principle of novelty preference is that following habituation to one stimulus, 
infants will look preferentially at a stimulus they judge to be different to the 
familiar stimulus they were habituated to (Mareschal & Quinn, 2001). A failure to 
look preferentially at a novel stimulus during the test phase following habituation 
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indicates that familiar and novel stimuli are being treated equivalently by the 
infant.  If these stimuli are nevertheless discriminable to the infant, then a lack of 
novelty preference fits the classic definition of categorisation that ‘discriminable 
stimuli are treated equivalently’ (Quinn, 2003). In paper 1, infants were 
familiarised to a hue from the World Colour Survey before it was paired at test 
with the adjacent colour from the stimulus sample.  This was repeated for 16 
stimulus pairs, and the novelty preferences were analysed to establish which 
colour differences infants distinguished in their recognition memory and which 
colours were treated as if equivalent.   
Novelty preference scores are calculated (looking time to the novel hue in 
comparison to the familiar hue), and pairs of stimuli where infants looked 
preferentially at the novel stimulus at test are considered to be the location of an 
infant colour category boundary.  Novelty preference scores for the colour pairs 
tested revealed infants’ recognition memory divides the colour continuum into red, 
yellow, blue, green, and purple categories. There were no significant novelty 
preferences for colour pairs within these categories, even when colour differences 
were large.  Crucially, infants’ novelty preference could not be explained how 
similar the colours in each pair were (perceptual similarity). Infants’ significant 
novelty preference response at category boundaries was not the result of colour 
pairs in these locations being easier to discriminate than other pairs.  This was 
revealed by regressions which showed differences in hue, chroma, or Euclidian 
distance calculated in perceptual colour spaces did not predict infant novelty 
preferences. Further evidence came from data collected from adults on the 
similarity of hues in a stimulus pair, which did not predict infant novelty 
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preference either.  Using a target detection task, we ruled out the possibility that 
infants’ non-significant novelty preferences (i.e. pairs within category) could be 
explained as an inability to discriminate colours in a pair. In this task, infants’ 
likelihood of fixating a chromatic target on a chromatic background did not relate 
to infant novelty preference for the same pair of colours in the main study. From 
these additional analyses and control experiments we can conclude that the 
pattern of infant novelty preferences can be accounted for by categorical 
recognition memory rather than lack of discrimination or perceptual similarity. 
The next stage in the study was to investigate the underlying mechanisms of infant 
colour categorisation – what guides infants division of colour into five categories?  
By plotting infants’ novelty preferences in a colour space that represents the early 
encoding of colour, paper 1 found that four of the five category boundaries align 
relative to the adaptation point with the cardinal axes that describe the early 
representation of colour in retinogeniculate pathways.  This alignment points to a 
biological basis for infant colour categorisation.  
Infant colour categories were then compared to the categories found in the world’s 
colour lexicons.  Striking commonalities were found between infant colour 
categories and the documented similarities found across adult colour lexicons 
documented in the World Colour Survey. Paper 1 revealed that infant colour 
categories are organised around hues which are commonly found to be at the 
centre of colour categories across languages. Infant colour categories were 
compared to data on the location of category centres from the World Colour 
Survey.  A permutation analysis found that the infant pattern of categorisation 
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captured these commonalities in centroids found in adult colour categories better 
than 95% of all possible permutations of the same number of category boundaries.  
Paper 1 supports previous studies which had found that infants categorise blue, 
green (e.g. (Catherwood et al., 1990), purple (Franklin & Davies, 2004), red and 
yellow (Bornstein et al., 1976), and provides the first evidence that infants also 
distinguish between purple and red. It is also the first to systematically sample at 
regular intervals from around the complete hue circle in order to capture infant 
colour categories. This enables the ground-breaking finding that infant colour 
categories are related to early encoding of colour in the retinogeniculate pathways.   
The study makes a critical contribution to the ongoing debate between 
Universalists and Relativists on the nature of colour categories and their lexicons 
as paper 1 provides concrete evidence that colour categories are not arbitrary.  
Instead colour categories are constrained in early development by the biological 
mechanisms which underpin colour vision, and these fault lines form the building 
blocks of adult colour categorisation across languages. 
 




 Paper 2 compared adult aesthetic judgements and infant responses to 
colour to investigate if there is an early basis for aesthetic preference for colour. 
Although adult aesthetic preferences appear to idiosyncratic, there is a suggestion 
that aesthetic judgements are an interaction between visual sensory processes and 
early perception, and on judgements based on higher order cognitive mechanisms, 
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such as cultural experience (Schulz & Hayn-Leichsenring, 2017). If some aspects of 
aesthetic judgments are based in early processes in the visual system, then we may 
expect some parallels between infant and adult response to stimuli.   For some 
visual stimuli, such as faces (Damon et al., 2017), this does appear to be the case as 
infants look for longer at stimuli which adults prefer. This raises an interesting 
debate on what underlies infants’ response to stimuli, as well as what adult 
aesthetic judgements are based on. 
In the domain of colour, adult aesthetic judgements have been shown to be very 
reliable with the same pattern of colour preferences being reported multiple times 
(e.g. Jastrow, 1897; Palmer & Schloss, 2010). If it is the case that aesthetic 
judgements are in part governed by sensory processes, then we may expect to see 
the roots of adult preferences in infant behaviour. However, as outlined earlier, 
previous studies that compare infant and adult colour preference have given 
conflicting reports on the similarity of adult aesthetic judgements and infant 
looking time to hues ( Adams, 1987; Hurlbert & Ling, 2012; Taylor, Schloss, 
Palmer, & Franklin, 2013). These conflicting outcomes may be the result of some of 
these studies using de-saturated stimuli that do not account for infants’ poorer 
discrimination of colour at lower saturations (Teller, Brooks, & Palmer, 1997). 
In paper 2 infant looking times to an extensive set of hues were related to adult 
aesthetic judgements. The stimuli were all maximally or very highly saturated, 
ensuring that infants would be able to detect the stimuli. Data was taken from 
paper 1 on infant looking times for multiple hues.  In addition, adults were shown 
each hue individually under the same illumination conditions which infants viewed 
the colour, and asked to rate on a scale how much they liked or disliked each 
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colour. There was a significant correlation between infant looking time and adult 
preference for colours; when colours were highly saturated, on average infants 
looked for longer at the colours which adults preferred. Both infants and adults 
showed a peak in response to blue hues, and a minimum for green-yellow hues. 
Comparison of the measures for infants and adults with how colours activate the 
retinogeniculate pathways showed that responses could be partially summarised 
in terms of how colours activate the blue-yellow neural pathway of colour vision.  
These findings suggest that there is an underlying sensory component to infants’ 
looking preferences which later manifests as an aesthetic preference in adults. This 
study is one of few to present the same set of colours to adults and infants, and also 
carefully considers the development of infant colour perception in its stimulus 
selection. Paper 2 has implications for our understanding of what drives infants’ 
responses to stimuli, Infant looking to colour does not necessarily reflect their 
affective response to colour, as there are a variety of processes and reasons an 
infant may look longer at a stimulus, such as novelty or complexity. Paper 2 
provides an insight into how sensory mechanisms may bias infants’ response to 
colour.  
 
1.9.3. Paper 3 – Further investigation of the perception of the Munker-White 
illusion in infancy 
 
  
 Paper 3 examines the perception of the Munker-White illusion in 4-8 month 
old infants. This illusion, where the same colour appears to shift in hue, saturation, 
or lightness (or any combination of the three) depending on context, is thought to 
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be the result of a combination of both high and low level visual processes (for 
example assimilation (Ripamonti & Gerbino, 2001), and scene segmentation 
(Anderson, 2003). Studying the Munker-White illusion in infancy provides insight 
into when and how perceptual processes develop and integrate, and also gives 
more information about the processes behind the perception of illusions in adults.  
As discussed earlier, one previous study (Yang et al, 2010) suggested that infants 
can perceive the Munker-White illusion. However, the perceived difference in 
colour caused by the illusion, although detectable to adults, is subtle and possibly 
below threshold for saturation discrimination in infancy (e.g., see Knoblauch et al., 
2001 for infant thresholds). The first study of paper 3 is an attempt to replicate the 
original study by Yang et al (2010).  Replication in developmental science is 
particularly important due to a noisy participant population and common variation 
in effect sizes found across studies (Duncan, Engel, Claessens, & Dowsett, 2014). In 
the second study of Paper 3 a habituation paradigm is used to further investigate 
the perception of the Munker-White illusion in infancy. 
In experiment 1, two stimuli were used which to adults appear to be made up of 
different colours, even though the component colours of both stimuli are physically 
identical. Due to the spatial arrangement of these colours, the yellow component of 
one stimulus appears more saturated than it does in the other stimulus. These 
stimuli are presented to infants, and looking times are recorded. The expectation is 
that if infants do perceive the illusions, they will look for longer at the stimulus 
which appears to be more saturated. However, despite identical method, sample 
size and analysis, we did not replicate the findings of Yang et al: infants did not 
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look significantly longer the stimulus which is perceived to adults as being more 
saturated.  
Experiment 2 aimed to address some of the stimulus and design limitations of 
Yang et al,’s study, by using stimuli that are clearly discriminable for infants, and 
having appropriate control of a priori preferences.  The second experiment used a 
habituation paradigm where infants were familiarised to the illusion before a test 
phase which was designed to elicit 2 different patterns of response dependant on 
infants’ perception of the stimulus; one response if participants habituated to the 
physical colour of the stimulus, and another if participants habituated to the 
illusory colour of the stimulus. Interestingly, infants’ response at test did not follow 
either predicted pattern of response: they looked at all stimuli equally.  One 
potential explanation is that infants were distracted by one component of the 
stimulus (the striped background) rather than processing the stimulus holistically 
which would be needed to experience the illusion. 
Paper 3 reopens the question of whether infants experience the Munker-White 
illusion, and also raises questions about the integration of perceptual processes in 
infancy. The paper provides lessons in conducting research on visual illusions in 
infancy.  This paper also highlights two methodological issues relevant to 
developmental science and broader topics within perception; firstly, the 
importance of tight control and design of stimuli, and secondly the value of 
replicating research within noisy population groups. 
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The adult visual system is optimised to represent the statistics of the 
natural world. For example, when the spatial frequency characteristics of images 
are similar to those found in natural scenes, adults show improved performance on 
recognition and discrimination tasks (e.g. Párraga, Troscianko, & Tolhurst, 2000; 
Tolhurst & Tadmor, 2000). It is currently unknown when in development our 
visual system begins to show this alignment to the statistics of natural scenes. 
Paper 4 investigates whether a bias in colour sensitivity that has been found in 
adults and which has been related to the distribution of chromaticities in natural 
scenes is also present in infants.  
Adult sensitivity to saturation is not equal across all hues (Bosten, Beer, & 
MacLeod, 2015). One method of quantifying these inequalities is to measure 
discrimination thresholds along the cardinal directions and its intermediaries, and 
fit a discrimination ellipse through the resulting threshold points. Elongation of 
this ellipse in a particular direction reveals poorer sensitivity along that axis. 
Discrimination ellipses in adults show significant elongation along the blue-yellow 
direction (the negative diagonal) of the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram 
across a range of tasks. The blue-yellow axis along which adult sensitivity is 
poorest is close to the ‘daylight axis’, the direction along which the chromaticity of 
daylight illumination varies, between blue skylight and yellow sunlight (Pearce et 
al., 2014). This has led to the suggestion that adult sensitivity may be poorest along 
this axis as a result of chromatic tuning to the chromaticities most common in 
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natural scenes in order to make visual processing as efficient as possible (Bosten et 
al., 2015; Foster, Nascimento, & Amano, 2004). 
Paper 4 measures infant and adult discrimination ellipses, and estimated 
thresholds around the hue circle. We recorded infants and adults eye-movements 
whilst being shown a coloured target on a grey background to measure their 
ability to see the colour. Thresholds were measured for 8 colours and for each 
colour there were 8 levels of saturation. The method of constant stimuli was used 
which provided full psychometric functions for infants and adults for each colour.  
These psychometric functions were then used to estimate thresholds for each 
colour and these were then used to fit a discrimination ellipse.  
Infants and adults both showed reduced sensitivity along the blue-yellow axis, 
being poorer at detecting blue and yellow targets.  There was therefore evidence 
that infants displayed the characteristic blue-yellow bias in the discrimination 
ellipse found in prior adult studies. These findings suggest that either the 
mechanisms underlying the tuning of colour perception to natural scenes are 
innate, or the calibration to natural scene statistics happens very early in 
development, between 2- 4 months (between the points when trichromacy first 
develops and the youngest participants in paper 4).  
Paper 4 also sheds new light on the measurement of psychometric functions in 
both infants and adults. The likelihood of target detection in the task is the 
combination of many factors including visual sensitivity, attention, motivation, and 
gaze control. Each of these factors bears an influence on performance, and can be 
described via its own psychometric function, with the psychometric functions 
measured in paper 4 being the outcome of the combination of these different 
   
49 
 
   
 
factors. The analysis revealed that selecting threshold criteria (alpha) at different 
points along the psychometric function resulted in variation in the amount of bias 
in the discrimination ellipse, implying that the weight of each of these factors, and 
its contribution to performance varies across the psychometric function. At points 
where performance is only just above chance (at lower alpha levels) participants 
psychometric functions appears to be influenced most by visual sensitivity, i.e. the 
weight of the psychometric function underlying visual sensitivity is greater than 
those governing other processes. A similar variability in thresholds collected from 
infant psychometric functions across alpha criterion has been reported when using 
an adaptive staircase procedure with infants (Jones, Kalwarowsky, Braddick, 
Atkinson, & Nardini, 2015), here we report similar effects when using the method 
of constant stimuli.   
Paper 4 provides the first firm evidence that the infant visual system is aligned 
with natural scene statistics, and provides a developmental window during which 
alignment could take place.  Paper 4 also has implications for our understanding of 
statistical learning in infancy (see Saffran & Kirkham, 2018 for a review), as it 
demonstrates that sensitivity to statistics in an infants’ environment is found for 
colour. Previous studies have found other types of statistical learning in infancy, 
such as statistical learning of sequences (e.g. Kirkham, Richardson, Wu, & Johnson, 
2012; Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, & Newport, 1999), although generally statistical 
sensitivity has been demonstrated at an older age than is found in Paper 4. There 
are also implications for the development of tasks that are appropriate for 
threshold measurement in infancy (Jones, Kalwarowsky, Atkinson, Braddick, & 
Nardini, 2014; Jones, Braddick, & Atkinson, 2015). Paper 4 demonstrates that 
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careful consideration should be given when defining threshold criterion for 
analysis. It also shows that full examination of psychometric functions can reveal 
insights into the different processes guiding performance, and the different 
processes underpinning cognition across performance.    
 
1.10. Overall Contribution 
 
 
The papers in this thesis demonstrate that the roots of mature colour 
perception are found in infancy and in the physiology of early colour vision. 
Previous discussions of the development of colour perception have underweighted 
the input of these early biological mechanisms and their shaping of our perception, 
instead weighting the role of experience far more heavily than may be necessary. 
Whilst the role of experience clearly does have a large influence on perceptual 
development, it is important to appropriately account for the relative weightings of 
biological mechanisms and experiential factors to enable a more detailed overview 
of development. This highlights one of the main benefits of examining perceptual 
processes in infancy. Behaviour is revealed not to be entirely idiosyncratic but 
instead to share a common element across individuals which is revealed in 
measuring infant response to stimuli. With an increasing understanding of 
appropriate measurement of perceptual phenomena in infancy, we are also able to 
gain a greater insight into the workings of adult perception.  
Several of the papers cause us to challenge current theories and debates in 
cognitive science. For example, our demonstration of how the retinogeniculate 
pathways provide the fault lines of infant colour categorisation propose a 
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challenge to Relativist theories of categorical perception. Similarly, the evidence of 
an underlying influence of sensory mechanisms in colour preference in infant and 
adult response to colour demonstrates that it is unlikely to be interaction with 
objects alone (ecological valence theory) which influences our aesthetic preference 
of colour. Both these findings indicate a common starting point to our perception 
of colour. We can also begin to see how infant perception of colour has 
implications and consequences for adult perception of colour. It appears that the 
underlying mechanisms of our colour vision provide guidelines upon which our 
interaction with objects and the environment can build upon.  
The extent to which these findings are specific to colour or are the result of domain 
general mechanisms has important implications for our understanding of the 
development of broader cognitive skills and developmental theory. Underlying 
sensory biases and structures have been suggested by some (e.g. Bjorklund, 2015, 
Barrouillet, 2015) to increase the chance of a positive adaptive response to their 
environment, and as a result, represent the ability for infants to extract meaningful 
information from their surroundings. We are able to see from the papers in this 
thesis that infants are drawing on information in the world around them (e.g. 
paper 4), and that their sensory apparatus to helps inform their perception and 
behaviour of the world. 
 
1.11. Future Research 
 
 
The field of infant colour perception is a diverse and exciting one with many 
outstanding questions which can contribute to ongoing debates in both perception 
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and developmental science. There remains much to be learnt about how infants’ 
colour perception is structured, both through development of some of the central 
questions presented in the papers of this thesis, and in areas beyond the scope of 
the current thesis where we know very little, such as  the development of colour 
constancy or the cortical processing of colour in infants. Here follows a brief 
outline of some outstanding questions in infant colour perception. 
Firstly, how is the journey from biologically constrained colour categories to a 
culturally informed colour lexicon made? There is currently a gap in our 
knowledge of how infants learn to abstract colour from properties and successfully 
map colour words to their internal representation of colour categories. There may 
also be broader implications for understanding the development of the ‘skill’ of 
categorization more generally, as similarities have been drawn between colour 
word learning in childhood and factors which have been shown to moderate 
category learning, such as perceptual salience, input frequency, and category size 
(Yurovsky, Wagner, Barner, & Frank, 2015). There has been preliminary work to 
find the beginnings of an ability to attribute colour words to objects via a referent 
selection task (Forbes & Plunkett, 2017), but how perceptual categories relate to 
lexical categories across development is not understood. Mapping colour 
categories and colour word acquisition across the developmental life span can 
enable researchers capture this transition to help identify how our cultural 
experience builds upon the fault lines provided by our visual system.   
Other means of approaching this question can also be found in brain based 
measures such as fNIRs. fNIRs has previously been used to demonstrate 
categorical responding in the infant cortex (Yang, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi, & Kuriki, 
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2016), meaning it may be possible to map infant and children’s categorical 
response to colour by measuring cortical response to colour categories across 
early developmental lifespan. This would allow for comparison of the development 
of lexical categories found with studies of young children to the underlying 
representation of colour in the cortex, giving an exciting insight into how the 
interaction of low level mechanisms and cultural influence shapes our perception 
of colour.  
The second question to be asked in future research is how and when infants 
acquire colour constancy. Understanding the development of colour constancy is 
possibly critical to our understanding of the progression from biologically 
constrained colour categories to mature culturally varying colour lexicons, as there 
would appear to be an advantage in having colour constancy when children 
attempt to understand what the, for example, green part of an object is.  Currently 
very little is known or understood about the development of colour constancy, 
although there have been recent advancements in our understanding of perceptual 
constancy more broadly (e.g. Yang, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi, & Motoyoshi, 2015; 
Fleming, 2015) It has been suggested that 7-month-old infants perceive constant 
surface properties, whilst 5- and 6-month-olds do not, putting forward the idea of 
a ‘pre-constancy’ phase of infant development (Yang, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi, & 
Motoyoshi, 2015). However, disentangling whether infants’ response is the result 
of low-level stimulus properties rather than a holistic integration of cues present 
in the stimuli can be difficult, and it’s in this area where research should be focused 
(see Witzel, O’Regan, & Hansmann-Roth, 2017 for discussion of the surface 
properties of Yang et al’s (2015) stimuli).  
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A third question arises from our finding that infants are sensitive to natural scene 
statistics from as young as four-months-old.  If infants are raised in an 
environment with a different pattern of variance in chromaticity, do they show 
alignment with their environment, or is the blue-yellow bias genetically 
determined? Currently, the majority of current hyperspectral image sets depict 
natural scenes which do show a blue-yellow bias, but it is likely that there are 
environments where the chromatic distribution of scenes may not show the same 
amount or direction of variation (e.g., a lush jungle). Similarly, the variation in 
chromatic scenes which we are exposed to may be markedly different within the 
same geographic region across the year (e.g. the Arctic Circle; Laeng, Brennen, 
Alden, Paulsen, Banerjee, & Lipton, 2007), which could lead to different patterns in 
early tuning if this effect is the result of experience rather than a biological 
unfolding.  
One much needed future study would capture and quantify the variation of a range 
of natural scene statistics across cultures and environments, and then test 
individuals across the life span who have lived experience of a particular 
environment. This will help disentangle how the mature visual system is optimised 
for its environment, and the way in which experience and the worlds’ statistical 
regularities interact and informs our perceptual experience. These cross-cultural 
approaches could use a task similar to that outlined in paper 4 in order to compare 
thresholds to variations in an individuals’ environment, and also across the life 
span of different populations. Developing our knowledge of our sensitivity to 
natural scene statistics can contribute to understanding the mechanisms of 
perceptual learning across the life span, and how probabilities are represented by 
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the different stages of vision and perception (Pouget, Beck, Ma, & Latham, 2013). 
Testing the domain generality of sensitivity to natural scene statistics beyond the 
case of colour will identify how our perceptual system is (or is not) optimised to 
represent the statistical regularities of our environments. A greater understanding 
of these processes will also help inform developmental models of perception and 
cognition in infancy, early childhood, and adults (Yermolayeva, & Rakison, 2014). 
A final area for development in future is how colour information becomes 
integrated with other sensory modalities. Questions about how and when cross-
modal correspondences are formed in childhood can help researchers gain a 
qualitative insight into perception across the lifespan. Cross modal associations 
adult colour perception are found across a number of domains, but there are 
outstanding questions on their origin as they remain relatively undocumented in 
infancy and early childhood. Many studies of cross-modal integration indicate that 
some cross-modal experiences common to adult perception are already 
successfully integrated in early infancy (e.g. colour and object, Kimura et al, 2010; 
vision and auditory. Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1982; Burnham & Dodd, 2004; object and 
texture, Sann & Steri, 2007), with some correspondences being ‘lost’ with age 
(Ludwig & Simner, 2013). In addition, there are areas where children do not 
integrate information from across/within domains until they are over 8 years old 
(Nardini, Bedford, & Mareschal, 2010; Gori, Del Viva, Sandini, & Burr, 2008).  
Understanding the how and when the brain becomes aware of such co-occurrences 
of its environment over development will provide a qualitative insight into 
perceptual experience of infants and children, as well as having informing models 
of perception across the life span. There also remain questions about what the 
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advantage, both to infants and adults, the integration or lack of integration 




The papers in this thesis present key findings on four areas of infant colour 
perception; the structure of infant colour categories, the origins of infant colour 
preference, the perception a colour illusion in early infancy, and sensitivity of 
infants to chromatic natural scene statistics. Two main themes emerge across 
these papers, firstly, infant response to colour appears guided by the low-level 
sensory mechanisms of colour vision, and secondly, that this structure provides 
the roots from which mature colour perception can then develop. For example, 
infants’ response to colour is shaped by the underlying sensory mechanisms of the 
retinogeniculate pathways, and echoes of this influence of behaviour are found in 
adult colour lexicons and adult aesthetic judgements of colour.  
There are outstanding questions particularly in exactly how experience influences 
our perception of the chromatic world, and how this may relate to the 
development of more domain general mechanisms across the life span. 
Advancements in methodologies of testing infants, and developments in our 
understanding of infant vision mean that developmental scientists are well placed 
to investigate outstanding questions on how infants see and think about colour.  
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Chapter 2 - Paper 1: Biological origins of colour categorization 
 
Skelton, A. E., Catchpole, G., Abbott, J. T., Bosten, J. M., & Franklin, A. (2017). 





The biological basis of the commonality in colour lexicons across languages 
has been hotly debated for decades. Prior evidence that infants categorize colour 
could provide support for the hypothesis that colour categorization systems are 
not purely constructed by communication and culture. Here, we investigate the 
relationship between infants’ categorization of colour and the commonality across 
colour lexicons, and investigate the potential biological origin of infant colour 
categories. We systematically mapped infants’ categorical recognition memory for 
hue onto a stimulus array used previously to document the colour lexicons of 110 
non-industrialized languages. Following familiarization to a given hue, infants’ 
response to a novel hue indicated that their recognition memory parses the hue 
continuum into red, yellow, green, blue and purple categories. Infants’ categorical 
distinctions aligned with common distinctions in colour lexicons, and are 
organized around hues that are commonly central to lexical categories across 
languages. The boundaries between infants’ categorical distinctions also aligned, 
relative to the adaptation point, with the cardinal axes that describe the early 
stages of colour representation in retinogeniculate pathways, indicating that infant 
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colour categorization may be partly organized by biological mechanisms of colour 
vision. The findings suggest that colour categorization in language and thought is 
partially biologically constrained, and have implications for broader debate on 
how biology, culture and communication interact in human cognition. 
 
2.2. Significance Statement 
 
Humans parse the continuum of colour into discrete categories (e.g., ‘red’ 
and ‘blue’), and the origin of these categories has been debated for many decades. 
Here we provide evidence that infants have colour categories for red, yellow, 
green, blue and purple. We show that infants’ categorical distinctions align 
strikingly with those that are commonly made in the world’s different colour 
lexicons. We also find that infants’ categorical distinctions relate to the activities of 
the two neural sub-systems responsible for the early stages of colour 
representation. These findings suggest that colour categorization is partly 
organized and constrained by the biological mechanisms of colour vision, and is 
not arbitrarily constructed by language.  
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The extent to which cognition is biologically ‘hardwired’ has been hotly 
debated (Carey, 2009; Cohen, Chaput, & Cashon, 2002; Hespos & Spelke, 2004; 
Wynn, 1992). Colour cognition has provided a fertile testing ground for such 
debate. One key question has been the origin of colour terms and their categories. 
Although the spectrum of colour is continuous, humans typically refer to colours 
with a number of discrete terms (e.g., red, green, blue). Some have argued that how 
terms categorize the continuum of colour and how colour lexicons evolve is 
biologically constrained (Berlin & Kay, 1969; Kay, 2005), others have argued that 
colour terms and their categories are culturally and linguistically constructed 
(Roberson et al., 2000). Cognitive scientists from a broad range of disciplines (e.g., 
linguistics, neuroscience, vision science, anthropology, developmental science) 
have been working for decades to understand how colour terms and their 
categories form. These efforts have established that although the colour lexicons of 
the world’s languages vary in the number of colour terms and in how they parse 
the continuum of colour, there is also striking commonality across languages and 
evidence for ‘universal’ constraints (Kay & Regier, 2003; Lindsey & Brown, 2006, 
2009, Regier et al., 2005, 2007). For example, in the World Colour Survey (WCS), 
speakers of 110 non-industrialized languages named 320 colours (Kay et al., 
2009), and analyses have shown that the centers of the categories denoted by 
these languages’ colour terms cluster around particular hues (Kay & Regier, 2003). 
These particular hue regions also appear to be central to the colour categories of 
industrialized languages (e.g., English), and are commonly the location of the ‘focal’ 
best examples of colour terms (Regier et al., 2005).  The organizing principles for 
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this common categorization structure have been sought, and computational 
models have suggested a number of sources such as the chromatic structure of 
natural scene statistics (Yendrikhovskij, 2001) chromatic discrimination 
thresholds (Baronchelli, Gong, Puglisi, & Loreto, 2010) or ‘near-optimal 
partitioning’ mechanisms based on basic principles of categorization (Regier et al., 
2007). There has also been a hunt for neurons which encode colour categorically in 
regions of the visual cortex and early ventral stream (Bird, Berens, Horner, & 
Franklin, 2014; Brouwer & Heeger, 2013; Persichetti, Thompson-Schill, Butt, 
Brainard, & Aguirre, 2015). 
 
Although we do not yet have solid evidence for the neural basis of commonalities 
and ‘universal’ constraints in colour naming, further impetus for the idea that 
colour terms and categories have a biological basis has come from studies with 
infants (Bornstein et al., 1976; Catherwood, Crassini, & Freiberg, 1990; Clifford, 
Franklin, Davies, & Holmes, 2009; Franklin et al., 2008; Franklin & Davies, 2004; 
Franklin, Pilling, & Davies, 2005; Ozturk, Shayan, Liszkowski, & Majid, 2013; Yang 
et al., 2016). Converging evidence suggests that pre-linguistic infants as young as 
four months old respond categorically to colour. Many of the infant studies have 
relied on the ‘novelty preference’ method that has been used to demonstrate that 
categorization is a domain-general and fundamental aspect of infant cognition 
(Mareschal & Quinn, 2001). Infants are familiarized to a given hue through 
repeated presentation (until infant looking at the hue wanes) and a novel hue is 
then presented during a test phase. If infants look longer at a novel than familiar 
hue at test (a novelty preference) then infants are deemed to distinguish the two 
hues in their recognition memory. Studies have shown that infant recognition 
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memory appears to distinguish hues that are differentiated by certain lexical 
distinctions (e.g., blue-green), and infant recognition memory treats hues within 
these lexical categories as if they are equivalent (e.g., no novelty preference). This 
‘same-category’ equivalence in recognition memory has been found even when 
hues within a lexical category are well above infants’ chromatic discrimination 
thresholds when measured with simple detection tasks (Franklin et al., 2008; 
Franklin et al., 2005), and when hue differences are maximized (Franklin & Davies, 
2004). Infants’ responses therefore fit the classic definition of categorization: 
‘responding in an equivalent manner to discriminably different stimuli’ (Quinn, 
2003, pg 52) . Evidence for a categorical response in infant recognition memory for 
hue has also been provided using neuroimaging methods, such as event related 
potentials (Clifford et al., 2009), and near infra-red spectroscopy (Yang et al., 
2016).  
 
Infants’ apparent categorization of colour suggests that colour categorization may 
have a biological origin.  Of course, lexical colour categories cannot be completely 
biologically determined since colour lexicons vary across languages both in the 
number of colour terms and in the location of lexical colour boundaries. 
Communication needs, and cultural and environmental forces are inevitably 
valuable in explaining the evolution of a colour lexicon within a culture (Quinn, 
2003). However, it is possible that lexical colour categories are partly rooted in the 
underlying mechanisms of the early visual system that code for colour. This partial 
constraint could potentially explain the commonality in categorization structure 
across the world’s languages, such as the clustering of categories around particular 
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regions of colour (Kay & Regier, 2003) or the common category ‘motifs’ that are 
seen across languages (Regier et al., 2005).  
 
Although it is theoretically possible that colour categories have biological roots, the 
current evidence of a categorical response to colour in infancy is insufficient for a 
full endorsement of this theory. First, the majority of the evidence for a categorical 
response to colour in infants comes from testing a few colour categories that are 
defined by their lexical distinction in English (e.g., blue-green and blue-purple). 
The full continuum of hue has not been tested and so categorical distinctions may 
have been missed. This means that, although there is converging evidence that 
infants respond categorically to colour, the number and location of infant colour 
category boundaries is not currently known.  
 
A more complete characterization of infant colour categorization is needed to 
clarify the relationship between infants’ categorical response and lexical colour 
categories. One possibility is that the way in which infant categories divide up the 
hue continuum is highly similar to the structure of colour lexicons. An alternative 
possibility is that infants’ categorical response is a quirk of a few limited regions of 
colour space, and that it has little resemblance to more comprehensive 
categorization systems seen in language.  Infant colour categories could align with 
those of specific languages, for example, lexicons of industrialized languages that 
have a greater number of basic terms than lexicons of non-industrialized 
languages. However, we consider it more likely that infant colour categories would 
align not with any one language in particular, but rather with the categorization 
structure that is common across the world’s languages, since it is this commonality 
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that potentially suggests some form of biological constraint. For example, one 
hypothesis is that infant colour categories are organized around the hues that Kay 
and Regier (Kay & Regier, 2003) have revealed to be commonly at the centers of 
the categories of the WCS.  
 
A second reason why there is currently insufficient evidence for the theory that 
colour categorization has biological origins is that the underlying mechanisms of 
infant colour categorization have not been systematically investigated. Infant 
categories, at least at 4-months, are unlikely to have communication or cultural 
origins, but they are not necessarily rooted in the biological mechanisms of the 
visual system. It is often assumed that the presence of infant categorization is 
evidence of a biologically determined ‘innateness’, yet infants also have a 
remarkable ability to learn categories by tuning into the statistical regularities 
present in stimulus exemplars (Fiser & Aslin, 2002). Environmental origins of 
colour categories have been proposed (e.g. Kay et al., 2009)  and it is at least 
theoretically possible that infants are able to tune into the statistical regularities 
and structure of their chromatic environment in order to extract a categorization 
structure (Clifford et al., 2009). Another possibility is that infants’ colour 
categorization is based on ‘near-optimal’ partitioning of the colour spectrum as has 
been argued for lexical categorization (Regier et al., 2007), with infants also 
applying basic principles of categorization (Garner, 1974) to an uneven perceptual 
colour space.    
 
When Berlin and Kay (Berlin & Kay, 1969)  first discovered the regularity in the 
evolution of colour terms across colour lexicons, it was proposed that colour 
   
64 
 
   
 
categories had a biological basis. However, subsequent investigation of the 
retinogeniculate cone-opponent pathways of the visual system that underpin the 
early encoding of colour has revealed that these pathways do not encode the ‘basic’ 
white, black, red, green, blue and yellow categories (and the perceptually pure 
‘unique’ hues of these categories) as originally proposed (Jameson & D’andrade, 
1997). What are commonly known as the ‘red-green’ and ‘blue-yellow’ cardinal 
cone-opponent mechanisms are actually better described as ‘cherry-teal’ and 
‘chartreuse-violet’ in terms of the appearance of the colours they encode. The idea 
that the cardinal mechanisms can explain the commonality in colour categorization 
across languages such as good examples (focals) and perceptually pure examples 
(unique hues) of colour has therefore been largely dismissed. Nevertheless, there 
has been some recent tentative evidence for a link between the early colour 
mechanisms and colour categorization from a study that concluded that the ‘red-
green’ cone-opponent mechanism accounted for the common ‘warm-cool’ category 
distinction that arises from analysis of WCS naming data (Xiao, Kavanau, Bertin, & 
Kaplan, 2011). It is theoretically possible that infants are able to draw on cone-
opponent mechanisms in a similar way in order to categorize colours. Evidence 
that infant colour categorization is related to the cardinal axes of colour vision 
would be strong support for the theory that colour categorization has biological 
origins.  
 
The current investigation had three aims:  First, to establish the hue categories that 
infants have; Second, to establish the relationship between infant colour categories 
and adult colour lexicons; Third, to identify the underlying mechanisms of infant 
colour categorization and whether infant categories are related to the cardinal 
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cone-opponent mechanisms that underlie early coding of colour. Together, the 
findings aim to shed light on whether colour categorization has biological origins 
that partially constrain the formation of colour categories within a language.  
 
In order to address these aims, we mapped infant categories onto the hue circle 
using the stimulus array from the WCS. We systematically sampled colours from a 
row of the WCS stimulus grid. Within this row, hues span the hue circle, are at 
constant lightness and at varying chroma (similar to saturation or colourfulness). 
We sampled colours at regular hue intervals that we predicted, on the basis of 
infant chromatic thresholds  would be large enough to be discriminated at 4-6 
months (Knoblauch et al., 2001). We confirmed in an additional experiment that 
the colours are discriminable at 4-6 months and that the findings of the current 
experiment are not related simply to the perceptual similarity of the colours (see 
Appendix A, figure 7.4). In the current experiment, we used the novelty preference 
method to look for hue pairs that are distinguished in infant recognition memory, 
and for hue pairs for which there is no novelty preference despite being 
discriminable in other contexts. As a second test, we also tested three larger hue 
pairs which straddled two or more smaller hue pairs to confirm whether or not 
hues in that region were distinguished in infant recognition memory when 
chromatic differences were larger. Regions where infants appear to treat hues as if 
equivalent are identified as being from one hue category, and regions where 
infants distinguish hues are identified as being categorically distinct. 
 
Systematically mapping infants’ hue distinctions, rather than just testing a few 
‘English’ categories as in previous research, avoids a priori assumptions that infant 
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colour categories align with lexical categories from any one language. Using the 
WCS stimulus grid allows direct comparison between the hues distinguished in 
infant recognition memory and the lexical distinctions and commonalities present 
in the world’s colour lexicons, enabling the relationship between infant and lexical 
colour categories to be clarified. For example, infant colour categorization is 
compared to colour lexicons from the WCS, to identify any correspondence 
between the categorical distinctions infants make and those in specific languages. 
In addition, we conducted an analysis across all 110 languages in the WCS to see 
whether infant colour categories are structured to capture hues that are commonly 
central to lexical categories.  We then investigated the underlying mechanisms of 
infant categorization, and plotted the stimuli and infants’ responses in a colour 
space which has axes that correspond to the cardinal mechanisms of colour vision 




2.4.1. Novelty preference and infant colour categories.  
 
Analysis of infant looking times during the familiarization phase confirmed 
that infants familiarized to each hue (see Appendix A, Familiarization and Novelty 
Preference). Novelty preference scores were calculated as: (time looked at novel 
colour during test phase / total time looked at novel + familiar colour during test 
phase)*100 (see Appendix A, figure 7.2).  Novelty preferences are tested using 
Bayesian analysis (Jeffreys, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, 
Morey, & Iverson, 2009; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der Maas, 
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2011). Bayes factors are reported which calculate the ratio of how probable the 
data is given one model (e.g., the null) relative to a second model (e.g., the 
alternative). A B of 3 or greater indicates substantial evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis (H1) over the null (H0), often equivalent to p<.05 (Jeffreys, 1961). A B 
of 0.33 or below indicates substantial evidence for H0 over H1 and a B between 3 
and 0.33 indicates data insensitivity for distinguishing between either hypothesis. 
Bayesian analysis is more appropriate for our data than null hypothesis 
significance testing (NHST) as: i) we require our analysis to enable us to make 
statements on whether the null hypothesis can be accepted (whether infants treat 
colours equivalently), whereas NHST provides no measure of credibility in favor of 
the null and non-significant results do not enable a definite conclusion (Dienes, 
2014); ii) we needed a statistical approach which guarantees sensitivity with a 
minimum number of participants (we have a between subjects design with 16 
conditions) and Bayes combined with an optional stopping rule (test until B is 
sensitive in either direction) enables this as B retains its exact meaning as the 
evidence in favor of H1 over H0 with further data collection (Rouder, 2014); and 
iii) Bayes factors should not be adjusted for multiple testing (we have 16 tests) as 
false alarm rates are dealt with through information in the data with no reference 
to how many other tests are conducted (Dienes, 2016). In addition to Bayes 
factors, we report associated p-values from null hypothesis statistical testing 
(NHST), although these are for reference only since they are affected by the 
optional stopping rule and multiple testing. We interpret all effects with respect to 
Bayes factors only.   
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Stimuli were drawn from row G of the WCS Munsell array (Munsell Value = 4, Y= 
12 cd/m2) in steps of 3 Munsell hues insofar as possible, yielding 14 stimulus hues. 
The Munsell coordinates of the stimulus hues, preceded by the column number in 
Figure 2.1, are (2, 5R), (3, 7.5R), (6, 5YR), (9, 2.5Y), (12, 10Y), (15, 7.5GY), (18, 5G), 
(21, 2.5BG), (24, 10BG), (27, 7.5B), (30, 5BP), (33, 2.5P), (36, 10P), and (39, 7.5 
RP).  
Starting from column number 3, adjacent sampled hues were paired (e.g., 3&6, 
6&9, 9&12……39&2) and novelty preferences for each pair were recorded (see 
Methods).  One-sample t-tests were conducted (against 50%) on novelty 
preference scores for each pair. Here, B refers to a Bayes factor in which the 
predictions of H1 were modeled as a normal distribution with an SD of 20.  All 
pairs had a sensitive B with 10 participants, apart from three pairs (7.5R-5YR, 
7.5GY-5G and 5PB-2.5P) which required 17, 20, and 12 participants respectively. 
Bayes factors revealed support for H1 for four hue pairs: green-yellow (7.5GY-10Y, 
t(9)=4.19, p=.002, B=686.05; blue-purple (5PB-2.5P), t(11)=2.98, p=.001, B=7.43; 
blue-green (2.5BG-10BG), t(9)=2.81, p=.02, B=5.05; red-yellow (7.5R-5YR), 
t(16)=2.67, p=.02, B=3.51; and purple-red (10P-7.5RP), t(9)=7.31, p=.001, B= 
4.9E+09 (columns 3-6; 12-15; 30-33; 21-24 and 36-39 in figure 1A). The other 9 
pairs showed firm support for H0 (all B<1/3, weakest probability of H0 was for 
pair 7.5GY-5G, where t=1.88, p =.07, B=0.19).   
Infants were also tested on three more widely separated stimulus pairs which 
spanned several of the original pairs (three larger pairs within green, blue, 
red/yellow). There was firm support for H1 for the large red/yellow pair (7.5RP-
10Y, columns 38-12), t (9) =2.84, p=.02, B=6.30E+00 and for H0 for the larger hue 
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differences within green (7.5GY-2.5BG, columns 24-30) or blue (10BG-5PB, 
columns 15-21), (largest t=1.34, smallest p=0.21, largest B=0.17).  We identify 
stimulus 10Y, 2.5Y and 7.5GY as ‘yellow’ here due to Munsell hue notation, 
although at the Munsell value sampled, these hues are darker than prototypical 
yellow.  This issue is returned to in the Discussion. 
 
Figure 2.1. Infant colour categorization and the relationship to lexical colour 
categorization. (A) Novelty preferences suggest infant recognition memory 
distinguishes red-yellow, green-yellow, blue-green and blue-purple hues 
but not hues within these categories. Sampled stimuli are outlined in black, 
horizontal lines joining stimuli indicate colour pairs which did not elicit 
novelty preference, gaps indicate novelty preference. Numbers are from the 
WCS stimulus grid and indicate the different hues. (B) Colour naming 
systems for row G stimuli based on: WCS data for Wobé (3 Basic Colour 
Terms (BCTs)), Jicaque (5 BCTs) and Huave (7 BCTs); English colour 
naming (11 BCTs,(Witzel, Sanchez-Walker, & Franklin, 2013); and the 
‘Green-Blue-Purple’ naming motif for row G stimuli (Lindsey & Brown, 
2009). Vertical thick black lines indicate category boundaries between 
stimuli given the same most frequent term within a language. 
Correspondence between the category boundaries in language and infant 
novelty preferences can be seen. (C)  Frequency of category centroids from 
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the WCS for each hue in row G (Kay & Regier, 2003). The gaps in the thick 
black horizontal bars at the bottom of figure 1C indicate hues which were 
straddled by colour pairs which elicited novelty preference, as also shown 
by the gaps in the black horizontal lines in figure 1A. Category centroid 
frequencies tend to peak in regions which are not distinguished by infant 
recognition memory and are generally lowest in regions which are 
distinguished. 
 
2.4.2. Relationship to lexical colour categories.  
 
Figure 1B gives examples of colour naming systems for the sampled 
stimulus row for a selection of languages from the WCS which illustrate agreement 
between infants’ response and adult lexical colour categories (Wobé, Ivory Coast; 
Jicaque, Honduras & Huave, Mexico) with 3, 5 and 7 basic colour terms (BCTs) 
respectively (Regier et al., 2007). Figure 2.1B also gives English naming data from 
(Witzel, Sanchez- Walker, & Franklin, 2013) and the green-blue-purple naming 
motif (GBPm) that was identified from Lindsey and Brown’s (Lindsey & Brown, 
2009) cluster analysis of WCS naming data, for row G stimuli. Correspondence 
between the distinctions made in infant colour memory and those made by colour 
terms and the colour-naming motif can be seen by comparing figure 2.1A and 2.1B. 
The 5 categorical distinctions that infants make align with the location of 4 of the 
distinctions made in the English colour lexicon, and with lexical distinctions in 
colour lexicons with fewer basic terms than English. For example, Huave is a colour 
lexicon with 7 basic colour terms and 4/5 of the categorical distinctions in Huave 
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for row G stimuli are in the same hue region as the distinctions that infants make in 
their recognition memory. We show correspondence between infant and lexical 
colour categories for a selection of 3 WCS languages, yet inspection of naming data 
from the other WCS languages reveals correspondences for many other languages 
as well. We also find that infants’ categorical distinctions align with 3 of the 
categorical distinctions in the GBPm (Lindsey & Brown, 2009).  
 
Figure 2.1C plots the frequency of category centroids in WCS languages for all hues 
in row G of the WCS stimulus grid (Kay & Regier, 2003). The plot shows that the 
centers of the categories of 110 non-industrialized colour lexicons peak at 
particular hues and have minima at particular hues (low centroid counts are likely 
to indicate category boundaries). Infant novelty preferences are indicated 
underneath the plot by gaps in the solid black horizontal bars. The gaps align 
qualitatively well with the low points in the bar plot, corresponding to few WCS 
centroids. Distinctions infants make between green-yellow, blue-purple, purple-
red, and red-yellow hues appear to provide fault lines that separate the centroid 
peaks from each other (Appendix A, figure 7.3). Infants’ distinction between blue-
green hues does not fit so well with this pattern, since although it separates the 
centroid peaks at blue and green, it also spans a region of high centroid counts 
from WCS languages which have composite blue-green ‘grue’ terms. Analysis of the 
number of category centroids for hues that were straddled by each pair, identified 
that the particular combination of 5 pairs for which infants had novelty preference 
spanned hues with fewer centroids than 4.27% of any other combination of 5 pairs 
from the pairs tested (Appendix A, Analysis of WCS Centroids).  This suggests that 
hue pairs which are categorically different for infants are in regions which are 
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infrequently at the center of lexical categories and that infant colour categories are 
optimally organized around hues which are commonly central to lexical colour 
categories: fewer than 5% of other 5 pair combinations are better organized. 
 
2.4.3. Underlying mechanisms of infants’ response.   
 
To test the hypothesis that infant colour categorization is related to the 
cardinal mechanisms of colour vision we plotted, using reflectance spectra taken 
from the University of Joensuu Colour Group database 
(https://www.uef.fi/en/web/spectral/-spectral-database), the Stockman and 
Sharpe 2° cone fundamentals (Stockman & Sharpe, 2000) and a D65 illuminant, the 
stimuli and infants’ novelty response in the MacLeod-Boynton chromaticity 
diagram (MacLeod & Boynton, 1979). In this colour diagram the axes L/ (L+M) and 
S/ (L+M) represent the ‘cardinal’ mechanisms of colour vision that correspond to 
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Figure 2.2. Stimuli plotted in MacLeod-Boynton cone-opponent space with (L/ 
(L+M) and (S/L+M) cardinal axes of colour vision that correspond to the 
retinogeniculate pathways. The dashed vertical and horizontal lines 
indicate the background (Munsell N5) to which infants were adapted. The 
Munsell hue codes for stimuli are given and black lines connecting stimuli 
indicate no novelty preference for that pair. The cross between 7.5R and 5R 
indicates a pair that was not tested.  
 
A regression analysis found that the Euclidean distances in MacLeod-Boynton 
colour space did not predict infants’ novelty preferences (R2 =.01, p=.71, B=2.71E-
17, see also an equivalent analysis in CIELAB colour space in Appendix A 
Discrimination and Novelty Preference, and figure 7.4). Inspection of the stimuli 
and novelty preferences plotted in the MacLeod-Boynton chromaticity diagram 
suggests a relationship with the cardinal colour mechanisms. Four of the pairs for 
which there were novelty preferences straddle the vertical and horizontal axes 
originating from the background chromaticity, Munsell N5, on which our stimuli 
were presented. This indicates a novelty preference in infants when stimulus pairs 
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are at different polarities (relative to the background) either in S/ (L+M) or in L/ 
(L+M). Further analyses ruled out the hypothesis that variation in novelty 




Converging evidence from prior research suggests that infants respond 
categorically to colour. However, since the full hue circle has not been previously 
tested, the number and location of categorical hue distinctions were unknown. 
Therefore, the relationship between infant colour categories and those of the 
world’s colour lexicons, and the underlying mechanism of infant colour categories 
have been unclear. In order to address these issues, we systematically mapped 
infants’ novelty preference responses onto a row of the WCS stimulus grid. Infants 
successfully familiarized to a given hue, and when presented subsequently with a 
novel hue, infants had a novelty preference for five pairs of hues in red-yellow, 
green-yellow, blue-green, blue-purple and purple-red regions of colour space. 
There was also firm evidence for a lack of novelty response within the hue regions 
of blue, green, purple, yellow and red. The lack of a novelty response within purple, 
blue and green regions was found even when the largest hue differences spanning 
pairs that lacked a novelty response were tested.  
 
As noted earlier, we use the term ‘yellow’ to denote stimuli in the yellowish region 
of the hue continuum following the Munsell hue notation.  However, stimuli were 
sampled at constant lightness close to the lightness of the prototypes of other hues 
but darker than prototypical yellow.  The dark and non-prototypical nature of the 
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stimuli in the yellow region may account for why there was much more individual 
variation for the less widely separated red-yellow and green-yellow pairs than 
most other pairs (more infants had to be tested on these pairs for a sensitive Bayes 
factor), and the novelty preference effect was weakest for the red-yellow pair. 
Testing these hues at prototypical lightness levels would confirm this. 
Nevertheless, whatever the appropriate gloss for the yellowish hues (and this 
would obviously vary across languages), the current study identifies a categorical 
distinction for infants in this region.   
An additional experiment and further analysis ruled out the hypothesis that 
novelty preferences were simply related to perceptual similarity and confirmed 
that colours can be discriminated in other contexts (see Appendix A, 
Discrimination and Novelty Preference). The findings therefore suggest that 
infants’ recognition memory is categorical: some colours are treated as if they are 
equivalent in infants’ recognition memory, yet others which are not always more 
perceptually dissimilar are treated as if they are different. Overall, our findings 
suggest that infant memory parses the hue continuum at the lightness level tested 
into five categories: red, yellow, green, blue and purple. Prior research has 
provided evidence that infants’ recognition memory parses colour into blue, green 
(Bornstein et al., 1976; Catherwood, Crassini, & Freiberg, 1987; Clifford et al., 
2009; Franklin & Davies, 2004) and purple (Franklin & Davies, 2004) categories, 
with a suggestion of separate red and yellow categories as well (Bornstein et al. 
1976). Unlike prior studies, we systematically sampled at regular intervals around 
the complete hue circle, providing the first evidence that infant memory also 
distinguishes purple and red.  
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2.5.1. Relationship to lexical colour categories.  
 
Mapping infant categories onto the WCS stimulus grid clarifies the 
relationship between infant colour categories and lexical colour categorization. 
Correspondences between the location of infants’ categorical distinctions and 
those in colour lexicons can be seen. In particular, the common green-blue-purple 
naming motif that was revealed by Lindsey and Brown’s (Lindsey & Brown, 2009) 
cluster analysis of WCS data has categorical distinctions in four of the same hue 
regions as those of infants. This correspondence between the distinctions that 
infants make and those in colour naming systems is also highlighted by our 
comparison of infant colour categories and the locations of the WCS category 
centroids from Kay and Regier (Kay & Regier, 2003). Infants have separate red, 
yellow, green, blue and purple categories, and there are also separate clusters of 
category centroids from WCS languages in these hue regions. Infants’ categorical 
distinctions isolate the peaks in category centroids from one another. An analysis 
revealed that hues at infant colour category boundaries are not commonly at the 
center of lexical colour categories. This suggests that hues within infant colour 
categories (hues straddled by pairs where we find no novelty preference) are 
commonly at the center of lexical colour categories. Infants’ blue-green categorical 
distinction did not fit the pattern so well, since it fell in a region where there are a 
high number of lexical category centers due to the high incidence of WCS languages 
with a composite green-blue ‘grue’ term. Nevertheless, that fewer than 5% of other 
5 pair combinations were better organized around hues which are commonly 
central to lexical colour categories, does indicate a striking similarity between pre-
linguistic and lexical categorization.    
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2.5.2. Underlying mechanisms. 
 
  We found no evidence that infants’ novelty preference is driven by how 
perceptually similar hues are. However, when infants’ novelty response was 
plotted in a colour space defined by the cardinal colour sub-systems that 
correspond to the retinogeniculate pathways underlying colour vision, we see for 
the first time that four of the categorical distinctions that infants make are 
separated by axes in this colour space that pass through the chromaticity of the 
background, which could be considered the ‘adaptation point’. We propose 
therefore that the null points of the two cardinal subsystems of colour vision 
provide boundaries that infants may use to parse the colour continuum into 
categories in their recognition memory. This of course cannot account for infants’ 
categorical distinction between red and yellow – which must derive from 
alternative mechanisms. 
 
Our proposal that the cardinal colour mechanisms provide fault lines for infant 
colour categorization is related to similar arguments made about adult colour 
naming. For example, one study of adult colour naming and hue settings provides 
evidence that the cardinal axes align with adults’ blue-green and yellow-green 
category boundaries (Malkoc, Kay, & Webster, 2005). Another study suggests that 
whether or not L-M cone-contrast between the colour and background is positive 
(reddish) or negative (greenish) aligns with a common categorical distinction in 
WCS languages between warm and cool colours (Xiao et al., 2011). Similarly, we 
also find that whether or not colours are ‘redder’ or ‘greener’ than the background 
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(values higher and lower than the background on the L/(L+M) axis) provides a 
fault line for infants’ green-yellow and blue-purple categorical distinctions, but we 
also find that S/(L+M) provides a fault line for infants’ red-purple and blue-green 
categorical distinctions. A link between low-level mechanisms of colour vision and 
categorization is also implied by a computational simulation which shows that 
universal colour categorization can be accounted for by human’s just noticeable 
difference function (Baronchelli et al., 2010; Mullen & Kulikowski, 1990). It has 
been suggested that categorical clustering of neurons at V1 can account for the 
warm/cool categorization in languages (Xiao et al., 2011). However, an association 
between the cardinal mechanisms and categorization does not necessarily indicate 
that neurons code categorically at early stages of the visual system. The cardinal 
mechanisms may simply provide perceptual inequalities which provide a basis for 
post-perceptual categorization in temporal and frontal regions of the brain 
(Brouwer & Heeger, 2013; He et al., 2014; Koida & Komatsu, 2007; Persichetti et 
al., 2015). 
 
Although we point to an association between the cardinal mechanisms of colour 
vision and infant colour categorization here, it is clear that in addition to such 
biological forces, culture, environment and communication are likely also to 
determine both how many colour terms there are in a lexicon and the categorical 
distinctions that are needed. It seems likely that languages would override 
categorical distinctions that are important in infant colour memory if they are not 
relevant for a given culture or environment (Hespos & Spelke, 2004). One 
important question for further research is how we transition from a pre-linguistic 
colour categorization based largely on biological mechanisms to a lexical colour 
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categorization that may make additional or fewer distinctions. The lack of one-to-
one mapping between pre-linguistic and lexical colour categorization may well 
partly explain the difficulty that children have in learning the words for colours 
(Franklin, 2006; Johnson, McQueen, & Huettig, 2011; Pitchford & Mullen, 2003; 
Wagner, Dobkins, & Barner, 2013). Further research should also examine whether 
the distinctions in infant colour memory are ‘universal’ across different cultures 
and environments. Given the link to the cardinal mechanisms of colour vision we 
expect them to be largely consistent across cultures, but cultural variation in pre-
linguistic categorization is at least theoretically possible.          
To conclude, we find that infant recognition memory parses the hue circle into 
blue, green, purple, yellow and red categories, and we find similarity in the 
structure of pre-linguistic and lexical colour categorization. The retinogeniculate 
mechanisms of colour vision appear to provide fault lines for infants’ categorical 
distinctions between hues. Our findings provide further evidence that colour 
categorization has biological origins.  Our results also relate to broader debate on 
the biological origins of aspects of cognition such as knowledge about the physical 
world, mathematical ability and spatial cognition (Hespos & Spelke, 2004). 
Although certain cognitive processes may seem to a large extent to be culturally or 
linguistically constructed due to apparent linguistic and cultural diversity, by 
looking at commonalities across cultures and languages, and by investigating these 
cognitive processes in infancy, biological origins of cognitive processes can also be 
revealed. 
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2.6.1. Participants  
 
A total of 295 4-6 month old infants took part in the study, with 116 infants 
excluded from the final sample for the following reasons: infant fussiness or lack of 
looking (N=78); family history of colour vision deficiency (N=3); failure to 
familiarize during the familiarization phase, as defined by a non-negative slope of 
looking times across familiarization trials (N=17), failure to look during the test 
phase (N=12), equipment or experimenter error (N=3), prematurity (N=3).  The 
final sample of 179 infants (89 males) had a mean age of 21.3 weeks (SD 2.42). All 
infants had a birth weight greater than 2500g and no known visual or neurological 
conditions. Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Sciences and 
Technology cross schools ethical committee at University of Sussex, and the 
European Research Council Executive Agency ethics committee.  Written informed 
consent was obtained from the parents of the participants 
 
2.6.2. Apparatus. 
Stimuli were presented to infants in two square 12 x 12 cm windows of a 
wooden booth painted with gray Munsell N5 paint (Y=19.77 cd/m2, x=0.312, 
y=0.325). The two stimulus windows were 3.5 cm to the left and right from central 
fixation, and the infant was sat in a car seat at eye-level to the horizontal center of 
the windows at a distance of 50 cm. A 4 by 5 cm digital display was embedded into 
another window at the central fixation point in order to centrally fixate infants in 
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between trials, and a circular hole above this (diameter = 2cm) had a webcam 
positioned behind it focused on the infants’ face. A pulley system around the back 
of the booth allowed the left and right stimulus windows to either display stimuli 
during trials, or two squares of Munsell N5 gray and the central digital display 
during inter-trial intervals. The webcam fed into a computer (Dell Precision 390), 
which recorded the infants’ faces in QuickTime. A Matlab program indicated the 
onset and offset of trials and allowed coding of infant looking. Stimuli were viewed 
under a D65 illuminant (X-Rite: Judge II (6500K) 24”), with a D65 bulb embedded 
in a hood at the top of the booth and two D65 spot lights angled directly onto the 
two stimulus windows from behind the infant in order to ensure the appropriate 
amount of light was reflected from the stimuli. There was no other light source in 
the room and the room had black walls and no windows.  
 
Stimuli were sampled from the WCS stimulus array: an array of 320 colours from 
the Munsell system that vary in Munsell value (lightness) and hue and are at 
maximum chroma (similar to saturation or colorfulness) for each given stimulus. 
Stimuli were sampled from row G of the array (Munsell value = 4, Y= 12 cd/m2) in 
steps of 3 Munsell hue, giving 14 hues in total (5R, 7.5 R, 5 YR, 2.5 Y, 10 Y, 7.5 GY, 5 
G, 2.5 BG, 10 BG, 7.5 B, 5 PB, 2.5 P, 10 P, 7.5 RP). Stimuli were presented as squares 
(12 cm for infants) of reflective Munsell card.   
   
82 
 
   
 
 
2.6.3. Design and Procedure. 
 
Infants were tested with a novelty preference procedure, where there was a 
familiarization phase with one hue repeatedly shown, and then a test phase where 
the familiar hue was paired with a novel hue across four trials. The time spent 
looking at the novel hue relative to the test hue during the test phase was 
calculated (novelty preference). Each infant saw one hue pair, and there was a 
minimum of 10 infants per pair (infants randomly allocated), with the hue that was 
familiar or novel counterbalanced for each pair. Hue pairs were defined first by 
pairing adjacent stimuli separated by 2 Munsell hue units. Where there was no 
novelty preference for two or more adjacent hue pairs then the larger hue 
difference spanning the adjacent pairs formed another hue pair to be tested. 
During the familiarization phase the same hue was presented in left and right 
windows for 8 8-second trials, and in the test phase one familiar and one novel hue 
were presented for 4 5-second trials with the left/right location of the novel hue 
counterbalanced and randomized. Inter-trial intervals were a minimum of 1 
second and the trial then commenced once infants were centrally fixated, with a 
minimum 2-second interval between the familiarization phase and the test phase. 
An experimenter sat behind the infant testing booth worked the pulley system to 
reveal the stimuli during each trial and to reveal, during the intertrial intervals, the 
digital display which played a black and white looming and contracting bulls-eye 
central attention getter. A second experimenter viewing the webcam output coded 
infant looking online, while blind to the condition (colours tested) and location of 
the novel colour. A subset (21%) of the data was coded twice, by an independent 
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experimenter blind to condition and stimulus location, giving an inter-rater 
reliability of Pearson’s r=0.91.  
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Chapter 3 - Paper 2: Infants look longer at colours that adults like when colours are 
highly saturated. 
 





The extent to which aesthetic preferences are ‘innate’ has been highly 
debated (Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004).  For some types of visual stimuli 
infants look longer at those that adults prefer. It is unclear whether this is also the 
case for colour.  A lack of relationship in prior studies between how long infants 
look at different colours and how much adults like those colours might be 
accounted for by stimulus limitations.  For example, stimuli may have been too 
desaturated for infant vision. In the current study, using saturated colours more 
suitable for infants, we aim to quantify the relationship between infant looking and 
adult preference for colour. We take infant looking times at multiple hues from a 
study of infant colour categorisation (Skelton, Catchpole, Abbott, Bosten, & 
Franklin, 2017), and then measure adult preferences and compare these to infant 
looking. When colours are highly saturated, infants look longer at colours that 
adults prefer. Both infant looking time and adult preference are greatest for blue 
hues and are least for green-yellow.  Infant looking and adult preference can be 
partly summarised by activation of the blue-yellow dimension in the early 
encoding of human colour vision. These findings suggest that colour preference is 
at least partially rooted in the sensory mechanisms of colour vision, and more 
broadly that aesthetic judgements may in part be due to underlying sensory biases.   
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It is well established that humans have preferences for some visual stimuli 
over others, for example, preferences for specific faces, patterns, colours or spatial 
compositions (e.g. Fancher, 1996; Palmer & Schloss, 2010; Rhodes, Hickford, & 
Jeffery, 2000). The source of these perceptual and aesthetic preferences is much 
debated (e.g. Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999; Reber et al., 2004).  One idea is that 
preferred visual stimuli have characteristics that are optimal for the human visual 
system to process, and therefore that these preferences are to some extent ‘innate’ 
(Krentz & Earl, 2013; Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999). In support of this idea 
there is evidence that infants look longer at visual stimuli that adults prefer. For 
example, infants look longer at attractive than unattractive faces, both human 
(Damon, Mottier, Meary, & Pascalis, 2017) and non-human (Quinn, Kelly, Lee, 
Pascalis, & Slater, 2008), and longer at patterns with vertical than horizontal 
symmetry or asymmetrical patterns which are less preferred by adults (Bornstein, 
Ferdinandsen, & Gross, 1981). Infants also look longer at original art that adults 
prefer than art where the balance or focus has been altered (Krentz & Earl, 2013).  
However, in the case of colour preferences, the relationship between infant looking 
and adult preference is less clear.  
Colour preference might seem to be a personal and idiosyncratic phenomenon. 
However, studies have repeatedly found a consistent pattern of colour preference 
in adults: on average, preference ratings follow a smooth curve as colours vary in 
hue, with a preference maxima at blue, a minima at dark yellow, and with cool 
colours generally preferred over warm colours (Hurlbert & Ling, 2007; Palmer & 
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Schloss, 2010). This pattern of colour preference has been measured as far back as 
1897 (Jastrow, 1987), and the broad pattern of preference is generally consistent 
across industrialised cultures (but see Taylor, Clifford, & Franklin, 2013 for an 
example of cultural variation).  Various theories of colour preference have argued 
that patterns of colour preference are in some way ‘natural and universal’ and that 
at least some aspect of colour preference is ‘innate’.  For example, Ecological 
Valence Theory (EVT, Palmer & Schloss, 2010) proposes that people like/dislike 
colours to the extent that they like/dislike the objects that are associated with the 
colours. Whilst such associations can be learnt during an individual’s lifetime, EVT 
also suggests that innate colour preferences could draw humans to entities which 
are evolutionary beneficial (e.g., clean water) and away from those which are not 
(e.g., rotting waste).  Others (e.g., Hurlbert & Ling, 2007) have highlighted how 
patterns of colour preference can be effectively summarised in terms of the two 
fundamental neural dimensions that underlie early colour encoding (the ‘red-
green’ and ‘blue-yellow’ cone-opponent processes), perhaps suggesting that these 
colour preferences are rooted in the basic mechanics of the visual system rather 
than higher level conceptual thought.   
Further weight to claims of the ‘innateness’ of colour preference would be given if 
a relationship between infant looking and adult colour preference was established. 
Several studies have found that infants look longest at blue hues and least at 
yellow or yellow-green (Adams, 1987; Bornstein, 1975; Franklin, Bevis, Ling, & 
Hurlbert, 2010; Franklin, et al., 2008; Teller, Civan, & Bronson-Castain, 2004; 
Zemach, Chang, & Teller, 2007), these maxima and minima in looking times do 
broadly correspond respectively to adults’ highly liked and disliked colours (e.g. 
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Taylor, Schloss, Palmer, & Franklin, 2013; Hurlbert & Ling, 2012).  However, other 
studies have found a less favourable correspondence. In one study, infants were 
found to look longer at yellow than blue (Adams, 1987).  One reason for 
discrepancies between infant and adult studies could be the differences in 
lightness and saturation of stimuli across studies, as hue preferences interact with 
lightness and saturation (Palmer & Schloss, 2010; Camgoz, Yener, & Guvenc, 2002).  
Only two studies have tested infants and adults using the same stimulus set.  One 
study tested eight colours that were radiant and monochromatic lights (untypical 
of natural surfaces) and found that infants generally looked longer the more adults 
liked a colour (Bornstein, 1975).  Another study tested only four hues at two 
lightness and saturation levels, and found no relationship between infant looking 
time and adult preference (e.g., infants did not look longer than chance at blue 
hues) (Taylor, Schloss, Palmer, & Franklin, 2013).  However, stimuli were 
relatively desaturated, and it is possible that the discrepancy between infants and 
adults was due to infants’ poor discrimination of blue-yellow differences (tritan 
colour vision) at low saturation (e.g., see Teller, Brooks, & Palmer, 1997), and that 
a stronger relationship between infant and adult measures would exist at higher 
saturations.   
In the current study, we aim to establish whether infants do look longer at colours 
the more adults like them by using a more comprehensive and suitable stimulus 
set than prior studies.  We reanalyse data from a study of infant colour 
categorisation (Skelton, Catchpole, Abbot, Bosten, & Franklin, 2017) to obtain 
infant looking times for various hues, and measure adult preferences for these 
same hues.  Skelton et al.’s infant study investigated colour categorisation (not 
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preference) using a novelty preference method where 4-6 month old infants were 
first familiarised to one hue and then shown a novel hue, and separate groups of 
infants were tested on 13 different hue pairs.  Here, in order to identify infants’ 
pattern of colour preference, we analyse the length of time infants spent looking on 
the first trial of the familiarisation phase, giving looking times for 14 hues.  We 
analyse the first trial of familiarisation rather than the total looking time across all 
8 familiarisation trials since differences between stimuli are likely to wash out 
over time as infants habituate to stimuli (as is required for the novelty preference 
method). Hues were reflective stimuli that are more typical of surfaces in the 
natural world than computer rendered or light based stimuli, were at a constant 
lightness level and were at or close to the highest saturation levels for each given 
hue.  Based on prior studies of infant colour vision (e.g., Knoblauch, Vital-Durand, 
& Barbur, 2001), it is anticipated that 4-6 month old infants would be able to easily 
detect all stimuli, and that both red-green and blue-yellow discriminations could 
be made at such high saturation levels.  We relate infant looking times to these 
hues to adult ratings of colour preference.  We also relate both measures to how 
the hues activate the ‘red-green’ and ‘blue-yellow’ dimensions of colour encoding 
(as done for adults in Hurlbert & Ling, 2007, and infants in Franklin, Bevis, Ling, & 
Hurlbert, 2010), to identify the extent to which infant looking time and adult 
preference can be summarised by basic sensory processes that underpin colour 
vision.   
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3.3.1.1. Infants  
Data from 295 4-6 month old infants who took part in a study on colour 
categorisation in infants (Skelton et al., 2017) was analysed. The final data set 
consisted of 201 infants (97 male, Mage = 21.23 weeks, SD= 2.47), as 94 infants were 
excluded for the following reasons: fussiness (n=78), lack of looking during the 
critical first trial (n=7), family history of colour deficiency (n=3), prematurity 
(n=3), and experimenter or equipment error (n=3). All infants were full term, 
weighed over 2500g at birth, and had no known neurological or visual conditions, 
and parents reported no family history of colour deficiency. 
3.3.1.2. Adults 
 
Forty adults (5 males) from the University of Sussex (Mage= 20.63 years, SD= 
3.21) took part. All participants were screened for colour vision deficiency using 
Ishihara’s test for colour deficiency (Ishihara, 1917). 
 
3.3.2. Stimuli and set up 
 
The colours were sampled from the World Colour Survey stimulus array, a 
set of 320 colours in the Munsell system which vary in Munsell value (lightness), 
hue, and are at high chroma (similar to colourfulness, or saturation) for each 
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stimulus. Stimuli were 14 hues sampled at regular intervals of Munsell hue around 
the colour circle at one lightness level (Munsell value 4, Y= 12cd/m2).  
In the Munsell system hues are divided around the hue circle into hue sectors: red, 
yellow-red, yellow, green-yellow, green, blue-green, blue, blue-purple, purple, and 
red-purple, using initials (R, YR etc.) for simplicity. The Munsell notation of the 
stimuli is given in the form: hue value/chroma. The full notations of stimuli are; 5 
R 4/14, 7.5 R 4/14, 5 YR 4/8, 2.5 Y 4/6, 10 Y 4/6, 7.5 GY 4/8, 5 G 4/10 2.5 BG 4/8 
10 BG, 4/8, 7.5 B 4/8, 5 BP 4/10, 2.5 P 4/10, 10 P 4/10, 7.5 RP 4/10.  Stimuli are 
also plotted here in a version of the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram 
(figure 3.1), where the two axes represent activation in the retinogeniculate 
pathways that underlie colour vision L/(L+M) (‘red-green’) and S/(L+M)) (‘blue 
yellow’).  The conversion of stimuli from CIE xyY to the MacLeod Boynton 
Chromaticity Diagram was carried out with reflectance spectra taken from the 
University of Joensuu Colour Group database 
(https://wwww.ue.fi/en/web/spectral/spectraldatabase), the Stockman and 
Sharpe 2° cone fundamentals (Stockman & Sharpe, 2000), and a D65 illuminant. 
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Figure 3.1. Stimuli plotted in MacLeod-Boynton cone-opponent space with 
(L/(L+M) and (S/L+M) cardinal axes of colour vision which correspond to 
activation of the retinogeniculate pathways. The dashed vertical and 
horizontal lines indicate the background (Munsell N5) to which infants and 
adults were adapted. The Munsell hue codes for stimuli are given. 
 
For the infants, colours were presented as two 12cm squares in a viewing booth 
painted with Munsell N5 paint (Y= 19.77 cm/m2, x=0.312, y=0.325).  The stimuli 
were presented in two windows whose inner edge was 3.5cm to the left and right 
of central fixation. Infants were seated in a car seat 50cm away from the centre 
point of these windows. Colours were illuminated by an overhead illuminant and 
by two spotlights angled onto the stimuli from behind the infant. All lighting was 
an artificial simulation of natural daylight illumination (D65, 6500k). 
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Adults’ stimulus colours were identical to those used in the infant experiment. 
Each colour was presented as a 5 cm square mounted on card painted with 
Munsell N5 paint. A table was set up in the infant testing booth allowing adult 
participants to view the colours under the same illumination condition as the 
infants.   
 
3.3.3. Design and Procedure 
 
Infant data is taken from the looking times in Skelton et al.’s (2017) colour 
categorisation study. Here, for the purpose of examining colour preference, the 
looking time from the first 8 second trial in Skelton et al. is analysed.  In Skelton et 
al., prior to the first trial, infants were centrally fixated with a black and white 
looming attention-getter displayed on a small screen between the two windows of 
the booth. Once the attention-getter was centrally fixated, two identical squares of 
colour were lowered into the viewing windows, and an experimenter blind to the 
condition coded infant looking to the colours using a MATLAB program whilst 
viewing the infant via a webcam.  Each infant saw one hue, and there was a 
minimum number of 10 infants per hue, with infants randomly allocated to each 
hue. Skelton et al. followed an optional stopping procedure that is routine when 
using Bayesian analysis.  This means that the sensitivity of the Bayes Factors in the 
analysis of Skelton et al. determined how many infants were tested: testing 
stopped when a sensitive Bayes Factor was reached in support of either the null or 
alternative hypotheses (e.g., Rouder, 2014).  As a result of this the number of 
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participants allocated to each hue are not equal across hues (average N per pair = 
14.35, SD = 4.52). 
Adults were shown colours individually in a random order twice and were asked 
to rate their preference for the colours on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 by making 




As in Skelton et al., traditional null hypothesis significance testing is 
accompanied by Bayes factors to aid with the interpretation of the data.  Bayes 
factors allow richer interpretation of the strength of the evidence for either the 
null or alternative hypothesis, (Dienes, 2014), and in the case of regression they 
allow us to assess the predictive strength of each possible regression model, 
without having to correct for multiple comparisons, a process which can increase 
the chance of type II errors (Dienes, 2016). A BF of 0.33 indicates evidence for the 
null hypothesis, and a BFBF of 3 and above indicates substantial support for the 
alternative hypothesis. Values close to 1 suggest that the data is not sensitive 
enough to concretely support either the null or alternative hypothesis (Wetzels & 
Wagenmakers, 2012).  
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3.4.1. Comparison of infant looking time and adult preference ratings 
 
Total infant looking times to both left and right squares of colour were 
averaged across infants for each hue. Infants looked for longest at one of the blue 
hues (10 BG, M= 4236ms, SD= 1180.31), twice as long as the hue they looked at 
least, which was one of the yellow hues (2.5 Y, M= 1996 ms, SD= 1239.60). Adults 
maximum and minimum preference ratings were for the same hues that infants 
looked lonest and least at, with the highest preference for 10 BG (M= 78.86, SE= 
2.52), and lowest for 2.5Y (M= 18.02, SE= 2.11), (figure 3.2). As can be seen in 
figure 3.2, infants tend to look longer the more adults prefer the colour. This was 
confirmed with by a significant robust correlation (using the MATLAB toolbox, 
Pernet, Wilcox, & Rousselet, 2003), between infant looking time and adult 
preference ratings across hues, r=0.73, t= 3.707, p= 0.003, bootstrapped 95% CI 
[0.39 0.91], BF= 17.73. 
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Figure 3.2. Correlations between average infant looking time (ms) and average 
adult preference rating (0-100). Error bars +/- 1SE 
 
3.4.2. Sensory mechanisms of colour preference 
 
In order to assess whether the sensory mechanisms that underpin colour 
vision could summarise infant looking times or adult colour preference, a series of 
regression analyses were conducted.  To determine which model, L/(L+M) or 
S/(L+M), or a combination of both, is most accurate at predicting infant and adult 
response to colour, a stepwise regression with L/(L+M) entered first and S/(L+M) 
second into the model as predictor variables for infant looking time and adult 
preference. Bayes Factors were calculated using an R package, BayesFactor, 
(Rouder & Morey, 2012, Liang, Paulo, Molina, Clyde, & Berger, 2008) for all 
possible models. The stepwise regression found that a significant amount of the 
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variance in infant looking time could be predicted from S/(L+M) alone, with 
infants looking for longer at colours which were bluer (greater S/(L+M) 
activation), R2= 0.304, F(1,12)= 5.23, p= 0.041, Beta= 0.551 (figure 3.3). However, 
the BF for this model was 2.02, suggesting there is not firm evidence in this dataset 
for the experimental hypothesis (Bayes factors for both L/(L+M) and L/(L+M) & 
S/(L+M) models were also insensitive, BF= 0.54, BF=0.97 respectively). 
For adults, the stepwise regression also found that the best model was S/(L+M) 
alone, and adults preferred colours more which were bluer (greater S/(L+M) 
activation), R2=0.515, F= 12.76, p=0.004, Beta=0.718, BF= 10.41 (figure 3.3). Note, 
the Bayes Factor for a model with both L/(L+M) and S/(L+M) was 4.14, 
demonstrating that a model with both predictors would also predict variation in 
adult preference ratings, although to a lesser extent than S/(L+M) alone.  
 
Figure 3.3. Correlations of average adult preference rating (0-100) and S/(L+M) 
(left), and average infant looking time (ms) and S/(L+M) (right). Error bars 
+/- 1SE. 
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The current study aimed to quantify the relationship between how long 
infants look at colours and how much adults like those colours. We found a striking 
correspondence between infant looking and adult liking.  The colour looked at 
least by infants was the most disliked by adults and the colour looked at most by 
infants was the most liked by adults. The relationship between infant and adult 
measures was significant and infant looking times accounted for over half of the 
variance in adult preferences.  Infant looking and adult preference were also both 
best accounted for by a sensory model of colour vision which quantified how the 
colours activate the ‘blue-yellow’ S/(L+M) retinogeniculate pathway.    
The pattern of infant looking across colours, where infants look longest at blue 
hues and least at yellow/green hues was similar to several prior infant studies (e.g. 
Bornstein, 1975; Franklin et al 2010, Franklin , et al., 2008; Teller, Civan, & 
Bronson-Castain, 2004; Zemach, Chang, & Teller, 2007; see also Brown & Lindsey, 
2013). The current study elaborates on the pattern of infant looking by using a far 
more extensive stimulus set than in prior studies.  The stimulus set in the current 
study also had colours that were well above infant chromatic thresholds at 4-6 
months and which were at very high saturation levels to guard against the concern 
that infants cannot make tritan discriminations at low saturation.  Given the 
correspondence between infant looking and adult liking in the current study when 
stimuli are at high saturation, we propose that the different pattern of infant 
looking and lack of infant and adult correspondence in Taylor et al. 2013 was due 
to stimuli being de-saturated.       
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Adult colour preferences, and to a lesser extent infant looking times at colours 
could be effectively summarised by the underlying sensory mechanisms of colour 
vision. The fact that S/(L+M) along was the best predictive model of both infant 
looking and adult preference provides further weight to the argument that infants 
and adults have a similar pattern of response to the colours.  Previous studies, also 
report that adults give a positive weighting to S/(L+M), with adults rating more 
blueish hues as more preferred (Hurlbert & Ling, 2007), although one prior study 
found that infant looking is best summarised by L-M ( Franklin et al., 2010).   We 
propose that this discrepancy can again be explained by infants’ poor tritan 
discrimination at low saturation levels – when stimuli are highly saturated as in 
the current study and unlike in Franklin et al., 2010, S/(L+M) is the strongest 
predictor of infants’ response just like for adults.  For both adults and infants, the 
relationship between S/(L+M) and their response does appear to be somewhat 
curvilinear (with their response peaking at blue not at maximum S/L+M) which 
explains why a simple linear model of sensory mechanisms only predicts around 
half of the variance in response.  More complex modelling of other colour spaces 
may capture infant colour preferences better than just cone-opponency, as in 
adults (Schloss, Lessard, Racey, & Hurlbert, 2017). Nevertheless, the relationship 
of adult colour preference with S/(L+M) and also with infant looking times 
provides further weight to the argument that colour preference is at least partially 
rooted in the sensory mechanisms of our colour vision.   
Of course, how long infants look at colours cannot completely account for how 
much adults like colours – just over half of the variance in adult preference is 
explained.  This leaves room for other experiential factors to contribute to adult 
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colour preference such as the associations between colour and objects that are 
made over a lifetime (e.g., Palmer & Schloss, 2010).  We are not suggesting that 
colour preferences are completely ‘innate’.  We also do not suggest here that how 
long an infant looks at a colour reflects their affective or aesthetic response to 
colour.  Infants might look longer at stimuli for reasons other than liking those 
stimuli.  For example, novelty or complexity is known to drive infants’ looking 
response, for example infants look for longer at a fearful face than a happy face 
(Peltola, Leppanen, Palokangas, & Hietanen, 2007).  Adults do look longer at 
stimuli that they like (Taylor et al., 2010), yet we are unable to determine from this 
and prior studies whether this is the case for infants (see Taylor et al., 2010 for 
further discussion of this issue).   Further research which aims to identify how 
infants’ sensory biases to some colours over others matures into a conscious and 
explicit affective response to colour is needed.  For now we establish that when 
colours are sufficiently saturated for infants to see there is a high degree of 
similarity between how long infants look at those colours and how much they are 
liked by adults. 
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Chapter 4. Further investigation of the Munker- White illusion in infancy 
 





Investigating whether the developing visual system perceives visual 
illusions can further understanding of how low-and high-level perceptual 
processes develop, and also of the mechanisms behind the illusions. A previous 
study (Yang, Kanazawa, & Yamaguchi, 2010) suggested that 4-8 month old infants 
can perceive the Munker-White illusion, an illusion where colours appear different 
depending on their context. Here we question whether the illusory effect of Yang et 
al.’s stimuli really would be strong enough for 4 month old infants to detect given 
their poor chromatic sensitivity.  In Experiment 1, we attempt to replicate Yang et 
al’s study, and in Experiment 2 we adopt an alternative habituation method. 
Neither experiment provides evidence that infants at 4 months perceive the 
Munker-White illusion. The methodological challenges in establishing whether or 
not infants perceive visual illusions are discussed.  
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4.2. Introduction  
4.2.1. Visual illusions in infancy 
 
Visual illusions are a by-product of the visual system trying to understand 
ambiguous information, and are a key feature of perceptual experience (Corney & 
Lotto, 2007). Research on the perception of illusions in infancy could potentially 
provide a greater understanding how perceptual experience develops, how 
equivalent infant and adult perception is, as well as the mechanisms behind the 
illusion itself (Pereverzeva & Teller, 2009).  Prior studies have argued that infants 
perceive illusions that depend on visual completion and illusory contours, such as 
the Kanizwa square (Kawabata, Gyoba, Inoue, & Ohtsubo, 1999), simultaneous 
contrast (Pereverzeva & Teller, 2009) and the Munker-White illusion (Yang et al., 
2010). If infants really do perceive these illusions then it suggests that the visual 
processes that underpin these illusions such as assimilation, perceptual 
transparency, and figure-ground processing are active in early infancy.  The 
current study re-visits the claim that infants perceive the Munker-White illusion. 
We provide both a replication and extension of prior research in order to establish 
whether infants really do perceive this illusion and to further understand how the 
illusion works.  
 
4.2.2. The Munker-White illusion 
 
The Munker-White illusion is an illusion where a colour is perceived as 
different depending on the context. (White, 1979) The illustration in figure 4.1 
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shows the same orange coloured circle either on a blue background with green 
overlapping stripes (on the left), or on a green background with blue overlapping 
stripes (on the right). Both left and right circles are composed of the same orange 
colour (as in the top central circle), yet the context of the stripes and background 
means that the orange is perceived differently in the two examples.  Theories on 
the illusion have previously suggested the involvement of low-level mechanisms 
such as colour assimilation (Ripamonti & Gerbino, 2001) and simultaneous 
contrast (Anderson , 2003). Colour assimilation is a colourimetric shift towards a 
surrounding colour, and simultaneous contrast is a colourimetric shift away from a 
surrounding colour. However, models incorporating only these low-level 
mechanisms can underestimate the size of the illusion in adults. It is only by 
including higher-order processes as well that the illusion can be accounted for.  For 
example, by including scission; the segmentation of a scene which presumes the 
illusory colour is an object which lies between the foreground and background 
(Anderson, 2003).  
 
Figure 4.1. Illustration of the Munker-White illusion. There are a total of three 
individual chromaticities in this image, the stripes (blue and green), and the 
circles (orange). All three circles in the image are composed of the same 
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orange colour but are perceived as different depending on the surround and 
foreground (e.g. on a blue background with green stripes in the foreground 
(left), or on a green background with blue stripes foreground (right)).  
 
There is evidence that the low-level processes that have been implicated in the 
Munker-White illusion are present from 4-6 months old.  For example, Pereverzeva 
and Teller, (2009), demonstrated simultaneous colour contrast in infants at 4 
months.  They presented infants with two coloured circles; one embedded in a 
static chromatic surround, and the other in a temporally modulating surround 
which flickered between two chromaticities at a rate below threshold for adults. As 
it was below threshold, it was perceived as static, but the modulation of colour 
resulted in the embedded circle being perceived as shifted in colour a result of 
simultaneous contrast between stimulus and surround. Infants preferred the 
modulating stimulus over the static, showing that they could detect the changes in 
the chromaticity of the embedded circle. Higher order scene segmentation abilities 
such as scission have also been shown to be present in infants 4-7 months old (e.g., 
Johnson & Aslin, 2000). Johnson and Aslin (2000) habituated infants to a stimulus 
where a coloured rod moved behind a semi-transparent rectangle which altered 
the hue of the part of the rod which it overlapped. Infants at test looked 
preferentially at a two coloured rod, rather than a single coloured rod, suggesting 
that they perceived the two-coloured object as novel, and had perceived one single 
colour object behind a semi-transparent object during habituation. However, even 
if infants perceive processes such as simultaneous contrast and scission on some 
tasks this does not guarantee that infants are able to integrate these different 
processes in a way that causes them to perceive the Munker-White illusion.  One 
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study has claimed that infants perceive the Munker-White illusion from as early as 
4-months old (Yang et al., 2010).  However, the current study questions the 
validity of this claim.   
 
4.2.3. Examination of Yang et al. (2010) 
 
 In Yang et al.’s study, stimuli were made up of three colours (figure 4.2): 
red, pink, and yellow, displayed so that the yellow would be perceived as more 
saturated in one stimulus (on the left) than the other (on the right), despite having 
the same chromaticity. Infants prefer colours which are perceived as more 
saturated  (Teller & Bronson-Castain, 2004), and so it was expected that if infants 
can perceive the illusion they would prefer to look at the side with the more 
perceptually saturated yellow. Infants did indeed look longer at this stimulus. A 
potential alternative explanation for this finding is that infants looked longer at 
that stimulus as it had a greater amount of red than the other stimulus as prior 
studies have found that infants look longer at red than some other colours 
(Franklin, Bevis, Ling, & Hurlbert, 2010, Franklin, Gibbons, Chittenden, Alvarez, & 
Taylor, 2012). Yang et al. attempted to control for this with a second pair of stimuli 
which had the same ratios of colour than the original stimuli, but where the three 
colours were shown spatially separately (see bottom panel of figure 4.2).  Infants 
did not have a preference for the stimulus with more red when shown in this form.  
It was therefore inferred that infants’ preferences reflect their ability to perceive 
the Munker-White illusion. 
   
105 
 
   
 
 
Figure 4.2. Examples of composition of the stimulus sets used in Experiment 1, 
stimuli here are illustrative, and not exact replicas of the actual stimuli 
used. Test stimuli are illusory stimuli, although the red, yellow, and pink 
elements of the two stimuli are identical, the yellow in the target stimulus 
appears more saturated than the yellow in the non-target stimulus. Control 
stimuli are composed of the same colours in the same ratios as the colours 
in the test stimuli.  
 
Here we question the conclusions of Yang et al.’s study.  Our main concern is that 
the perceived illusory difference in the saturation of the yellow is noticeable but 
small even to adults, and we question whether infants would be able to 
discriminate such a small difference in perceived saturation.  Discrimination of 
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saturation increases by a factor of 1.4-2 with each doubling of age across the 
lifespan (Knoblauch, Vital-Durand, & Barbur, 2001). Given that the perceived 
difference in the saturation of the yellow is small for adults we question whether it 
would be discriminable for infants given their much smaller saturation thresholds.   
We also consider whether the control in Yang et al. does indeed rule out 
alternative explanations for infants’ preference. The control aims to control for a 
priori preferences for red as an alternative explanation.  However, there is more 
varying in the illusory trials than just the amount of red. For example, the target 
stimulus is perceived as ‘warmer’ than the non-target stimulus and whether or not 
the red colour is in the foreground or background of the stimulus also differs.  We 
therefore propose that Yang et al.’s conclusion that infants perceive the Munker-
White illusion is unsafe – there are potential other explanations for infants 
response. 
 
4.2.4. The current study 
 
In the current study we present two experiments which investigate 
whether infants really do perceive the Munker-White illusion.  First, given concern 
over whether infants really could discriminate such a small perceived difference in 
saturation in Yang et al.’s study, Experiment 1 presents a straightforward 
replication of Yang et al’s original study. One possibility is that the effect in Yang et 
al. is actually a type 1 error.  Replication is important in developmental science 
particularly given the variation in effect sizes often found across studies as a result 
of a noisy participant population (Duncan, Engel, Claessens, & Dowsett, 2014). It is 
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also in all research not uncommon to have varying p values across many 
replications, even though there is no change in population effect (Cumming, 2011), 
meaning that replications are valuable for gauging a measure of the true effect of 
the experimental manipulation. Second, given concern over the stimulus design 
and control in Yang et al., Experiment 2 presents a new method and stimulus set 
for studying the Munker-White illusion in infants. This method controls for 
potential a priori preference confounds and we choose illusory stimuli that should 
be discriminable for infants.  The experiment aims to enable us to more confidently 
determine whether infants are responding on the basis of the physical 
characteristics of the stimuli or their perceived illusory content. 
4.3. Experiment 1: Replication of Yang et al 
Experiment 1 is a straightforward replication of Yang et al., we also measure 
infants’ eye-movements with an eye-tracker to provide greater precision on infant 




Twenty five participants (11 male) aged between 4-8 months (Mage= 200.96 
days, SD=54.13) took part in the study. A further 2 were tested but excluded due to 
fussiness. In the final sample, 12 infants were aged between 4-6 months (Mage= 
148.54 days, SD=18.76, and 13 were aged 6-8 months ((Mage= 249.64 days, 
SD=15.35). In Yang et al (2010) there were 28 infants in total, with 14 infants in 
each age group. . All infants were full term, weighed over 2500g at birth, and had 
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no known neurological of visual conditions, and parents reported no family history 
of colour deficiency.  
4.3.1.2. Apparatus and set up 
 
Infants sat in a car seat 50cm from a 22” Mitsubishi DiamondPlus 230SB 
Diamondtron CRT monitor, with a resolution of 1600x1200, and a refresh rate 85 
Hz. Eye-movement data was recorded via SR Research Eyelink 1000 system using 
remote tracking.  
4.3.1.3. Stimuli 
 
There were two sets of stimuli; test and control. Both sets were replicas of 
those used in (Yang et al, 2010). The test stimuli consisted of 118 horizontal 
stripes of either red (CIE x = 0.575, y = 0.347, Y (lightness) = 24.2) or pink (CIE x = 
0.306, y = 0.186, Y(lightness)=24.2). These stripes overlapped a set of vertical 
stripes alternating yellow (CIE x = 0.410, y = 0.487, Y (lightness) = 40.5) and either 
red or pink (figure 4.2). This results in the yellow appearing more saturated in one 
image than in the other; the perceived more saturated stimulus (with red 
overlapping stripes) is the ‘target’ and the perceived less saturated stimulus (with 
pink overlapping stripes) the ‘non-target’ (pink overlapping stripes). 
In order to asses if infants will look longer at stimuli with higher proportions of 
red, the control stimuli were blocks of the same red, pink, and yellow in the same 
spatial area of colour as the test stimuli. The control stimulus with a greater 
amount of red is referred to as the target control stimulus (figure 4.2).  
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Infants watched cartoons whilst the eye-tracking camera was set up, and 
then completed a 5 point calibration. Infants were centrally fixated by a black and 
white looming attention getter before each trial appeared, as well as between 
trials.  
Participants were first shown two 15 second trials with the target and non-target 
stimulus counter-balanced for left and right location, followed by two 15 second 




Traditional null hypothesis significance testing is accompanied throughout 
all experiments by Bayes factors to aid with interpretation of the data.  Bayes 
factors allow richer interpretation of the strength of the evidence for either the 
null or alternative hypothesis, (Dienes, 2014). A (B) of 0.33 indicates evidence for 
the null hypothesis, and a (B) of 3 and above indicate substantial support for the 
alternative hypothesis. Values close to 1 suggest that the data is not sensitive 
enough to concretely support either the null or alternative hypothesis  (Wetzels & 
Wagenmakers, 2012))  
As in the original study, infant looking time to the target stimulus was converted to 
proportional looking (looking time to target/ looking time to target + non 
target).The mean total looking time of the two trials for 4-5 month infants (M= 
17656.31ms, SD= 6907.21ms), and for 6-8 month old infants (M=21147.15ms , 
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SD=4017.67ms) was not significantly different to the mean looking times reported 
for these age groups (19200ms and 19400 ms) in Yang et al (2010) (4-5 month old 
infants, t (12)=-0.806, p=0.436, BF=0.361, 6-8 month old infants, t (13)= 1.253, 
p=0.232, BF=0.520).  If infant looking behaviour is driven by a perceived higher 
saturation in the yellow, then they should look longer at the target stimulus during 
the test trials. This appeared to be the case, participants looked proportionally 
longer at the target stimulus than the non-target stimulus (53.89% vs 46.11%, see 
the left most column in figure 4.3). However, this was not supported by analysis 
via a one sample t-test against chance (0.5), t=1.738, p=0.094. A Bayes Factor 
calculated with the method of Dienes (2008), with a standard deviation of 0.2 
(chosen to reflect the distribution of novelty preferences usually found in infant 
research), supported that there was no significant difference from chance, 
BF=0.04. Analysis by age group revealed that neither 4-5 month olds or 6-8 month 
old show a significant preference for the target stimulus (younger infants, 
t(12)=1.338, p=0.206, BF=0.03, older infants, t(13)=1.133, p=0.278, BF=0.02). 
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Figure 4.3. Preference for the target stimulus in the illusory (test) and control 
(made up of 3 blocks of colour) conditions, where equal looking at target 
and non-target stimuli would be 0.5 (dashed line). Error bars represent +/-
1SE. In the illusory condition, the target stimulus is the one where the 
yellow is perceived by adults to be more saturated, and the target control 
stimulus is the one with the highest proportion of red in it.  
 
Younger infants did not look proportionally longer than older infants at the target 
stimulus over the non-target stimulus on the test (illusory) trials as they had in 
Yang et al. To confirm that age does not predict looking preference to the target 
stimulus, we ran a linear regression with age as a predictor variable, and found no 
significant relationship between looking preference and age, F(1,27)=0.003, 
p=0.95, BF=0.35.  
Infants did not look significantly longer at the control target stimulus than the non-
target control stimulus (52% vs 48%, see right-hand column in figure 4.3). This 
was supported by one sample t-test to chance (0.5), t(26)=-0.975, p=0.338, BF= 
0.01, There was no relationship between age and looking preference for the 
control stimuli. A linear regression with age as a predictor on looking preference 
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4.3.3. Experiment 1 Discussion 
 
Yang et al’s hypothesis was that if infants could perceive the Munker-White 
illusion, they would look for longer at the target stimulus during test trials due to 
the increased perceived saturation of the yellow. In the current study, we do not 
replicate the findings of Yang et al: infants did not look significantly longer at the 
target illusory stimulus.  Bayes factors indicate that we can have confidence in this 
null effect: the null result is not an issue with power and we have sufficient 
evidence in support of the null. The samples of infants used across studies is very 
similar, using the same age ranges, and approximately the same number of infants 
(25 vs 28 infants), and the analysis reported here is the same as that carried out in 
Yang et al’s (2010) study.  
One explanation for the lack of preferential looking at the target than non-target 
stimulus in the current study is that Yang et al.’s stimuli do not produce a large 
enough illusory effect for infants’ to discriminate.  As outlined above, what 
motivated the replication was concern over whether or not the perceived 
difference in the saturation of the yellow in the stimuli as a result of the illusion 
really is discriminable for infants.  To verify this concern, we checked how similar 
the two yellows are perceived for adults and whether this perceived difference is 
above discrimination thresholds for infants.  To do this we asked 3 adults to 
choose a yellow stimulus with a computerised colour-picker that matched the 
perceived yellow in both test stimuli.  The difference in the perceived yellows was 
on average 5.84 ΔE units in a perceptual colour space (CIE LUV, 1976), whereas 
Knoblauch et al. (2001) report average saturation thresholds of 21 ΔE at 4-months 
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old.   This supports our suspicion that the stimuli used by Yang et al. may well be 
unsuitable for assessing the Munker-White illusion in infants.  
 
4.4. Experiment 2: A new design and stimulus set for assessing the Munker-White                              
illusion in infancy 
 
The lack of replication of Yang et al. in Experiment 1 re-opens the question 
of whether infants do perceive the Munker-White illusion. Experiment 2 aims to 
adopt a more appropriate stimulus set for testing the illusion in infants and a 
design which more effectively isolates an illusory response. The design relies on 
the method of habituation, and the design can distinguish whether infant looking 
at test is driven by the physical or illusory perceptual difference in the stimuli, 
where the differences are above infant detection thresholds. The method also aims 
to control for infants’ a priori colour preferences. 
Infants are first shown coloured rectangles on a red and purple striped 
background. These rectangles represent the physical match to the embedded 
rectangle used during the habituation phase, the perceptual match to this colour 
when viewed as part of the illusion, and a third completely novel colour. Following 
this, during the habituation phase infants are shown two identical stimuli where 
one of the rectangles of colour during the a priori preference phase is either 
presented on a red background with overlapping purple stripes, or a purple 
background with red stripes. If infants perceive the illusion then during the 
habituation phase they will habituate to the illusory perceived colour of the 
embedded rectangle, and not the physical colour of it. During the test phase infants 
should look longer at the perceptual match than the physical colour, as the 
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perceptual match is novel to them. As longer looking in the test phase of 
habituation tasks can be interpreted as a familiarity preference (Houston-Price & 
Nakai, 2004), a completely novel colour different to those seen in the illusory 
stimulus is also presented at test in order to distinguish whether infant responding 
at test is driven by novelty of familiarity. If infants look for longest at this 
completely novel colour, we can infer that longer looking at either the perceptual 
or the physical matches is the result of a novelty preference, and not a familiarity 
preference. Finally, we also control for a priori preferences by comparing infant 






Thirty four infants (17 male) aged between 4-8 months (Mage=190 days, 
SD= 37.05) took part in the study. A further 6 infants were tested but excluded due 
to a family history of colour deficiency (N=2) or not completing all test trials (N=4).  
All infants were full term, weighed over 2500g at birth, and had no known 
neurological or visual conditions, and parents reported no family history of colour 
deficiency. 
4.4.1.2. Apparatus and set up 
The apparatus and set up were the same as in Experiment 1.  
4.4.1.3. Stimuli 
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Stimuli were either patches of colour on a striped background (for pre- and 
post-habituation phases of the study, see procedure), or patches of colour on a 
coloured background overlapped by stripes (for the habituation phase).  
Each stimulus is made of three colours; the two colours which make up the 
background/foreground stripes, and a third patch of colour. The third colour was 
either a physical match to the rectangle in the illusory trials, a perceptual match to 
the appearance of the coloured rectangle in the illusory trials, or a novel colour 
which is not close in appearance to the perceptual or physical colour patches on 
other trials, but of a similar lightness as the physical and perceptual match. A novel 
stimulus was included to aid with interpretation of the results post-habituation. To 
find these perceptual matches, 8 adults (Mage= 23 years) were presented each of 
the stimuli in the illusory pair individually, and asked to adjust a coloured 
rectangle (presented on a background of red and purple stripes) to match their 
perception of the rectangle in the illusory stimulus. Participants could adjust the 
colour in hue, saturation, and lightness, and stimuli were displayed in the same 
size as they were used in the infant experiment. 
As the illusion can be seen in two ways (with red stripes overlapping the patch, or 
purple stripes overlapping the rectangle), there are two stimulus sets which differ 
in illusory and perceptual match stimuli. 
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Figure 4.4. a) Examples of stimulus set, i) illusory stimulus, stimulus used in 
habituation phase of study composed of a patch of colour on either a red 
(purple) background with purple (red) stripes overlapping. ii-iv) non-
illusory stimuli, patches of colour on red and purple striped backgrounds, 
used during pre/post habituation trials; a physical match to the rectangle 
under the stripes in i), a perceptual match, and a novel colour. The 
chromaticity and luminance co-ordinates of the stimuli (in CIE colour 
space) are given below each stimulus.  Note, due to differences in monitor 
displays, printing, and size of the stimuli, colours may not appear correctly 
in the above figure. 
The Euclidean distance between the different coloured rectangles ranged between 
26.08 ΔE - 93.98 ΔE in a perceptual colour space (CIELUV, 1976), which is above 
the average chromatic discrimination threshold at 4-months (21 ΔE) as reported in 




There were three phases to the experiment: a priori preference; 
habituation; and test phases. During the a priori preference phase, participants 
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were shown the non-illusory stimuli in pairs. All non-illusory stimuli were paired 
with each other, with each trial being seen twice counter-balanced for left and 
right location of stimuli giving a total of 6 randomly presented trials, each 
presented for 3 seconds. This initial phase was to assess a priori preference for the 
different stimuli prior to habituation and test. 
During the habituation phase, infants saw 3 x 15 second trials of the illusory 
stimuli, where both stimuli on the left and right of the screen were identical. 
Participants were randomly allocated to habituation condition, seeing either the 
coloured rectangle on a red background with purple over lapping stripes, or a 
purple background with red overlapping stripes. Finally, in the test phase, 
participants saw the same 6 trials as during the a priori preference phase, again 




First, we check whether infants habituate to the illusory stimulus shown in 
the habituation phase.  An ANOVA with Trial as a factor revealed a significant 
decrease in looking times across habituation trials, F(2,66)=6.49, p= .003, 
BF=12.56 (figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5. Looking time (ms) to illusory stimuli shown across three trials during 
the habituation phase of the experiment. Error bars represent +/- 1SE.  
 
Second, we assess infant looking time at test.  If infants see the rectangle of colour 
during the habituation trials as its physical colour, as opposed to its illusory colour, 
then participants will look for longer at the perceptual match and novel stimulus 
during the test trials, as these would be the least familiar to them. However, if 
infants see the illusion during the habituation trials, we expect that they would 
look for longest at the physical match, and the novel stimulus.  In order to control 
for a priori preferences we also compare looking time at the three stimulus types 
at test post-habitation to pre-habituation. 
Infant looking time to test stimuli was analysed with an ANOVA with Stimulus 
Type (physical match, perceptual match, or novel colour) and Time (pre-
habituation or post-habituation), with age as a covariate (figure 4.6). There was no 
main effect of Stimulus Type F(2,64)=0.556, p=0.576, BF=0.131, or of Time (BF 
1.147 , insensitive), crucially, there was no significant interaction between time 
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and stimulus type, F(2,64)=0.011, p=0.989, BF=0.202. There was no difference in 





Figure 4.6. Total looking time at each stimulus (physical match, perceptual match, 
or novel) pre and post habituation. The maximum possible looking time at a 




Experiment 2 aimed to establish whether or not infants perceive the 
Munker-White illusion with a more appropriate stimulus set and design than Yang 
et al.’s original study, using the method of habituation.  Infants did habituate to the 
illusory stimulus during the habituation phase, however, their looking time did not 
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differ across the 3 stimulus types at test.  Infants looked equally at test at the 
stimulus which had a patch of colour that matched the physical colour of the 
illusory stimulus, and the stimulus which had a patch of colour that matched the 
illusory perception of the illusory stimulus, and a completely novel stimulus.  
Comparison of pre- and post-habituation looking times at the three stimuli also 
revealed that habituation to the illusory stimulus did not affect looking times to the 
stimuli: the pattern was the same pre- and post-habituation.   
We expected that infants would show a change in preference to the perceptual and 
physical matches of the illusory stimuli pre- and post- habituation, and that which 
stimulus the infants looked at longest at test would indicate whether the colours of 
the illusory stimulus are perceived as illusory or not. However, the lack of looking 
difference to three stimulus types does not support the hypothesis that infants 
perceive the illusory colour but also does not support the hypothesis that they 
perceive the illusory stimulus as a straightforward physical representation.   The 
sensitive Bayes factor for the lack of interaction between Stimulus Type and Time 
indicates that we can be confident of our null effect and that the lack of effect is not 
due to issues of power.   
The finding of the current experiment therefore suggests that the method is not 
sensitive enough to reveal whether infants’ respond differently to illusory or 
physical representations of the habituated stimulus.  One possibility is that infants 
did not sufficiently encode the differences in the physical, illusory and novel 
stimuli before and after habituation.  The high contrast red and purple stripes 
which surrounded the rectangle of colour which varied across conditions could 
potentially have provided too much of a distraction for infants to encode the colour 
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of the rectangle.  In support of this explanation, at test infants only spent 15% of 
the time looking at the coloured rectangle and 85% looking at the red and purple 
stripes. This low proportion of looking time at the coloured rectangle could 
indicate that infants did not encode the critical part of the stimulus for the 
rationale of the experiment.  Therefore, although we believe that Experiment 2 has 
many improvements relative to Yang et al.’s design (perceived stimulus differences 
were above infants discrimination thresholds; a priori preferences were controlled 
for and physical and illusory responses could be determined at test), the 
experiment is also unable to reveal whether infants’ perceive the Munker-White 
illusion. 
 
4.5. General Discussion 
 
Here we present two experiments which aim to establish whether infants 
perceive the Munker-White illusion.  Experiment 1 does not replicate Yang et al.’s 
(2010) finding that infants look longer at a stimulus that has greater perceived 
saturation due to the Munker-White illusion.  We propose that the lack of 
replication is not surprising since the perceived difference in saturation between 
the two test stimuli as a result of the illusion is very likely below threshold for 
infants at the age tested.  We therefore consider it likely that Yang et al.’s finding is 
a type 1 error.  Using Bayes Factors demonstrated that there was evidence in to 
support the null hypothesis, and so the null finding is not a result of reduced 
power. Experiment 2 aimed to address some of the stimulus and design limitations 
of Yang et al,’s study.  The experiment chose stimuli that were intended to 
maximise the illusory effect, where the difference between colours was above 
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threshold for infants.  The design also enabled us to control for infants’ 
spontaneous colour preferences, and there were clear predictions on how infants 
would respond if they saw the illusion or not.  However, despite these stimulus and 
design improvements, Experiment 2 was unable to decipher whether infants 
perceive the Munker- White illusion as infants looked equally at 2 test stimuli that 
matched the physical characteristics or the illusory perceptual characteristics of a 
habituated stimulus.  A further analysis of infant looking times suggested that 
infants may have been distracted by the striped background of the stimuli rather 
than looking at the critical coloured central rectangle and as a result differences in 
looking time across stimuli were not found.   Therefore, overall, we cannot answer 
the question of whether infants perceive the Munker-White illusion, and the lack of 
replication of Yang et al reopens this question for further investigation.  
There are several options for how to take the question of whether or not infants 
see the Munker-White illusion forward. One option would be to simplify the 
variation across stimuli by testing the achromatic version of the Munker-White 
illusion. In this version of the illusion, the perceived difference varies only in 
lightness and there are no changes in hue or colour temperature. Again the size of 
the perceptual effect of the illusion is quite small, and so it may be necessary to test 
older infants at a point where their visual sensitivity is developed enough to detect 
these small changes.  Another option would be to find an alternative design that 
builds on the improvements in the design in Experiment 2 but where infants will 
not be distracted by the striped background at test.   For example, one idea would 
be to make the rectangle in the test stimuli dynamic as movement is likely to aid 
with perception and attention in infants (Otsuka & Yamaguchi, 2003). 
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The current study illustrates two major challenges in investigating illusions in 
infancy. First, it should be clear what the expected responses from infants would 
be if they can see the illusion or cannot see the illusion. Preferential looking as 
used in Yang et al can represent infants’ ability to discriminate between the two 
physically different stimuli but this does not necessarily mean that they also see 
the illusion. Alternative looking time paradigms such as habituation (as used in e.g. 
(Tsuruhara, Nakato, Otsuka, & Kanazawa, 2011) study of the hollow face illusion) 
provide a less ambiguous alternative, but again, only when there is are clearly 
expected patterns of behaviour expected from infants who can and cannot 
perceive the illusion. Second, a priori preferences must be measured or accounted 
for appropriately. Infant looking behaviour and preference for stimuli can change 
with context, something which control stimuli must consider. Often the 
relationship between parts of a stimulus such as the spatial relationship or colour 
ratio is changed in studies of visual illusions to ‘break’ the illusion to provide a 
control condition (e.g. Kavšek, 2009; Kanazawa,, Kitaoka, & Yamaguchi, 2013).  
However, this can provide a new context for the same elements of the stimuli 
which could influence infant looking behaviour in a different way to the test 
condition. To best interpret the results of a study, infants’ a priori looking 
preferences for stimuli must be accounted for.  
Although studying the development of visual illusions in infants is challenging, 
visual illusions are a central part of human perception and are therefore important 
to understand. Studying illusions across development can give us an insight into 
how physiological and psychological processes develop. Illusions which are the 
result of low-level mechanisms (e.g. Mach bands, caused by lateral-inhibition) 
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provide another method of tracking the development of physiological processes 
across infancy. Many illusions which are not low-level are the result of an attempt 
to integrate statistics about the current scene with our previous experience with 
the environment (Corney & Lotto, 2007), and so may offer insight into how infants 
and children learn to integrate information from their experience and their current 
environment.  Therefore, the endeavour of establishing what visual illusions 
infants can see is a worthwhile one, and the current study identifies key issues that 
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Chapter 5. Colour vision is aligned with natural scene statistics at 4 months of age 
 
Skelton, A. E., Franklin, A., & Bosten, J.M, for submission to Nature. 
 
5.1. Abstract  
 
Visual perception in human adults is optimised to represent the statistical 
regularities of natural scenes (e.g. Párraga, Troscianko,& Tolhurst, 2000; 
Simoncelli, 2003). In infancy and early childhood, visual input is required to drive 
visual development (Blakemore, & Cooper, 1970; Berardi, Pizzorusso, & Maffei, 
2000; Knudsen, 2004), but we do not know if higher order scene statistics are 
extracted and represented. In adults, sensitivity to different hues shows an 
asymmetry, which relates to the statistical regularity of colour in the natural 
world. We measured infant colour discrimination to investigate whether or not the 
visual system in very early life can represent higher order scene statistics. Our 
results reveal that even as young as four months of age, colour vision is aligned 
with the distribution of colour in natural scenes. This is the earliest association 
between vision and natural scene statistics that has been found. Our measurement 
and analysis of full psychometric functions for infants and adults has additionally 
revealed that independent processes govern visual performance at different 
chromatic intensities. This additional finding suggests that the different choices of 
threshold criteria that are typically applied in the field of psychophysics may lead 
to different conclusions about the underlying visual processes.  
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Human perception is optimised in many ways to extract information from 
the environments that we find ourselves in. These calibrative processes occur over 
different time scales, both over evolutionary history (Hansen, Throsten, & 
Gegenfurtner, 2009), and within the lifetime of the individual (e.g. Wachtler, Doi, 
Lee, & Sejnowski, 2007). Some calibrative processes undoubtedly occur in infancy: 
for example, face (e.g. Kelly et al 2007), speech (e.g. Kuhl et al., 2006) and music 
(Hannon & Trehub, 2006) perception “narrow” during infancy to show biases for 
the stimuli encountered in infants’ individual environments. In mature perceptual 
systems, there is tuning to higher-order statistical regularities of visual scenes, 
thus visual channels are optimised to extract the regularities of spatial frequency 
(Hansen & Hess, 2006; Knill, Field, & Kersten, 1990; Tadmor & Tolhurst, 1994), 
orientation (Hansen & Essock, 2004), and attributes of colour (Long, Yang, & 
Purves, 2006) in natural scenes. Relatively little is known about when during 
visual development representations of the statistical regularities of natural scenes 
arise. Ellemberg et al. (2012) have found that representations of the spatial 
frequency structure of natural scenes was present in 10 year-olds but undeveloped 
in 6- and 8- year-olds. The only existing work on infants has shown that 9-month 
olds prefer a violation of natural texture representations only under some 
conditions (Balas & Woods, 2014) – conclusions about the alignment between 
infant perception and natural scenes cannot be securely drawn. 
Colour vision is a good example of a perceptual system that is optimised at several 
levels to extract information from natural scenes.  Human colour vision relies of 
information from three classes of retinal receptors, long- (L), medium- (M) and 
   
127 
 
   
 
short- (S) wavelength sensitive cones. The particular sensitivities of the human 
cones have evolved to optimally represent colour information relevant to the diets 
or skin colours of our primate ancestors (Changizi, Zhang, & Shimojo, 2006; Osorio 
& Vorobyev, 1996; Regan et al., 2001). Postreceptorally, colour is processed 
predominantly in two chromatically opponent channels, which themselves seem to 
be optimised to reduce information redundancy about natural scenes (Ruderman, 
Cronin, & Chiao, 1998). There has been recent interest in a third level of alignment 
with natural scene statistics: colour discrimination is poorest along a blue-yellow 
colour axis (Honjyo & Nonaka, 1970; Krauskopf & Gegenfurtner, 1992; Pearce et 
al., 2014; Álvaro, Linhares, Moreira, Lillo, & Nascimento, 2017) which is 
intermediate between the colour axes along which the two chromatically opponent 
retinogeniculate colour mechanisms are tuned (the vertical and horizontal axes in 
Figure 5.1a). It is the blue-yellow axis that contains most variance in natural scenes 
(Webster & Mollon, 1997; Bosten, Beer, & MacLeod, 2015), see figure 5.1b & c for 
an example of the variation found in natural scenes).  
 
 
Figure 5.1. a) The MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram representing the 
chromatically opponent channels of colour vision (L/(L+M) and S/(L+M)), 
the location of the blue-yellow axis is approximately along the negative 
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diagonal of this figure. b) an example of a natural scene, and c) a histogram 
showing the density and distribution of chromaticities of the natural scene 
(b) in the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram. The largest variance in 
chromaticities can be seen to fall along the negative diagonal. 
 
In the present study we investigated the time course of development of 
representation of the statistical distribution of colours in natural scenes by 
measuring colour discrimination in infants. We chose infants aged 4-6 months 
because existing data show that the S-cone reliant colour subsystem develops 
relatively late at 2-3 months ( Bornstein, 1975; Brown & Teller, 1989; Suttle et al., 
2002), and it is only after this point that infants have trichromatic colour vision. 
For 60 infants and 19 adults we measured eye movements to chromatic targets 
varying across 8 levels of saturation in 8 hue directions (Figure 5.2).  
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Figure 5.2. a) Infant (left) and adult (right) target chromaticities along the 8 
individual axes presented in a version of the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity 
diagram. Towards the centre of the figure, colours are less saturated, 
increasing in saturation radially along the axes. b)  Example target (left) is 
displayed within 6.9o of the participants’ fixation point.  If the target is 
fixated for a minimum of 160ms, the target is replaced by a smiley face 
(right), and a noise is played, and is recorded as a ‘hit’ for this trial. See 
appendix B, figure 9.2 for full example of trial progression. 
 
For each hue, when rate of detection is plotted against target saturation, a colour 
discrimination threshold can be defined at a certain performance criterion (alpha) 
along the resulting psychometric function (Figure 5.3a). Through thresholds for 
   
130 
 
   
 
each of the eight colours we fit colour discrimination ellipses, where the distance 
from the centre of the ellipse in each hue direction is the discrimination threshold 
in the MacLeod-Boynton chromaticity diagram (MacLeod & Boynton, 1979). We 
chose the MacLeod-Boynton diagram as a colour metric because it represents 
along its cardinal axes activity in the two predominant post-receptoral 
retinogeniculate colour mechanisms (Webster, & Mollon, 1991). If colour 
discrimination is limited by noise in either of these cardinal colour mechanisms, 
the resulting discrimination ellipse would be oriented either horizontally or 
vertically. Any bias in colour discrimination, such as a blue-yellow bias, means that 
discrimination must be determined by non-cardinal colour mechanisms.  
   
131 
 




   
132 
 
   
 
Figure 5.3. a) Example psychometric function, and psychometric functions for 
infants and adults across the 8 axes of the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity 
diagram, all showing probability of target detection as a function of 
stimulus intensity (saturation). The example psychometric function 
demonstrates how different alpha criterion result in different threshold 
measurements along the same psychometric function. For the infant and 
adult data, each individual graph shows psychometric functions for a 
specific axis in the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram, noted by angle 
in the bottom left of each figure. Thresholds were extracted at a range of 
alphas, and then used to fit ellipses to the three sample groups; two infant 
groups (younger and older than the infant sample median age) and adults. 
b) Resulting discrimination ellipses across a range of alpha criterion for 
younger, older, and adult participants in the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity 
diagram. Axis ratios are calculated from ellipses (c) plotted in a normalised 
version of the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram. In both 5.3b and 
5.3c, ellipses fitted from thresholds extracted at lower alphas are redder in 
colour, and those from higher alphas are bluer in colour.  d) Axis ratios as a 
function of alpha with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
 
For our primary analysis we fit discrimination ellipses for three groups, two infant 
samples split above and below the median age (younger infants: N=30, Mage= 4.55 
months, SD=0.27, and older infants: N=30, Mage= 5.82 months, SD=0.51), and 
adults. From the fitted ellipses we quantify the asymmetry in colour discrimination 
by taking an axis ratio. This is the ratio of the length of the ellipse along the 
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negative diagonal to the length along the positive diagonal, in a normalised colour 
space in which the variances along the x and y axes are equated (Bosten et al., 
2015). If the axis ratio is greater than 1, then colour discrimination is relatively 
poor in a blue-yellow colour direction, aligned with the axis of maximum 
variability in the colours of natural scenes. 
We were able to achieve very clear group psychometric functions for each of the 
three age groups and for each hue (Figure 5.3a). One obvious difference between 
the groups is in the position of asymptotes. For adults, performance quickly 
asymptotes close to 100%. For younger infants the asymptotes is at about 30-40% 
and for older infants at about 50-60%. This large difference means that any 
particular performance criterion (alpha) would fall on very different parts of the 
psychometric function for different groups. This prompted us to extract thresholds 
at different alphas, and to fit different discrimination ellipses to each set of 
thresholds at different alphas. Figure 5.3b shows the results of this analysis: for all 
three age groups, axis ratio is large at low alphas and then decreases as a function 
of alpha.  
The large axis ratios show that for all three age groups colour discrimination is 
selectively poor in a blue-yellow colour direction, as would be expected if colour 
vision is aligned with the statistics of natural scenes. Figure 5.3c shows axis ratio 
as a function of threshold alpha. For infants, axis ratios are large at low alphas 
(2.82 for younger infants at alpha=8%, 2.04 for older infants at alpha=8%), but as 
alpha increases they tend towards 1. Adults show the same decrease in axis ratio 
with alpha as infants, but maintain an axis ratio larger than one at all alphas. The 
figures show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for each group: for older 
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infants at the lower alphas the confidence intervals do not include 1, indicating 
that population mean shows worse discrimination along the blue-yellow axis than 
along the orthogonal axis. We conducted similar analyses at the level of individual 
participants for all infants as one group and all adults as another group (for details 
see Appendix B). Here, we found that there is a significant effect of alpha on axis 
ratio for both infants (Skillings-Mack, T(19)=274.64, p=<.001) and adults (χ2(19) = 
31.47, p =. 025).   
We propose that the strong dependence of axis ratio on alpha that we observe for 
infants is because visual factors limit performance at the lower reaches of the 
infant psychometric function. At low alphas, where there is the greatest degree of 
uncertainty in perceptual decision-making, infants are relying on tiny visual 
signals to generate an above-chance performance. However, at high alphas the size 
of the visual signal is sufficient for detection, but performance is still significantly 
below 100%. We propose that at these high alphas other factors such as attention, 
motivation and gaze control are what limits performance. This account fits well 
with the idea that colour discrimination is tuned to scene statistics: where visual 
processes are most important in determining colour thresholds, the chromatic bias 
in detection performance is most aligned with the distribution of colours in natural 
scenes.  
Our results show that like adults, infants show a bias in colour discrimination in a 
direction predicted from the distributions of colours in natural scenes, maybe as 
early as 4 months of age. Even though there is a significant increase in colour 
discrimination performance with age (see Appendix B, 8.4), the discrimination 
ellipses show no evidence for development in the degree of bias (figure 5.3b). Our 
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results are compatible with two schemes: either bias in colour discrimination is 
innate, perhaps calibrated to natural scene statistics neurogenetically, or that it 
develops very early by calibration to the statistics of natural scenes, between the 
ages of 2-3 months (when trichromacy first develops) and 4 months (the age of the 
youngest infants in our sample).  
Our finding that colour discrimination bias is a function of threshold criterion 
(alpha) for all three age groups has important implications for psychophysics. The 
choice of alpha in psychophysical analysis is arbitrary, but there are conventions 
that are commonly applied. For example, in a 4-alternative forced-choice task the 
81% point is often selected as the threshold criterion (Watson and Pelli, 1983) Our 
finding implies that the choice of alpha may have a significant impact on the 
conclusions of psychophysical studies, and that actually a lower alpha than is 
typically chosen may better isolate the sensory processes that psychophysicists are 
interested in.  
The relationship between axis ratio and alpha that we have observed would not 
have been apparent if we had not measured full psychometric functions. Typically 
in infant studies, discrimination performance is measured using the ‘preferential 
looking’ technique, where gaze duration in the presence and absence of a stimulus 
is compared statistically. This typically results in one number to decide whether a 
given target is above or below threshold (seen versus not seen).  Discrimination 
thresholds measured using preferential looking for infants of different ages are 
broadly comparable with our own, but owing to the time consuming nature of the 
method, are available for only a limited number of colour axes (see Appendix B, 
8.5). Our method of measuring detection performance using eye movements (see 
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also Jones, Braddick, Atkinson, & Nardini, 2015) is more efficient, allowing 
measurement of performance at a greater number of points and full psychometric 
functions, as is good practice for psychophysics in adults.  
Our results provide the first evidence that post-receptoral vision is aligned to 
natural scene statistics in early infancy. A major finding in colour vision science is 
that the L-, M- and S- cones are optimally spectrally positioned to extract colour 
information from the natural world.  If the alignment that we see in infants is 
achieved by neurogenetic calibration, then there must be genetic optimisation 
post-receptorally as well.  If the aligning process is ontogenetic, then the infant 
brain must be able to extract and calibrate to statistical information within a 
matter of months. This revises previous research which has only demonstrated 
statistical optimisation of perception later in infancy for social or linguistic stimuli.  
To distinguish these theoretically important accounts, future research will need to 
apply our methods to genetically similar infants living in radically different visual 
environments.  Our additional psychophysical finding that different processes 
predominate at different regions of the psychometric function has implications for 
interpreting prior and future psychophysical data on a broad range of perceptual 
processes.   
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7. Appendix A- Supplementary information for Paper 1.  
 
7.1. Discrimination and novelty preference 
The definition of categorization is that ‘discriminable stimuli are treated 
equivalently’ (p. 52, Quinn, 2003).  One possibility is that a lack of a novelty 
preference could indicate that infants cannot actually see the difference between 
colours rather than indicate that infants can discriminate the colours but treat 
them equivalent in memory. We predicted, on the basis of a study of infant 
chromatic thresholds (Knoblauch et al, 2001), that all chromatic differences should 
be discriminable for infants since all chromatic differences were larger than the 
average chromatic discrimination threshold at 4-months (threshold estimated to 
be 21∆E units in CIELAB colour space (Knoblauch et al, 2001): the smallest 
difference in the current study was 28∆E and the average was 62.38 ∆E for the 
smaller pairs and 109.47 for the larger pairs. However, there are difficulties in 
inferring discriminability from other studies which used different stimuli (e.g., 
Knoblauch’s estimates were for chromatic differences from neutral along protan, 
deutan and tritan axes, and the threshold estimates also had a good deal of 
variability).  In addition, even if all chromatic differences were above chromatic 
thresholds, it is possible that those stimuli with novelty preferences are more 
perceptually dissimilar.  Therefore, in order to further understand the relationship 
between discrimination, perceptual similarity and novelty preference we take two 
approaches.  First, we investigated the relationship between infants’ novelty 
preferences and the similarity of colours by testing whether the size of colour 
differences in a perceptual colour space and adult similarity ratings of the colours 
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predicted infants’ novelty preferences.  Second, we made additional measurements 
which directly tested infant discrimination of four of the colour pairs (two with 
novelty preferences and two without) to check that colours which failed to elicit a 
novelty preference could be discriminated in other contexts, and to assess the 
relationship between discriminability and novelty preference.   
 
7.1.1. Measurements of discrimination and perceptual similarity for stimulus pairs 
We tested discrimination and perceptual similarity using a target detection 
task developed by Franklin, Pilling and Davies (2005). In our target detection task 
a coloured target is seen on a coloured background and eye-movements are 
recorded with an eye-tracker to measure how well infants can discriminate the 
target from the background. Low-pass luminance noise was added so that the 
target could only be detected on the basis of the chromatic difference of target and 
background and not on the basis of luminance (colours were isoluminant for the 
average adult observer which is a good estimate of infant isoluminance 
(Pereverzeva, Hui-Lin Chen, Plamer, & Teller, 2002). The task was also made to be 
gaze-contingent such that a visual and auditory reward was played when the 
target was fixated and the next trial commenced automatically following target 
fixation (as in Jones et al, 2013). Four stimulus pairs were tested from green-
yellow and purple-red regions. For both regions, two adjacent pairs were sampled, 
one pair with a novelty preference and one without. We check whether these pairs, 
which include two of the smallest chromatic differences (in CIELAB), can be 
discriminated in the context of the target detection task, and compare the 
perceptual similarity of the colour pairs.  
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Of course, if infants can discriminate the colours in the context of the target 
detection task it does not necessarily indicate that they can be discriminated when 
seen in the context of the novelty preference task as the spatial characteristics of 
the task differ.  As the stimulus pairs in the target detection are abutting as figure 
and ground, this could lower discrimination thresholds on the task relative to the 
test phase of the novelty preference task where the two different stimuli were 
surrounded by a neutral ground. Unfortunately, in infants it is not possible to 
measure discrimination of two stimuli using looking measures when the stimuli 
are shown side by side on a neutral ground as in the novelty preference task but 
without a familiarization phase. Infants may look longer at one stimulus than the 
other which would indicate discrimination, but may not have a looking preference 
and still be able to discriminate them (e.g., be able to discriminate blue and red but 
look at them equally). However, the target detection task does provide a measure 
of relative perceptual similarity across the colour pairs. If novelty preferences are 
based on how different colours look rather than their categorical relationship, then 
the pairs for which there were novelty preferences should have greater target 
fixation than the pairs with no novelty preference.         
 
7.1.2.  Methods 
7.1.2.1.  Participants.   
 
Twelve 4-6 month old infants took part, with 2 infants excluded due to 
infant fussiness.   The final sample (8 males) had a mean age of 22.63 weeks (SD 
2.65). All infants had a birth weight greater than 2500g and no known visual or 
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neurological conditions.  
 
7.1.2.2. Apparatus and Stimuli.   
 
There were four stimulus pairs, sampled from the main experiment from 
green-yellow (2.5Y-10Y; 10Y-7.5GY) and blue-purple regions (2.5 P-10P; 10P-
7.5RP). The luminance and chromaticity co-ordinates (CIE x,y,Y, 1931) of the 
Munsell stimuli and the grey background for the novelty preference task were 
measured with a photospectrometer (spectrascan PR6500) in the viewing booth 
and under the same lighting conditions as the novelty preference task.  These x,y,Y 
were then rendered on a calibrated 22-in. Mitsubishi DiamondPlus 2070SB 
Diamondtron CRT monitor with a resolution of 1600 x 3 x 1200 pixels, 24-bit 
colour resolution, and a refresh rate of 100 Hz. Stimuli were displayed via a PC 
driven Cambridge Research Systems ViSaGe MKII Stimulus Generator. Stimuli were 
shown as a coloured circular target (which subtended a visual angle of 6.9°), on a 
coloured background which filled the entire screen, with low pass luminance noise 
(12 cd/m2). The experiment took place in a blacked-out booth with the monitor 
being the only source of light.  Eye-movements were recorded with an Eyelink 
1000 eye-tracker (SR-Research), placed immediately in front and below the 
monitor, and the central point of the monitor screen was at the participants’ eye-
level at a distance of 35 cm.  Participants were sat in a car seat that was fixed to a 
stable chair.  
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7.1.2.3.  Design and Procedure. 
 
 Infants were shown a cartoon whilst the eye-tracker was focused on their 
eye, and this was followed by a four-point calibration. On each trial, the coloured 
target was displayed simultaneously with the coloured background up until target 
fixation but not longer than 2250 ms. Fixation was defined as 160ms of continuous 
looking at one point, as in Jones et al (2014). If the target was fixated, the program 
automatically displayed a smiley schematic face in the same location as the target 
(of the same size, with eyes and mouth defined in gray) and a simple melody was 
played for 500ms. Following this, or after 2250 ms if there was no target fixation, 
the next target and background were presented, with the target location 
constrained with the target positioned at a random location 6.9° of visual angle 
from the infants’ initial point of fixation (Jones et al, 2014). If infant gaze strayed 
from the screen, the trial was discounted, a looming and contracting black and 
white attention getter was displayed centrally and the next trial was onset once the 
attention getter was fixated. In addition to the four stimulus pairs from the novelty 
preference task, and a condition where the target and background were the same 
colour (7.5 B) in order to estimate chance performance on the task.  The allocation 
of each colour in a stimulus pair as target or background was counterbalanced, and 
trial order was randomized. Trials continued until infant looking at the screen 
waned or until a maximum of 120 trials had been completed.   
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7.1.3. Results and Discussion 
 
The percentage of trials where the target was fixated was calculated for the 
four green-yellow and purple-red stimulus pairs (hit rate), and the condition 
where target and background were identical (guess rate). Figure 7.1 gives the 
guess rate and the hit rates for the four pairs (left side of the figure) with the 
novelty preferences for the same pairs from the main experiment for comparison 




Figure 7.1.  The average percentage of targets fixated (left side of figure) for the 
four pairs tested in the target detection task, with novelty preferences from 
the main experiment for comparison (right side of figure).  The dashed line 
in each panel indicates chance performance (also indicated by the guess 
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rate in the target fixation panel). Asterix indicate pairs for which the 
evidence was in favor of H1 when compared to chance.   
 
Bayesian paired samples t-tests (with a Cauchy prior of 0.707) revealed that for all 
four pairs the target was fixated at a rate greater than chance, meaning that all four 
colour pairs were discriminable: 7.5GY-10Y, t(9)=3.13, p=.01, B=5.32; 10Y-2.5Y, 
t(9)=2.77, p=.02, B=3.31; 2.5P-10P, t(9)=8.04, p<.001, B=1081.83; 10P-7.5RP, 
t(9)=6.11, p<.001, B=175.26. Moreover, fixation was not more likely for the two 
pairs which elicited novelty preferences (7.5GY-10Y & 10P-7.5RP, mean=42.18, 
SD=18.41) than the two pairs which did not (10Y-2.5Y & 2.5P-10P, mean=41.98, 
SD=5.85), t(9)=.09, p=.93, B=.31.  These findings clearly show that colour 
differences which failed to elicit a novelty preference are discriminable by infants 
in other contexts. Even if the context of the target detection task enhances 
discriminability, novelty preferences are unlikely to be simply related to 
perceptual similarity since targets for colour pairs with greater novelty preference 
were not always fixated at a greater rate than colour pairs with no novelty 
preference.   
 
In sum, we show here that infants’ novelty preferences are unlikely to be due to 
discriminability or perceptual similarity as: i) all colour differences were above 
estimated average chromatic thresholds; ii) novelty preferences do not relate to 
chromatic differences in perceptual colour space, and iii) chromatic differences 
which failed to elicit a novelty preference are discriminable in other contexts and 
not always detected more readily than chromatic differences with a novelty 
preference.  We therefore suggest that infants’ pattern of novelty preference 
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indicates that infant colour memory is governed by the categorical relationship of 
the colours. 
 
The current study demonstrates that colour categories affect infant hue memory.  
Another question is whether colour categories themselves affect perception 
(categorical perception, Franklin, Pilling, & Davies, 2005). That question is 
different to the one addressed in the target detection experiment outlined above.  
The experiment above seeks to obtain a measure of perceptual similarity to see 
whether perceptual similarity rather than categories can account for infants’ 
novelty preferences. An experiment that tested categorical perception would need 
to instead equate same- and different-category chromatic differences in 
discrimination and see whether categories affect perceptual similarity. Franklin et 
al. found that coloured target detection was faster when on different- than same-
category coloured backgrounds, when the chromatic differences were equated in 
CIE perceptual colour space (Franklin, Pilling, & Davies, 2005). However, as 
discussed above, it is an assumption that adult and infant perceptual colour spaces 
are similar, and equating stimuli in discrimination rather than perceptual 
similarity would be more logical for testing categorical perception. One approach 
which may clarify whether colour categories affect infant perceptual similarity 
would be to equate same- and different-category colour differences in the number 
of just-noticeable differences and then test whether the categorical status affects 
target detection when chromatic differences are suprathreshold. This approach 
was adopted by (He, Witzel, Forder, Clifford, & Franklin, 2014) to investigate the 
time course of colour category effects in adults, and when colours were equated in 
just noticeable differences (JNDs), colour categories affected post-perceptual 
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processing around 200 ms from stimulus onset. Now that the current investigation 
has identified infants’ categorical distinctions, the approach taken by He et al. can 
be applied to infants. 
7.2.  A priori preference 
Infants have a priori preferences for looking longer at some hues (e.g., reds 
and blues) than others (e.g., yellow-greens) (e.g., Franklin et al, 2008; Franklin, 
Bevis, Ling, & Hurlbert, 2010; Zemach & Teller, 2007; Brown & Lindsey, 2013). The 
current study controlled for such a priori preferences by counterbalancing across 
infants which stimulus was novel for each pair of stimuli. Due to this 
counterbalancing, preference for a certain hue (e.g., blue) is unlikely to account for 
novelty preference for a stimulus pair (e.g., blue and green) as half of the infants 
saw a given hue as the novel colour and half as the familiar hue – when novelty 
preference is averaged across infants the effect of any a priori preferences should 
cancel out (Franklin, 2009). Mean novelty preferences were in fact highly similar 
irrespective of which stimulus in each pair was novel and which was familiar: the 
discrepancy in novelty preference was on average only 5%.  In addition, a priori 
preferences are unlikely to account for novelty preferences as a priori hue 
preference in infants varies smoothly with hue and therefore two similar hues are 
unlikely to elicit a large difference in looking times (Brown & Lindsey, 2013).  An 
analysis was conducted to confirm that a priori preferences could not account for 
variation in novelty preference across stimulus pairs. The average looking time at 
each hue during the familiarization phase was used as an index of a priori 
preference.  Looking time during the familiarization phase is a valid index of a 
priori preference as prior research has established that infants’ a priori 
   
175 
 
   
 
preferences for hues are comparable whether hues are presented singly (as in the 
familiarization phase) or as pairs (as in the test phase) (Bornstein, 1975).  The 
average familiarization looking time at a stimulus (during either the first trial or 
across all familiarization trials) did not predict infants’ novelty preference for that 
stimulus, largest R2 = .004, smallest p=.38, largest B=.14. Likewise, the difference in 
average familiarization looking time for the two stimuli in each pair did not predict 
the variation in novelty preference across pairs, R2 = .009, smallest p=.19, largest 
B=.22.    
       
7.3. Familiarization and novelty preference 
Figure 7.2 provides the average looking time at hue during the 8 
familiarization trials and the novelty preference scores for pairs of adjacently 
sampled hues (adjacent pairs) and larger hue pairs which straddle pairs where no 
novelty preference was found (large pairs). A repeated measures ANOVA with hue 
(14 levels) and trial (8 levels) as factors revealed a linear trend for trial, 
F(7,1148)= 53.965, p=<.001, B=3.29E+74, on infant looking time during the 
familiarization phase. There was no interaction of trial and hue, F(14,164) 1.28, 
p=.225, B=.002). 
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Figure 7.2. (A) Infant looking time during the familiarization trials averaged across 
hues (+/-1se). (B) Novelty preference percentages (+/-1se) for pairs of 
adjacently sampled hues (pairs on left of vertical dashed line in figure) and 
larger hue pairs which straddle smaller pairs (pairs on right of vertical 
dashed line in figure). Asterisk indicate novelty preferences which produce 
a Bayes factor in Support of H1 relative to H0 (B>3), with equal looking at 
novel and familiar hues indicated by the dashed line at 50%. Munsell codes 
of hues of each pair are given. 
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7.4. Analysis of WCS centroids 
To investigate the hypothesis that infant colour categories are organized 
around hues that are commonly central to lexical categories, we conducted an 
analysis using the WCS naming centroids (the number of times that the hue is at 
the center of a WCS lexical category when plotted in a perceptual colour space 
(CIELAB)). If infant colour categories do capture the common centers of lexical 
categories revealed by the WCS, then the hue pairs which are categorically 
different for infants (indicated by pairs with novelty preference) should span hues 
which are infrequently at the centers of lexical categories (i.e. coincide 
infrequently with category centroids when counted across WCS languages). We 
investigated whether the combination of 5 pairs for which we find novelty 
preference optimally avoids category centroids (centroid frequencies were taken 
from ref 8). We consider the 13 adjacent stimuli pairs from row G, hue columns: 
(3,6), (6,9), (9,12), (12,15), (15,18), (18,21), (21,24), (24,27), (27,30), (30,33), 
(33,36), (36,39), (39,2). The 5 pairs corresponding to infant novelty preferences 
are: (3,6), (12,15), (21,24), (30,33), (36-39). 
 
A simple means to quantitatively assess how well the infant preferences align with 
the WCS naming centroids is to assign a score to this particular configuration: the 
total number of centroids between the 5 stimuli pairs (excluding the stimuli 
column centroid counts). In this case, the score would be the sum of the centroid 
frequencies for hue columns (4,5), (13,14), (22,23), (31,32), (37,38). We can then 
examine how well this particular configuration of 5 hue pairs (corresponding to 
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the infant novelty preferences) ranks against any of the 1287 possible 
combinations of 5 hue pairs, by computing the score of each of these 
configurations. To do so, we first computed the naming centroids over all 110 
languages in the WCS, following Kay and Regier (2003). We then explicitly 
computed the score for all 1287 possible combinations of 5 hue pairs, using the 
centroid counts along the stimulus row that we sampled from (row G). We found 
that only 4.27% of the 5 pair combinations (55/1287) resulted in a lower total 
centroid count than the 5 pairs which infants had novelty preferences for (i.e., 
more optimally captured hues that are not central to lexical categories).  
 
Additionally, we used the peak centroid counts for each hue at any lightness level 
so that the centroid peaks seen in figure 7.3 are captured in the analysis. We found 
that only 3.26% (42/1287) of the combinations resulted in a lower total centroid 
count than the 5 pairs which infants had novelty preferences for. For this peak 
centroid analysis, the best 5 pair combination that had the lowest centroid count 
included 4 of the 5 pairs for which infants showed a novelty preference, and only 
the blue-green pair differed (the best combination included the pair adjacent to 
and bluer than the blue-green pair for which infants showed a novelty preference).  
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Figure 7.3. The full WCS stimulus grid and centroid analysis. A. WCS stimulus grid 
for 40 hues at 8 lightness levels. Stimuli in the current experiment were sampled 
from row G. B. Centroid analysis from Kay & Regier, 2003. The black and grey 
contour lines indicate the number of speaker centroids falling at that point in the 
stimulus grid from WCS data, with the outermost contour representing 100 
centroids and each subsequent inner contour representing an increment in 100 
centroids. Infant novelty preferences are indicated by the gaps in the thick black 
horizontal line at row G.  
 
7.5. Stimulus positions in a perceptually uniform colour space 
A series of regressions found that differences in CIE hue, CIE chroma and 
Euclidean difference in CIELAB perceptual colour space (figure 8.4) as predictors 
of novelty preference did not predict novelty preference (largest R2=.072, smallest 
p=.31, B=3.28E-10). In addition, a sample of 40 adults (5 males, mean age = 21.17 
years (SD=1.37) rated the similarity of hue pairs twice using a line rating scale, and 
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Figure 7.4. Stimuli plotted in CIELAB perceptual colour space. Stimulus pairs for 
which there was no novelty preference are indicated with black lines 
joining the stimuli, and pairs where there was a novelty preference are 
indicated by the absence of these lines. The cross between 7.5R and 5R 
indicates a pair that was not tested. Euclidean distances in this space do not 
predict infants’ novelty preference.  
This analysis indicates that the colour pairs which infants do not distinguish in 
recognition memory are not the smaller chromatic differences in adult perceptual 
colour space which adults find more dissimilar than other pairs. However, one 
possibility is that infant perceptual colour space at 4-6 months is different to that 
of adults (even in adults CIELAB is not perfectly uniform for large chromatic 
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differences (Wyszecki & Stiles, 2000). A difference in infant and adult perceptual 
colour space would need to be radical to be able to account for the pattern of 
novelty preferences in our data since there was even no novelty preference for 
pairs with very large CIELAB differences. However, a radical difference between 
infants and adults is perhaps unexpected since infants are known to be 
trichromatic by at least 3-months (e.g., Knoblauch et al, 2001) mean adult 
isoluminance is a good approximation of infant isoluminance (Pereverzeva, Hui-
Lin Chien, Palmer & Teller, 2002) and based on chromatic thresholds on protan, 
deutan and tritan axes their perceptual colour space could be predicted to be 
similar to that of adults albeit with poorer sensitivity (Knoblauch et al, 2001).  
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8. Appendix B - Supplementary information for Paper 4.  
 
8.1. Method and analysis 
8.1.1. Participants 
 
Sixty four infants (age range=4.01-6.80 months, mean age= 5.18 months, 
SD= 0.76 months) took part in the experiment. Four infants were excluded from 
the study due to fussiness preventing them from proceeding past the calibration 
phase of the study. All participants were born at 37 +/-2 weeks, met a minimum 
birth weight of 2500g, had no known visual deficits, and no history of epilepsy.  
 
Nineteen adult participants were recruited by experimenters (13 female, mean 
age= 26.42 years). Participants had normal colour vision as assessed by the 
Ishihara pseudoisochromatic plates (38 plate edition) and the Lanthony tritan 
album, and all had normal or corrected vision. 
 
8.1.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
 
Target stimuli were coloured circles that subtended a visual angle of 6.9° on 
a surround metameric with equal energy white that subtended a visual angle of 
41°. The chromatic difference between target and surround was isoluminant for 
the standard observer (Stockman, MacLeod & Johnson). In order to prevent 
individual participants detecting the target via a residual luminance difference, 
low-pass luminance noise was added over the whole display. The mean luminance 
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of both target and background was 28 cdm-2, and luminance noise was linearly 
distributed to range between 10% of the mean. The chromaticities of the target 
stimuli varied in saturation along 8 axes within a version the MacLeod-Boynton 
(1979) chromaticity diagram based on the Stockman MacLeod and Johnson (1993) 
cone fundamentals. The centre of our stimulus space was a point metameric with 
equal energy white (the background chromaticity), and there were 8 points per 
axis (64 points in total) increasing in saturation away from the centre. Four of the 
axes were the cardinal directions in the MacLeod-Boynton chromaticity diagram; 
two axes were in the blue-yellow direction (the cerulean line), and two axes were a 
reflection of this line through the vertical axis of the MacLeod-Boynton 
chromaticity diagram.  
For adults, stimuli were spaced logarithmically along these axes, to focus the 
collection of data closest to where adult threshold levels were expected to be. For 
infants stimuli were sampled in equal steps along each axis (Figure 8.1). Due to 
infants’ lower discriminability thresholds (Knoblauch et al, 2001) stimuli were 
sampled from a wider range of chromaticities than adults.  
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Figure 8.1. Infant (left) and adult (right) target chromaticities along the 8 
individual axes presented in a version of the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity 
diagram. Towards the centre of the figure, colours are less saturated, 
increasing in saturation radially along the axes. 
 
Stimuli were presented on a Diamond Pro 2070SB CRT Monitor (Mitsubishi, 
Tokyo, Japan) via a PC-driven ViSaGe MKII Stimulus Generator (Cambridge 
Research Systems Ltd, Rochester, UK). Eye-movement data was recorded via a SR 
Research Eyelink 1000 system, and the experimental programme was run in 
MATLAB (R2016a, The MathWorks Inc., Nantucket, MA). The system was gamma-
corrected using a LS-100 luminance meter (Konica-Minolta, Tokyo, Japan), and the 
colour calibration achieved using a spectrascan PR655 spectroradiometer (Photo 




Infant participants were seated in a car seat mounted in a chair 60cm from 
the screen, and watched a cartoon on screen during camera set up, and then 
completed a 9-point spatial calibration. If necessary (e.g. if participants moved a 
lot), participant eye-movements were recalibrated during testing. 
Before each trial, participants were presented with a blank screen of luminance 
noise (duration), 250ms. Targets appeared within 6.9o of the participants’ current 
fixation point to the display.  If participants fixated the target (or a 1 o area around 
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the target) for 160ms, this was recorded as a successful fixation (a ‘hit’), and the 
target was replaced with an image of a smiley face, and a short musical tune was 
played.  If the target was not fixated within 2250 ms, no auditory or visual reward 
was played, and a miss was recorded (see figure 9.2). 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Example trial procedure. Participants are presented with a blank screen 
of luminance noise for 250ms before a target is presented. If fixated for a 
minimum of 160ms, the target is replaced by a smiley face, and a noise is 
played, and is recorded as a ‘hit’ for this trial. After another blank display of 
luminance noise, the next target is displayed and is not fixated within 
2250ms, no reward is played, and the next trial starts.  
If participants’ gaze left the screen, a looming black and white spiral accompanied 
by a loud noise was played to refocus infants’ visual attention to the screen. Once 
the participant was centrally fixated, the experimenter pressed a key to allow trials 
to start again.  
For adult participants, trials were presented as 10 blocks of 64 trials (total 640 
trials), testing duration was approximately 30 minutes. During each block of trials, 
each chromaticity was presented once, in a random order, resulting in each 
chromaticity being presented 10 times to each participant. Participants were told 
that their task was to continually search for and look at targets on the screen. 
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In order to encourage maximum engagement with the task for infants, informed by 
pilot testing (N=4), 3/10 trials presented a maximally saturated stimulus. Stimuli 
were presented in blocks of 64, and testing was continued until the infant became 
disengaged with the task. 
 
8.2.  Data and analysis 
 
8.2.1. Infant Data 
 
 
For analysis at group level, infants were split by median age into two groups 
(younger and older). Details of the total number of trails completed by each infant 
group and mean proportion of ‘seen’ targets are given below.  
 
Table 1. The mean proportion of targets seen (‘hits’) across all trials by all infants, 
younger, and older infants.  
Group Mean age months (SD) Mean proportion of ‘hit’ 
trials (SD) 
All infants 5.18 (0.76) 0.24 (0.15) 
Younger infants 4.55 (0.27) 0.20 (0.13) 
Older infants 5.82 (0.51) 0.29 (0.15) 
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Figure 8.3. Histograms of the total number of trials completed by all infants 
younger infants (left, N=30), and older infants (right, N=30). 
 
8.2.2. Infant and adult data fitting 
 
 
 Psychometric functions were fitted using a local linear fit (Żychaluk, & 
Foster, 2009), and were best fit using a logit fit for infants, and a Weibull fit for 
adult data. Lapse rate was included as a free parameter.  
The guess rate parameters were estimated from empirical data on similar tasks. 
Infant guess rates were taken from data from 13 infants of a similar age range to 
the current study who participated in a target detection task in Skelton et al. 
(2017). In that version of the task, chromatic targets were presented on a 
chromatic background, including a proportion of trials which presented a target on 
a background of equal chromaticity. The infant guess rate in the current study is 
taken from the number of targets fixated and recorded as a ‘hit’ on this version of 
the task: 13 targets seen from 170 targets presented, around 8%.  
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Adult guess rate was estimated from adults (n=5) who completed a version of the 
target detection task described in 9.1. The targets in this control task were from a 
limited sample drawn randomly from the stimuli set used in paper 4, with the 
addition of targets with the same chromaticity as the background. Guess rates for 
adults are estimated from the number of trials fixated on trials where chromaticity 
and background are the same: 136 targets seen of 690 presented, around 20%.  
 
8.3. Individual participant analysis 
8.3.1. Individual infant analysis 
 
In order to fit individual infant ellipses for participants, data from the two 
hue angles which make up the blue-yellow axis (132o and 312o) were collapsed 
together, and a psychometric function was fitted. The same was also done for the 
two hue angles in positive diagonal (48o and 228o). As a result there were a greater 
number of data points for each saturation along the positive and negative 
diagonals than when fitting to individual hue angles, improving the ability to fit 
psychometric functions for each infants’ data.    
Three infants were excluded from this analysis as despite collapsing along the 
axes, they did not have enough points to fit an appropriate psychometric function 
to their data. As with the group level analysis, different axis ratios were extracted 
from different alpha criterion (see figure 9.4. for an example of the psychometric 
functions and axis ratio variation with alpha of a single infant participant).  It was 
not always possible to fit an appropriate ellipse for each infant at each alpha 
criterion, and axis ratios which were particularly large (above 10) or small (below 
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0.1) were excluded from analysis. As a result, the number of participants with 
individual ellipses fitted within an alpha criterion ranged from 30 to 51 (see table 
9.2. for details of the sample size at each alpha level).  
 
Figure 8.4. Example of an individual infants psychometric functions along the 
negative (48-228) and positive (132-312) diagonals diagonals of the 
MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram, and the resulting axis ratios as a 
function of alpha. 
 
When axis ratios are extracted from individual infants, there was a main effect of 
alpha on axis ratio (figure 8.4.), with lower alphas resulting in larger axis ratios 
(Skillings-Mack, T(19)=274.64, p=<.001). Wilcoxon signed rank tests with a 
bonferroni correction, showed axis ratios were significantly different to 1 between 
alpha levels of 0.19 and 0.22 (table 8.2.) 
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Figure 8.5. Axis ratios from 57 infants across varying alphas. Error bars +/- 1 
standard error. Asterisk indicates that axis ratios are significantly different 
to 1. For significance and sample size details, see table 9.2.  
 
Table 8.2. Results of the Wilcoxon Signed Rank one sample test against 1 for infant 
individual ellipses across alphas. Corrected for multiple comparisons, the critical 
value for p is .0025, asterisks indicate values which meet this criterion.  
Alpha criterion (2 d.p.) Final n of 
sample 
Z p 
0.05 30 2.09 .037 
0.08 37 2.59 .010 
0.11 45 2.91 .004 
0.14 48 2.82 .005 
0.17 50 2.82 .005 
0.19 51 2.82 .002 * 
0.22 53 3.05 .002 * 
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0.25 53 3.14 .003 
0.28 52 2.96 .003 
0.31 52 3.01 .005 
0.34 51 2.81 .009 
0.37 51 2.63 .012 
0.40 51 2.51 .013 
0.43 50 2.50 .028 
0.46 50 2.20 .063 
0.48 51 1.86 .060 
0.51 51 1.88 .058 
0.51 51 1.90 .076 
0.57 51 1.76 .072 
0.60 51 1.80 .093 
 
 
8.3.2. Individual adult analysis 
 
Due to the large number of trials adults completed (N=640) individual 
ellipses for adults could fitted in the same way as was done for the adult group 
analysis. Psychometric functions were fitted along each of the 8 axes, and 
saturation thresholds were extracted across varying alphas before fitting the 
ellipse in a normalised version of the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram. 
There was a main effect of alpha on axis ratios (Friedmans’ anova, χ2(19) = 31.47, 
p =. 025). Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing the axis ratios to 1 with a 
Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at p= .0026. Axis 
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ratios were significantly different to 1 at all alpha levels (Wilcoxon signed ranks, 
largest p= .001, Z=3.3).  
 
Figure 8.6. Means of individual axis ratios for adult participants at varying alpha 
criterion. Error bars +/- 1 SE. Axis ratios were significantly different to 1 at 
all alphas, as indicated by the asterisk.  
 
8.4. Developmental progression of saturation thresholds 
 
Another approach to assessing the development of the blue-yellow bias is to 
examine the developmental progression of saturation thresholds across the major 
axes of the MacLeod Boynton colour space. If development of the saturation 
thresholds of saturation thresholds along the blue-yellow axis is, for example, 
slower than the remaining axes, then this may suggest a gradual ‘tuning’ of the 
blue-yellow bias.  
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To investigate the developmental progression of saturation thresholds, data was 
collapsed across individual axes one the four major axes of the MacLeod Boynton 
chromaticity diagram; the two Cartesian axes (vertical and horizontal, 0o -180o, 
and 90o -270o), and the two intermediary axes (the blue-yellow axis and its 
reflection: 132o -312o , and 48o -228o ).  Thresholds were extracted from 
psychometric functions fitted using a local linear fit as described above (Żychaluk, 
& Foster, 2009). As with the main analysis, thresholds were extracted at different 
alpha levels. The thresholds across development were calculated with a moving 
age bracket which captured infant response across 5 time points across the age 
range of our sample of participants. 
Lower saturation thresholds are found across all ages at lower alpha levels than at 
higher alpha levels (figure 9.7.). Infant discrimination thresholds may be 
underestimated in psychophysical methods which use a single criterion.  The 
youngest infants’ thresholds plateau around an alpha of 35% as this is very close to 
the top of the psychometric function for these participants (see figure 5.3. in the 
main text for comparison of asymptotes of older and younger infants). This 
highlights that in interpreting the developmental progression of saturation 
thresholds across infancy, the co-development of attentional factors which can 
influence infant behaviour should also be considered.  
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Figure 8.7. Developmental progression of saturation thresholds along 4 major axes 
in the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram. See key in top left graph for 
details of the angles the major axes included, and a description of their 
location within the MacLeod Boynton chromaticity diagram. Each graph 
represents thresholds taken at a specific alpha, identified above each graph.  
 
Across all alpha levels, thresholds decrease across all four major axes. Qualitatively 
this rate of improvement in discrimination thresholds appears to be roughly 
equivalent across the four axes. Critically for the discussion of whether alignment 
to natural scene statistics progresses in early infancy, there does not appear to be 
evidence for a particular development of bias in thresholds along the blue-yellow 
axis across age.  
 
8.5. Comparison to Knoblauch et al (2001) 
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Previous studies have also measured chromatic discrimination thresholds 
in early development. Comparing discrimination thresholds recorded across 
studies can improve the accuracy of estimation of infant detection thresholds. Here 
we compare thresholds from the current study with those from Knoblauch et al 
(2001).  
There are significant differences between the current study and that of Knoblauch 
et al. Firstly, the two studies are very different in design. Knoblauch et al used a 
staircase procedure in a forced choice preferential looking paradigm where an 
experimenter blind to location judged if an infant was looking preferentially to the 
left or right of a screen. Secondly, Knoblauch et al measured thresholds along a 
smaller number of axes (along three colour directions; protan, deutan, and tritan).  
These differences do limit the extent to which it is possible to directly compare 
thresholds from the two studies, however, it does provide an insight into the 
variability found across methods in measuring infant thresholds. Figure 9.8. 
compares Knoblauch et al.’s data with  the discrimination ellipses measured in our 
study at two alpha levels, (the smallest and largest extracted). 
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Figure 8.8. Comparison of discrimination ellipses for older (blue ellipses) and 
younger (black ellipses) infants at two alpha levels (one small, one large; 
0.08 and 0.55) to threshold data from individual infant participants in 
Knoblauch et al (2001) along the protan (red), deutan (green), and tritan 
(blue) axes of colour vision. Blue ellipses show older infant group data, and 
black ellipses younger infant group data. Black cross and asterisk indicate 
the estimated thresholds of mean infants in the current study based on 
thresholds reported in Knoblauch et al.  
 
The largest discrimination ellipses fitted to the infants in our sample capture the 
majority of the highest thresholds measured in Knoblauch et al for infants aged 
below 6.8 months (the age of the oldest infant in our sample). This suggests that 
the two methods produce broadly compatible results. Often in studies if infant 
chromatic thresholds few directions are tested due to the nature of testing infant 
participants. One advantage of the target detection method presented in paper 4 is 
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that a wider range of directions in colour space can be tested with relative ease, 
with both individual and group level performance being possible, providing a 
potentially richer understanding of early perception.  A second advantage of the 
target detection task presented here is that both infants and adults complete the 
same task. Often when measuring discrimination thresholds, infants and adults 
tasks will be different (e.g. infants’ thresholds may be measured by preferential 
looking, whilst adults complete a 4AFC task). There is still, of course, a difference 
between adult and infant completion of the target detection task in paper 4 (adults 
having a greater understanding of what the task is for example, and can maintain 
attention for longer than infants). However, the target detection task does allow 
for a more in depth analysis including at varying alpha levels as opposed to having 
a single number as an output. This means we are able to consider the development 
of other limiting factors of infant performance as well as sensitivity when 
comparing across ages. The ability to do this shapes our understanding of the 
limiting factors on perception of colour across early development through to 
adulthood, and the relationship between the two.  
 
 
 
 
